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CHAPTER I
THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE IN AMERICAN CITIES
For half a century popular interest in city government in this
country has centered in the person and office of the municipal
executive. Both in matters of policy and of administration he
has commanded confidence to a far greater degree than has the
organ of legislation, the council. The result has been the rapid
decline of the latter and a corresponding growth in the power
and position of the executive. Not even the newer forms of
municipal organization have successfully stemmed the drift to-
ward executive domination. Mayors, commissioners, and man-
agers continue to attract the public interest in their plans and
activities while councils and commissions are passively tolerated
as necessary but unworthy of sustained attention.
The weakness of municipal government in this country has
long been bound up with the condition of the municipal council,
tho obviously not with that alone. The weakness of the legis-
lative organ as an object of citizen interest has seemed to be
fundamental. Whether due to bicameral organization, to the
council's lack of power, to legislative interference, to the ward
system, to the long ballot, to the executive veto, to traditions of
a corrupt and inefficient past, or to these and other reasons in
combination, the condition is one that apparently is of more vital
concern and is much more difficult to solve than is any deficiency
in administration. The American city seemingly has not devoted
to this situation the attention it deserves. Neither home rule,
commission government, manager government, the short ballot,
the abolition of wards, nor any of the many other reforms of
recent years have revived the municipal council to its alleged
rightful place in the mind of the citizen or in the conduct of
public affairs. The executive has resisted all the forces which
would normally have operated to restore the council to its prop-
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er power and prestige, and to subordinate administration to its
supervision and control.
The drift toward executive domination has been noted in many
fields of government in recent years. Presidential authority in
our national system increasingly forces Congress to do its will,
and executive usurpation is a frequent subject of protest on the
floors of the national legislature. The growing authority of the
British cabinet over the house of commons and the apparent ina-
bility of the latter to maintain the substance of the parliament-
ary system points to the triumph of the executive where the legis-
lative organs have been touted as omnipotent. The breakdown of
control by the council is apparent in Chicago where council gov-
ernment has made its last stand in the larger American cities.
Meetings of commissions in commission governed cities are not
objects of widespread public interest ; indeed, the very opposite is
notoriously the case. The city manager threatens to swallow up
the commission or council which selects him, and the meetings
which hear his reports and approve his recommendations do not
call forth those discussions of public policy or those criticisms of
public administration which reflect a vigorous and healthy legisla-
tive life. Whether one prefers it or not, the expanding activities
of modern government have reduced municipal councils no less
than national and state legislative organs to a condition of de-
pendence upon the executive. The predominance of the latter
in American city government is the outstanding fact of munici-
pal organization and operation.
Despite the multiplied demonstrations of the incapacity of
modern organs of legislation to deal with the problems of modern
government, orthodox opinion continues to cling to the notion
that the council should be the controlling factor in municipal
life. The fact that it is not dominant and probably will never
again be in control has not been fully appreciated. What is to
take its place is being determined by processes not subject to the
logic of theorists who worship the old order. Rather, there is
being worked out a popular forum which wisely or unwisely as-
sumes the responsibility of making decisions on questions of pub-
lic policy and which directly controls the executive to whom it
commits administrative affairs. Councils and other legislative
bodies may retain the shadow of authority, may still fill in the
details where the public at large has not voiced its will, may even
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select the administrative expert, but the responsibility of both
council and executive is immediately to the people and every
wise executive recognizes this fact.
If, then, there is being evolved some new form for the expres-
sion of democracy in which the people and the administrative
agencies are to constitute the most important factors and the
legislative organs are to be a less consequential feature than in
past municipal history, it is the part of wisdom to take stock of
the executive office in American municipalities today. The pub-
lic can intelligently determine its course only as it is familiar
with the situation now existing in administration. Too long the
processes of development-have gone on without an adequate an-
alysis of this situation, with the result that extravagant claims
have been made for this or that type of executive organization
and for one or another method of supervising administrative
agencies. It is in the hope of supplying in part such a survey of
the office of the municipal executive that this study is offered to
a public already aroused to progressive activity in municipal
affairs.
There are over two thousand American cities in which the
municipal executive is called by the title of mayor ; in approxi-
mately four hundred others he is known as president or mayor-
commissioner or as commissioner; and in less than one hundred
municipalities he is styled the city manager. The mayoralty ob-
tains in all but half a dozen of the larger and more important cit-
ies. It is the oldest of the three offices and until the opening of
the twentieth century was found in practically all American cit-
ies. The history of the mayor-commissionership and of the com-
missionership lies wholly within the present century and that of
the managership within the last decade. These facts impart sig-
nificance to the figures indicating the extent to which the newer
types of organization have been adopted. The favor with which
they have been greeted demonstrates the dissatisfaction with the
old order and the active character of the search for a municipal
constitution adapted to the twentieth century city. Such a con-
stitution must recognize two facts, viz., the dominating position
of the executive organ, and the immediate supervisory authority
of the municipal electorate in administration. The outlook for
a restored council is not promising and to those who long for
such a revival must appear positively discouraging. At best it
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will but share in the important decisions of public policy, the
executive and the electors playing the influential and decisive
parts. It may develop into a sort of electoral body to choose the
municipal executive; but as in school administration the execu-
tive, when chosen, will be actually responsible to the people and
will largely dictate the council's decisions.
The actual and the relative importance of the executive office
increases with the concentration of population in urban centers.
The heads of municipal administration often preside over popu-
lations aggregating hundreds of thousands and in some cases
millions. Three cities in this country rank higher in population
than do twenty-five of the states. Twenty-five cities have a high-
er population than do two of the states. Nine cities exceed and
eleven states fall below the half million mark. The office of
municipal executive is therefore frequently a commanding one
and vies in dignity and salary, tho not in authority, with the
governorship.
The spread and development of local autonomy undoubtedly
contributes to the importance of municipal office holding, and in
this accretion of strength the executive shares. "While it may be
truly urged that the relative importance of municipal chief mag-
istrates does not now appear to be much greater in the home rule
states than in others, it should be noted that the greater cities
are almost all located in the states where municipal home rule
does not obtain. One can hardly conceive of home rule for New
York City, Philadelphia, or Chicago without an accompanying
increase in the power and influence of the executive authority.
The electorate, however, will absorb the major portions of the
new strength conferred by a thoro-going regime of local self-
government. The so-called revival of the council is more appar-
ent than real.
Among recent developments which indicate a growing impor-
tance for the office under review there should be noted the appear-
ance of an executive consciousness on the part of the incumbents.
This is shown in the formation of leagues, associations, and simi-
lar organizations for the study of municipal problems. Many of
these organizations are the offspring of earlier associations of the
mayors. Their prominent and active members are principally
executives. National and sectional conferences of mayors have
been held, one for the consideration of public utility problems,
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the others dealing prominently with the question of national pre-
paredness. The city managers have a national organization and
hold annual conferences. The immediate results of these devel-
opments are not of such momentous importance, but the recog-
nition of a common interest in municipal and other problems of
the day and the effort to approach them semi-professionally in a
spirit of mutual helpfulness are highly significant of the place
of the municipal executive in American life.
The mayoralty is the most common and the most important
type of municipal executive organs. The mayor represents the
municipality in its dealings and relations as a corporate entity.
On behalf of the city he welcomes its distinguished visitors and
extends greetings to conventions and assemblies which gather
within its bounds. He delivers memorial and other addresses on
occasion, opens local festivals and pitches the first ball of the
baseball season. The mayor is marked for responsibility. The
office is immune from many of the weaknesses which appear in
every executive unit made up of more than one person.
Legally it usually lacks that basis in fundamental law which is
supplied the chief executive offices in state and nation ; its exist-
ence depends upon the will of the state legislatures and its
constitution and powers are defined in statute law, municipal
charters, and council ordinances. On the other hand the term
mayor is well worked into the political conceptions of the Amer-
ican public and even where changes of a radical nature are taking
place in municipal executive organization, the title often remains
to indicate the one who represents the unity, dignity, and author-
ity of the city.
The movement toward mayor government which was so con-
spicuous twenty-five years ago has subsided during recent years.
This movement had its origin and basis in the stress which mod-
ern municipal problems placed upon the administrative organi-
zation of the earlier council system. For the handling of these
problems there was necessary the directive force of some single
agent, together with the greater freedom of action and ease of
control which administrative unity made possible. The develop-
ment of the mayoralty followed, but it proved to be neither uni-
form nor adequate.
The forces which produced the mayor system are more potent
today than ever before. They have, however, taken more varied
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methods of attaining the desired administrative goal. Thus it is
that commission government and manager government have come
into being, and are successfully contesting with the mayor sys-
tem for the public favor. Both of these newer forms have made
spectacular growth and both have achieved remarkable results.
In the commission system the mayoralty remains, tho largely
shorn of its powers. In the manager form the mayor usually
disappears, tho in some eases remaining to perform the distinc-
tively political as differentiated from the business and adminis-
trative functions of the executive.
The evolution of the commission plan is proceeding steadily
and its application in larger cities will produce features and re-
sults not now foreseen. In its impact upon mayor government
it has undoubtedly stimulated and purified the latter and has,
perhaps, contributed to its permanence and 'Stability. At the
same time it has experienced a vigorous reaction in the strength-
ening of the mayoralty, in the demand for greater centraliza-
tion of administrative authority and responsibility and for the
separation of legislative and executive functions, in the increas-
ing need for expert administrators, and in the appearance of the
manager plan. It is significant also that in the commission form
the mayor-commissioner has a more favorable position than did
the mayor of a century ago. All the factors which have aided in
creating the mayor of today are either present to enhance that
position in commission government or are likely to appear as the
commission plan undergoes the test of metropolitan conditions.
In the manager plan the attempt to restore the municipal
council and the emphasis upon administration by experts are
features that constitute a sharp challenge to both the mayor and
the commission systems. The executive is apparently subordi-
nated to the council. Nevertheless, the history of government in
democracies evidences a tendency toward executive leadership.
Indeed, in our modern life with its large governmental constit-
uencies and its complex and highly technical problems it is
doubtful if any adequate form of municipal organization can be
devised which will assure efficiency and at the same time deny
executive leadership. There are those who believe that the city
manager, tho nominally elected by the council, will in fact be-
come the dominating factor in the regime of which he is a part,
and that the council will sink into practical subordination. The
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manager plan, on the other hand, is held to make possible a vig-
orous and responsible council operating in conjunction with a
trained and wide-awake executive, chosen because of his fitness,
and clothed with ample authority to control and direct the ad-
ministrative forces of the city. One may gauge the importance
attached to the coming of the manager form of municipal organi-
zation by the universal interest in its development and achieve-
ments. It is also significant that this form has supplanted the
mayor plan in the "model charter" prepared and presented by
a committee of the National Municipal League in 1915.
With the exception of the managership the municipal executive
office is largely devoid of standards indicating the fitness of the
holder for the performance of his duties. The mayoralty and
the mayor-commissionership alike are open to the good, bad, and
the indifferent, and in almost all cases to the untrained and to
the politically ambitious. The establishment of high standards
and traditions in the municipal service generally depends in no
small degree upon their establishment first in the office of the
chief executive. The prompt achievement of the latter task is
one of the problems before those who would retain the one or the
other of the above forms of organization.
It is not to be expected that the type or position of the munic-
ipal executive office will ever become uniform thruout the coun-
try. There is already considerable diversification in organization
and practice with respect to the office, and this is true of each
of the three principal systems. It is probable that this diversi-
fication will continue, especially as the principle of home rule
for cities comes to fuller definition and acceptance and permits
of experiments designed to meet the political conceptions and
conditions of the communities undertaking them. The progress
that has been made as a result of such experiments has nowhere
been more conspicuous than in the recent history of the munic-
ipal executive. Not a little of the strength and virility of the
commission and manager plans is due to the freedom and ease
with which cities have adapted them and developed them thru
local self-government. The experiences of the past and the ex-
periments of today may confidently be expected to stimulate and
hasten the evolution of more perfect organs for executing the
public will and administering the public business.
CHAPTER II
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
MAYORALTY
The term "mayor" is an ancient one. Originally it comes from
the Latin "magnus," being the comparative of that adjective,
but having the form
' '
mayor.
' '
It does not appear to have been
applied to the domain of city government by the Romans, tho an
officer called the "prefect" seemed to have exercised functions
much similar to those we commonly associate with the office of
mayor. The term gradually acquired political significance in
the kingdom of the Merovingian Franks. The chief officer of the
royal household was the major domus or mayor of the palace.
In the degeneracy of the Merovingian rulers came the opportuni-
ty of the mayors they became the chief officers of state and
finally usurped the royal title itself.
English Antecedents
The use of the term mayor became general wherever the
,Frankish influence was felt. Today forms of the word are found
in Germany, Portugal, France, Great Britain, and some of the
British Dominions. In Germany the "meier" exercises functions
similar to a bailiff, tho as a steward he may be a purely private
functionary. In Portugal the "maior" or "mayor" and in
France the "maire" are titles to which are attached a distinct
political significance. It is in England that the immediate ante-
cedents of the American mayor are to be found. Its beginnings
there are not fully known, being wrapt in the obscurity that
hides much of the origin of things in England. It is known that
the office existed de facto before it was recognized de jure in the
municipal charters. It is generally accepted by the authorities
that there was ho mayor in London prior to 1189, that there was
a mayor by 1193, and that the title was a Norman importation.
Norman influence in London was very strong and there was a
16
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tendency to copy French titles. The use of the term "mayor"
to designate the chief officer in cities had been extant in northern
France some years before 1189. The application of the title to
the portreeve, bailiff, or head officer of English cities and bor-
oughs certainly began under the Normans.
By 1216 some of the most advanced among the English towns
had succeeded in obtaining the charter right to elect their mayors.
This early emergence of the mayoralty gave it strength during
the following centuries when the organization of English munic-
ipal government was being definitely shaped, tho the perma-
nency of the title does not seem to have been assured until at
least the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century. While
Edward I, in organizing his parliament, seems to have recognized
the boroughs, he made the sheriff and not the mayor the return-
ing officer, thus indicating that no borough constitution of an in-
dependent character or fixed type had as yet come into existence.
The standard form of organization in municipalities was one
of the products of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and was
incomplete until the realization of the legal personality of the
municipal corporation. By the close of the fifteenth century,
however, the organization of municipal government had taken
permanent shape and the mayor was the chief magistrate. He
was one of the close corporation which the charter either created
or which custom had come to recognize, following some early
and successful usurpation, as having the right to exercise char-
ter powers. The general powers of these corporations differed
according to the respective charter terms and local practice. But
the form of English municipal government became fixed and re-
mained practically unchanged until long after the transplanting
of English stock and ideas to the shores of the New World.
In this early period of municipal history the obligation of
office holding was not unknown, and the custom of compelling the
one chosen as mayor to serve in that capacity was well estab-
lished. In the Cinque Ports and probably elsewhere a refusal
was punished by the demolition of the home of the delinquent.
In the case of London and other chartered cities the election of
the mayor was an annual affair, tho the incumbent was often re-
tained in office, and was sometimes reflected for many terms.
The mayor was "presented" to the king in the procedure pre-
scribed by the charters, and this was done following each elec-
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tion; and upon such presentation, the mayor-elect vowed his
loyalty to the ruler.
In his political capacity the mayor was from the first an officer
of no small consequence. The mayor of London was named as
one of the committee who were to enforce, if necessary, the Mag-
na Charta against John. The Londoners are quoted as announc-
ing that ''come what may, they should have no king but their
mayor.
' ' The mayor undoubtedly brot considerable standing and
prestige to the office, for he was one of the city's barons or chief
men. London's first mayor was a leader in the efforts to secure
charter privileges. Of the details of his power wre have little
exact knowledge, but there is no reason to doubt that he exer-
cised considerable control in the government and administration.
In the oath taken by the common councilor he agrees not to
leave the council without the mayor's permission. The mayor as
chief of the aldermen presided at assize, pleas, and hustings. In
the communal oath of 1193, as in that of the London freeman of
today, one of the vows taken is that of
' '
obedience to the mayor,
' '
a phrase which probably meant more in that day than in this.
One of the titles by which the corporation of London was known
in the late thirteenth century was "The Mayor and the Com-
monalty of London."
The developments of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries
made the mayor the most prominent official in municipal life.
The early charters of the fourteenth century often made pro-
vision for the election of the mayor by the burgesses ; but during
the fifteenth century there was a marked contraction of the elec-
torate, and the mayor usually came to be chosen by the council,
consisting of the aldermen and the common councilors. In ad-
ministrative and in legislative matters affecting the city he occu-
pied a position of authority, one that is still reflected in the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries. In the dealings of the munic-
ipality with the king and with the outside world in general the
mayor, as the head of the corporation, stood foremost. Of course
London was somewhat in advance of the other cities and her in-
fluence was widely felt in the organization and development of
the municipal constitution both in its chartered and its customary
forms.
The history of the mayoralty from 1600 to the American Revo-
lution, at which time the direct influence of English local insti-
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tutions in American life may be deemed to have ceased, is not
easy to trace. At the opening of the Tudor regime there were
between one hundred and two hundred chartered towns and
boroughs organized on the basis of the typical municipal consti-
tutions of mayor, aldermen, and common councilors, tho there
were numerous variations in detail. The tendency toward oli-
garchic control by this governing group was a feature of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The body of mayor, alder-
men, and common councilors became an ever narrowing one and
the drift to the "close corporation" was steady. In the later
seventeenth century the policy of the Stuarts was openly antag-
onistic to the continued existence of the old town charters, and
they were forfeited and surrendered in large numbers under
pressure from the crown. Even London sank so low as to be-
come a victim of this movement and the slight opposition to the
forfeiture of its charter shows the depth to which the spirit of
local self-government had fallen in England. Royal interfer-
ence and direction and local oligarchies became dominant factors
in municipal life. The mayoralty suffered no little impairment
of its former position of leadership, tho remaining as an impor-
tant factor in municipal life.
There was a recovery in municipal government after the fall
of the Stuarts but the recovery can hardly be said to have been
in the direction of constructive reform. There is rather a trans-
fer of the control over municipal life from the crown to the
landed aristocracy. There were no important developments in
the municipal constitution except as the process of petrification
may be deemed important. Of new life there was a plenty dur-
ing the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but in municipal
government it was unable to break thru the old shell until 1835.
Therefore, from the standpoint of municipal constitution, the
period is properly considered to be one of stagnation, if not one
of positive decline. From the standpoint of the mayoralty, as
will be pointed out later, it was also one of decline, a tendency
which culminated when the mayoralty lost out almost entirely
in the reforms initiated under the Municipal Corporations Act
of 1835, an act which established council government in English
cities.
It was during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that
the municipal institutions of the English were transferred in
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spirit, in nomenclature, and in form to the shores of America.
It is important, therefore, that the English mayoralty of those
centuries be more carefully examined with a view to ascertaining
how far it served as a model for the municipal executive in the
American colonies. Both the title and the position of the mayor
in the English municipal corporation were matters determined
by the borough charter. This instrument conferred upon the
executive considerable tho somewhat indefinite powers extending
to every feature of municipal borough life. In legislation he
presided over all assemblies of the corporation. In judicial mat-
ters he was the chief magistrate and clothed with all the powers
of a justice of the peace, an office which was then more important
than it is in America today. He also presided at the borough
quarter sessions, and held whatever courts the borough main-
tained, either in the capacity of sole judge or jointly with the
recorder. His judicial duties included service as coroner for
the borough and a number of quasi-judicial functions such as
those of escheator, or keeper of the borough gaol. The executive
and administrative authority of the mayor reveals the chief
source of his power, notwithstanding the wide judicial author-
ity of a local nature which he possessed. His appointive power
was extensive, sometimes including all but the few offices speci-
fied in the charter. He was empowered to regulate trade, ad-
minister public property, manage cooperative and quasi-public
enterprises, and to enforce the laws. In this latter capacity he
rose to a commanding place in municipal life. The mayor was
the ' ' lord of the town
;
" he was ' ' almost omnipotent ;
' ' the honor
and supreme authority of the seventeenth century city "subsis-
ted in his person;" he enjoyed the "first voice in all elections
and other things that concern (ed) the town." Despite the steady
decline in the mayoralty in England during the eighteenth cen-
tury due to the slow development of new forces within the cities,
a great part of his authority survived until the reform legislation
of 1835.
With respect to their methods of choosing the head of the cor-
poration, or mayor, English municipal corporations, during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, may be divided into three
main groups. By far the largest proportion from two-thirds
to three-fourths were close corporations and the mayor was
elected by the members of the corporation from among their own
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number. The second group comprised those in which there was
a restricted electoral power conferred upon the freemen or bur-
gesses, the members of the corporation retaining a strong control
either thru power of nomination or thru exclusive eligibility to
the mayoralty. In the third group there was a real approach
to municipal democracy, the freemen electing the councilors and
participating in general assembly in the nomination of the mayor
or chief officer of the corporation ; but the final choice of the latter
was usually left to some smaller body, such as the council.
The English custom in respect to mayoral salaries was not
materially different then from what it is today. There were, it
is true, certain nominal allowances and perquisites.
' ' But it may
safely be assumed that even the largest of these allowances never
did more than cover the out-of-pocket expences of the holder of
the office, and seldom sufficed to meet the innumerable charges
. . ." ''The Headship of the Corporation, whatever its nom-
inal emoluments, was in fact, in 1689 as in 1835, always an
honorary office of considerable personal labour, rewarded only
by the prestige, power and social consideration universally con-
ceded to the Chief Magistrate of the Borough." And there are
cases on record in which the boroughs adopted during this peri-
od the principle of requiring free service of their officers, the
mayor among others.
In Colonial Times
When one turns from the position of the mayoralty in the
mother country to consider the place which it held in the English
colonies in America, a contrast is at once apparent. The repro-
duction here of the close corporation, the custom of annual selec-
tion, and even of the studied attempt to copy after the English
model in the establishment of the mayoralty did not suffice to
prevent a marked differentiation. The strength of the office dn
England, whether due to charter custom, or the personal stand-
ing of the mayor or to all three in combination, was to no small
degree lost in the atmosphere of a new country, owing to the
leveling conditions of pioneer life, and to the tendency of trans-
plantings generally to manifest new characteristics and to fol-
low new lines of development. The effort to reproduce the Eng-
lish mayor was partly a conscious one, for in the Elizabeth, New
Jersey, charter it was provided that the mayor should have
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charge of the borough "in as full and ample manner as is usual
and customary for other mayors to have in like corporations in
our realm of England." The gradual introduction of English
' '
methods of government
' '
was one of the prudent achievements
of Colonel Nicolls according to William Smith, who made this
comment in connection with the incorporation of New York un-
der the care of the mayor, five aldermen, and a sheriff. No doubt
the colonists imagined that the English mayor was being repro-
duced in the colonies. The colonial mayors, it is true, often re-
ceived considerable prestige thru their appointment by the pro-
vincial governors, as in New York. They thus represented the
general government of the colony in local affairs. The mayors
were frequently reappointed, some serving for ten years. In this
way they were able at times to gain no small amount of personal
influence. But in general the powers of the corporation were ab-
sorbed by the municipal council. The colonial mayor was rela-
tively insignificant in both legislation and administration as com-
pared with his English fellow. He was in a real sense the servant
of the council.
If we view the position of the American mayor during the
period prior to 1796 from the purely legal point of view we find
that the standing of the office more nearly approached uniform-
ity during its early history than it has at any time since. Its
development has followed very diverse lines in different cities
and general uniformity in legal status is now beyond realization,
even tho it were desirable. But in the colonies the mayors were
all subordinate to their respective municipal legislatures. Tho
the detail varies slightly the general picture presented is always
the same. Even the judicial powers which were employed to
raise the mayor to such prominence in English boroughs were
allowed to lie dormant in the colonies and today are of little con-
sequence.
The position of the American mayor before 1796 may be sum-
marized as follows:
(1) The title was employed by municipal corporations in New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Maryland and Delaware ; altho it was first pro-
vided for in Maine, yet, except for Boston's appropriation of the
title after the Revolutionary war, it had not been in vogue in
New England before this date. The title of the office which in
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New England corresponded to the mayoralty was "moderator."
(2) The charter position of the mayor was not strong. He
had few powers other than minor ones. He was legally a part
of the council and often subordinate to the governor, and en-
joyed, therefore, no large independence.
(3) He was an officer of some prestige socially and politically,
depending largely on his personality.
(4) There was a marked absence on the part of the mayoralty
of discretionary activity in matters of police, sanitation, and
morals. In this respect there is a striking contrast with the
English mayor of contemporary years.
(5) Owing to frontier conditions and the leveling influences
under which the mayoralty was set up in this country the office
lacked much of the strength which custom and precedent gave to
it in England.
(6) The failure of the office to develop importance prior to the
adoption of the federal constitution may be traced to the absence
of appointive power, the want of a complex municipal life, the
active participation of the municipal councils in borough admin-
istration, and the failure of the mayors to exercise fully judicial
powers which they already possessed. In this respect the early
American mayor signally failed to follow the course marked out
by the mayors of English boroughs.
Since Colonial Times
It is extremely difficult to periodize the history and develop-
ment of the mayoralty in the United States since the close of the
colonial era. The development of the office has not been in any
sense uniform and any effort to generalize must recognize nu-
merous exceptions. This leads to the conclusion that it will be
well to emphasize certain dates which have some general accept-
ance or special significance in the history of the mayoralty and
describe the conditions then obtaining, with such reference to
the intervening years as the history of the office may seem to
justify. The years selected for this purpose are 1796, 1823,
1870, 1900, and the present time.
The year 1796 is significant both from the standpoint of the
American municipal constitution and of the mayoralty as a part
thereof. Both had been relatively unimportant in a population
of which less than four per centum lived in incorporated cities
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and boroughs. The years which had so much meaning in the
early history of the country stood for little in municipal history.
With the year 1796 it is different. It has real interest from the
point of view of the mayoralty for it betokens the play of new
forces and new ideas, and it introduces the years of development
and growth in the position of the mayor.
Many writers have called attention to the influence of the fed-
eral principles of government in our municipal organization. It
was but nine years after the framing of the federal constitution
and but seven years after it went into effect that the evidences of
this impact became discernible. Municipal government was in a
formative and primitive stage of its development in this country.
It therefore yielded quickly to the pressure of the ideas found in
the new federal organization. The predominance of these ideas
in the Baltimore charter of 1796 was overwhelming. In the case
of the mayoralty its development may properly be said to date
from this charter. Provision was made for the choice of a mayor
thru an electoral college chosen by popular vote ; the mayor was
given a veto which was of substantial character, a three-fourths
vote of the municipal council being necessary to override it; a
limited power of appointment, responsibility in law enforcement,
supervisory authority in municipal finance, and the duty of mak-
ing recommendations to the council were bestowed upon him; he
was to receive an annual salary. A more striking triumph of
the ideas which created the national executive can hardly be con-
ceived.
This victory proved to be too complete to be permanent. It
was to be a century distant before the real position of the munic-
ipal executive was to approximate relatively that of the federal
executive. The Baltimore charter was a prophecy not the ful-
filment. It was a thing born out of due season. Some one has
observed that the institutions which change most slowly, which
possess the most vitality, are the institutions of local govern-
ments. It is an observation which holds true in American munic-
ipal history. The council was too firmly rooted in the public
esteem and in the municipal constitution, the conditions de-
manding change were too feeble to force a general and immediate
acceptance of the theories of the federal constitution as appli-
cable to organization in municipalities. Every step in the ulti-
221] THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MAYORALTY 25
mate victory of the federal analogy was won only by a long
and painful process of development. And when the federal
principles finally triumphed in municipal life generally, when
it had created the federal plan with its strong executive, it was
heralded to the world as a conspicuous failure. Stress and cir-
cumstance had been creating other "plans." Intelligent care
and scientific investigation are modifying all plans.
The year 1796, however, marks an important point in munic-
ipal history. The Baltimore charter, tho premature, signifies
the emergence of the mayoralty into independence and impor-
tance. And the development of the mayoralty from this date
constitutes one of the main features of the evolution of Ameri-
can municipal life and organization. The Baltimore mayoralty
of 1796, with some few, tho not unimportant, modifications, is the
mayoralty now to be found in most American cities. It is one
of the few contributions of our municipal democracy to the the-
ory and practice of our municipal organization and differentiates
the American municipal executive from others in foreign lands.
In the course of the struggle of the federal ideas for recogni-
tion and supremacy in the municipal field, the year 1823 is sig-
nificant because of the contribution which was made in that year
and the years immediately following it to the conception of the
municipal executive. It is not possible to separate the develop-
ment of institutions from those personalities in which they find
expression. If the Baltimore charter of 1796 was a prophecy of
the mayor of a century later, Josiah Quincy was the later nine-
teenth century mayoralty incarnate. He became the chief mag-
istrate of the recently chartered city of Boston in 1823. Under
the charter of 1822 the office of mayor had supplanted that of
moderator. Yet the position was not an imposing and a com-
manding one. The importance of executive leadership was not
expressly recognized. Popular election alone appears as an im-
portant element in strengthening the mayoralty, tho Boston was
not the first to introduce the popularly chosen municipal execu-
tive. But popular election plus the personality and vigor of Mr.
Quincy produced a demonstration of the mayoralty and its pos-
sibilities that has left its mark to the present day. Moreover Mr.
Quincy consciously cultivated the intelligence, confidence, and
appreciation of the municipal electorate in the work which he
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was doing. He not only set the standards of the office for many
years in advance, but he left in the mind of the municipal citizen
a definite conception of a new type of municipal executive.
The contribution of Mr. Quincy was not the work of a man
lustful for power in order that he might aggrandize himself, or
further partisan interests. The strength which he brought to
the office and the interpretation which he gave to its place and
function in municipal organization were imparted with a full
appreciation of what he was doing. In describing the events of
his first inauguration as mayor Mr. Quincy says of himself ' ' The
Mayor, in his inaugural address . . . deduced the spirit of
the city charter from its language and the exigencies which led
to its adoption, and explained his views of the powers and duties
of the office of Mayor, and the principles by which he should en-
deavor to execute and fulfil them. ' ' He then outlined the defects
in the old town organization and especially those of division of
executive power, lessened responsibility, want of relationship in
the work of the former branches of the executive. The remedy
was provided for "in the powers of the Mayor," which he con-
ceived to be "requisite" for the efficient exercise and fulfilment
of the duties imposed upon the municipal executive. The pur-
pose which moved him during his mayoralty is clearly expressed
in his own words thus: "To postpone, and if possible, to pre-
vent the occurrence of such a state of indifference to the essential
qualities of the executive [as he was described in the preceding
paragraphs] . . . the Mayor elect deemed it his chief offi-
cial duty to produce and fix in the minds of all the influential
classes of citizens a strong conviction of the advantage of having
an active and willingly responsible executive, by an actual ex-
perience of the benefits of such an administration of their affairs ;
and also of their right and duty of holding the mayor respon-
sible, in character and office, for the state and the police and
finances of the city.
' ' To bring the responsibility of the executive
officer into distinct relief before the citizens, was accordingly a
leading principle, by which he endeavored to regulate his con-
duct in that office. This purpose he avowed, and never ceased to
enforce by precept and example, during his administration of
nearly six years.
No student of municipal history who has perused the career of
Mr. Quincy, either as recorded by himself or by others, or who
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has studied his messages and addresses to his fellow officers and
citizens in Boston can reasonably question but that he approx-
imated the ideals of the mayoralty as he saw them. He did not
escape scathing criticism of either his views or his acts. "The
Mayor assumes too much himself. He places himself at the head
of all committees. He prepares all reports. He permits nothing
to be done but by his agency. He does not sit solemn and digni-
fied in his chair, and leave general superintendence to others ; but
he is everywhere, and about everything, in the street ; at the
docks
; among the common sewers ; no place but what is vexed
by his presence." In these words Mr. Quincy quotes the com-
plaints of his adversaries. To a man with his convictions and
firmness of purpose they must have been the assurance that he
was in some measure achieving his purpose.
It is not easy to realize the full influence of such a mayoral
career as that conceived and worked out by Mr. Quincy. The
tracing of this influence in Boston is not so difficult, but else-
where the problem is a much harder one. Nevertheless one may
not doubt the fact that the effect of the demonstration which had
been thus consciously staged in Boston was an important factor
in the future development of the office. There was no little cor-
respondence between officials in the principal cities of the day,
for example, between Boston and New York, Philadelphia, and
Charleston, South Carolina, respectively. The achievements of
this administration in Boston were known elsewhere. It is not
possible to say to what extent mayors elsewhere were inspired to
larger efforts and more vigorous service by reason of Mr. Quin-
cy 's example. Even less is it possible to say to what extent the
latter 's methods had laid hold upon the ordinary municipal citi-
zen, or those who had to do with the drawing up of municipal
charters in the years following. There was a reaction from
mayor government even in Boston following Mr. Quincy 's re-
tirement, yet no succeeding mayor failed to feel his influence.
An influence of this sort is no less real because it is hard to
measure. Such conceptions as his do not permeate the public
consciousness nor command general acceptance all at once. But
that there is a real connection between a Quincy and a mayoral
type such as we are familiar with today cannot be seriously ques-
tioned. By seizing upon the opportunity to show the possibilities
of an office that was passing thru a formative period Mr.
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Quincy proved himself to be one of those creative spirits who
from time to time leave their impress upon even the institutions
with which they come in contact.
The acceptance of the elective mayoralty in Boston in 1822,
tho not the first instance of the elective principle being ap-
plied to this office, is also significant because it foreshadows the
triumph of the executive over the bonds which had heretofore
been the guarantee of council predominance. The overthrow
of the latter did not come all at once, but it has steadily declined
in influence and power from that day to this. Popular election
of the mayor spread rapidly and with popular election came in-
dependence. From being the servant of the council the mayor
was suddenly confronted with the opportunity of becoming its
master. The course of municipal development, the inability of
the councils to adjust themselves to the rapidly shifting condi-
tions of the following century, the like futility and ineffective-
ness of legislative interference, coupled, as it was, with waste and
spoils, the greater ease with which the mayor could be brot
to feel the pressure of public opinion and with which responsibil-
ity could be fixed upon him, all these factors and others combined
to give the executive its opportunity. Mr. Quincy seized upon
this opportunity with more zeal and with larger comprehension
than did most of his successors. But that the latter, too, did not
fail is evidenced by the fact that between 1822 and the present
time the mayoralty has received no serious setback in its move-
ment toward the most commanding position in the mayor and
council plan of government.
The importance of the triumph of popular election can hardly
be overestimated. It is an indication of the serious and honest
effort that was being made to apply the principle of the separa-
tion of powers to municipal government and organization. It
was a development that has changed the character of American
municipal institutions. The theory of the separation of powers
is impracticable. It works out in the establishment of some
extra-legal mastery, or as in the case of city government, the tri-
umph of one of the divisions of power set up. It was inevitable
in the municipal field, where the work of government is so largely
administrative in its character, that, once the principle of separa-
tion of powers was recognized, the mastery should gravitate
toward the administrative organ or head of municipal govern-
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ment. Popular election gave to the mayor the strategic position.
Mr. Quincy made the most of it. He always made it a point to
inform the electors with regard to his policies and plans. He
perceived very clearly that with the support of the electors be-
hind him he could readily dominate the council. His success has
perhaps never been excelled ; but his methods, and others which
he was not able to employ under the less favorable conditions
then obtaining in law and custom, have been assiduously utilized
by many a mayor in succeeding years. Had popular election of
the mayor never come, the council might have been saved, but
with popular election once established the supremacy of the
council in the field of municipal government was ultimately
doomed. The same forces are at work in varying degree in state
and nation, tending to exalt the administrative arm of the gov-
ernment and to depress the legislative; and the steady increase
of the presidency and the governorship at the expense of the con-
gress and the state assemblies respectively, and in spite of a re-
sistance fortified by the provisions of written constitutions, shows
how logical and irresponsible was the growth of the mayoralty.
If the establishment of popular election for the mayoralty was
not a direct blow at the power of the council, the bestowal of the
veto upon the mayor must be accepted as the beginning of the
positive movement against the position and integrity of the legis-
lative branch of the municipal government. This development
in the mayoralty appeared in the New York charter of the year
1830, and in the words of Mr. Greenlaw constitutes the "first
marked encroachment on the powers of the council. ' ' Moreover
this veto was an absolute one the signature of the mayor was
necessary to the enactment and validity of ordinances. The ab-
solute veto gave way to the qualified veto in the course of its
development, and this in turn to the selective veto when appro-
priation bills were concerned ; but the net result was the develop-
ment of a most important power of the municipal executive in
legislation, a power which in New York state has been extended
to include local and special legislation affecting municipalities.
The time when the mayoralty generally was vested with a legal
control over administration is not easy to determine. The ten-
dency in that direction antedates the year 1850, but it is between
1850 and 1860 that some of the more important and permanent
steps are taken. Out of twelve representative cities five of them
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made some progress toward vesting the mayor with varying meas-
ures of authority over appointments, and four of them vested in
him either complete or partial supervisory powers over adminis-
tration. Feeble powers of removal appear in three of them,
while the vague responsibility of being "chief executive" is im-
posed in five. In the charters issued in the smaller cities between
1850 and 1870 the mayor's administrative control is quite notice-
able. In Illinois, for example, the charters of Macomb, Jackson-
ville, and several other cities confer upon the mayor the power of
appointing the school board, a power not given under the general
municipal act of 1872 and bestowed today in only a few of the
larger cities. Altho the following decade appears to have
been a period of relatively little change, with reaction showing
itself here and there, as in Pittsburgh (where the veto power
was temporarily lost in 1867), yet there was no important set-
back in the development of the mayoralty. The year 1850 there-
fore marks the point when the mayoral office ' ' finds itself, " so to
speak, and it is definitely recognized in law as the principal re-
pository of administrative authority and responsibility. It must
be said, however, that the definite coordination of the mayor's
powers and responsibilities was not seriously attempted during
this period.
Roughly speaking the significance of the year 1870 lies in the
fact that counciliar supremacy and legislative interference had
both been tried and found wanting by this time. Corruption
and self-seeking were the usual product of the former and were
coupled with gross inefficiency. Confusion and irresponsibility
followed the train of legislative efforts to remedy the situation in
municipal government. The preliminary tryouts of the mayor-
alty had been made. Frequently the results had been favorable.
From this year, therefore, there is noticeable a distinct accelera-
tion in the trend toward mayor government. The mayor became
the "hostage" for the good government of the city, even before
authority commensurate with this responsibility was committed
to him. But this was not long the case. Within the next thirty
years the mayor system, with comparatively few exceptions, be-
came the rule in those parts of the country where municipal gov-
ernment was a problem of consequence. The steps which were
taken to effect this predominance of the municipal executive were
the extension of the mayor 's power of appointment and removal,
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a point upon which there was remarkable agreement among the
charter makers of the period, the lengthening of the mayor's
term of appointment to office, the express announcement in many
charters of the mayor's liability for the good government of the
city, and the expansion of the mayor's power in municipal legis-
lation and finance thru the bestowal of positive rights and
duties and the strengthening of his veto.
The development of the mayoral office to its position of respon-
sible leadership is largely the fruit of the last half century.
"The mayor system," "mayor government," and like expres-
sions by which we characterize the predominance of the executive
in the majority of American municipalities, represent compara-
tively recent efforts to describe the result produced by the evolu-
tion of organization in cities operating under the
' ' federal ' ' prin-
ciples. This result was so nearly achieved in 1900 that it had
called forth general recognition and no little treatment. More-
over, with few exceptions, it was a result that was accepted in
large measure in all parts of the Union. It had no serious rival
systems with which to contend. True the council was still pow-
erful in many cities. In states like Illinois, the general munic-
ipal law did not admit the supremacy of the executive in munic-
ipal affairs, but in practice he was very much more powerful
than the legislative acts alone would indicate. The place of the
office in the municipal regime appeared secure and in many
places complete. Its supremacy was now rooted deeply in the
past, and there were advocates, not a few, who urged continued
exaltation of the office as the most promising hope for good city
government in the United States. The hopes of reformers were
centered upon it and the enlargement of its influence and power.
The judicial functions of the office alone had declined in impor-
tance, except in some parts of the south and in Indiana.
Everywhere, practically, the mayor's power to mold the rest
of the administrative service, so far as it was under the control
of the local government, was recognized, tho to a much greater
degree in some cities than in others. Sometimes his powers of
appointment and removal were complete, but the practice was
more general of requiring the consent of the council, or of one
house thereof, to appointments, and often removals by the mayor
might be overruled by the council. The tendency was strongly
in the direction of making the authority of the mayor independ-
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ent of any interference on the part of the council in administra-
tive appointments and removals. In cities where this authority
was already complete a statement of reasons or a report to the
council of the grounds for the exercise of the power to remove
officials was sometimes provided as the sole check upon arbitrary
action. Mr. Greenlaw concluded in 1899 that in no other point
were the city charters so generally in agreement as in the depend-
ence of administrative officers upon the mayor.
The relation of the mayor to municipal legislation was ex-
pressed in an almost universal recognition of the veto power in
its qualified form and in a wide acceptance of the selective veto.
The veto, indeed, was in the process of a vigorous and healthy
development and was being strengthened in matters of finance,
including appropriations and indebtedness, and franchise grants.
The mayor sat in the council as presiding officer, and he was
usually clothed with authority to cast the deciding vote in case
of a tie and at times in other matters. In Chicago the mayor
had wrested from the council the acknowledged right to appoint
the committees of the latter, a victory for the executive that was
won by Carter H. Harrison, Sr., as a result of a hard struggle.
In New York City the influence of the mayor did not cease when
his term of office was ended, but he was given a seat and voice,
tho no vote, in the council meetings as long as he was a resi-
dent of the city.
Only a few years more were required before the application
of the federal principles brot forth the plan of municipal
organization, in which the mayor became the prototype within
the municipality of the president in our national government
with the administrative service grouped into great departments
headed by his appointees. In municipal charters and general
laws the mayor was made responsible for the government of the
city, for the honesty, efficiency, and economy of administration,
the character of its laws and the good order, peace, and safety of
the community. The attempt to find pure city government and
successful administration by the concentration of great powers
and even greater responsibility in the person of one man, in the
opinion of Mr. Greenlaw, was "almost pathetic." "There is,"
says Mr. Brand Whitlock, the ex-mayor of Toledo, Ohio, "a
strange, almost inexplicable belief in the almost supernatural
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powers of a Mayor." Says Mr. Whitlock, "I have been waited
on by committees of aged men demanding that I stop at
once those lovers who sought the public parks on moonlit nights
in June, I have been roused from bed at two o 'clock in the morn-
ing with a demand that a team of horses in a barn four miles on
the other side of town be fed ; innumerable ladies have appealed
to me to compel their husbands to show them more affectionate
attention, others have asked me to prohibit their neighbors from
talking about them. One Jewish resident was so devout that he
emigrated to Jerusalem, and his family insisted that I recall him ;
a Christian missionary asked me to detail policemen to assist him
in converting the Jews to his creed; and pathetic mothers were
ever imploring me to order the release of their sons and husbands
from prisons and penitentiaries, over which I had no possible
jurisdiction." To one sorrowful suppliant the mayor was "the
father of all." Moreover, "this exaggerated notion of the may-
oral power was not confined to those citizens of the foreign
quarters; it was shared by many of the native Americans, who
held the mayor responsible for all the vices of the community."
Mr. Whitlock wrote, of course, a decade or more later than Mr.
Greenlaw and others who were describing the mayor system of
the close of the nineteenth century, yet his words fairly describe
the popular opinion of the degree of responsibility which had
been heaped upon the municipal executive during the closing
years of that period, and indicate how impossible it was for the
mayor to approximate in performance the conceptions more or
less generally held regarding his position, powers, and functions.
Nor did the more intelligent escape this conception of the mayor-
alty. The
' ' Conferences for Good City Government ' ' gave large
space on their programs and in their published
' '
Proceedings
' '
to
rehearsals of the campaigns for the mayoralty in various cities ;
the progress forward or backward was to no small degree meas-
ured by the success of reform or independent mayors : the mayor
was to make up for the sins of the past, he was the prophet whose
coming was the promise of better things, and as executive he
appeared the sole hope and refuge of a people who despaired of
attaining good city government. The mayor was to be the
savior of a municipal citizenship that had not yet perceived that
its only salvation could come thru its own exertions, that in
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truth was almost convinced of its own incapacity for self-help.
The measure of responsibility heaped upon the mayor had far
surpassed the means at his command for meeting the multi-
tudinous demands and obligations that pressed upon him. In-
deed, the means for meeting the responsibilities placed upon him
were not fully bestowed upon the mayor, even when the measure
of his authority appeared to be the greatest.
By the close of the century the federal principles of govern-
ment as conceived and worked out in the American national gov-
ernment had wrought an almost complete change in the organ-
ization of American cities. Some things yet remained to be done
if a true copy of the federal system was to be realized in munic-
ipal government, but, barring a revolutionary upheaval in think-
ing and in tendencies, the complete application and acceptance
of these principles did not appear to be far distant. Moreover,
most men were hoping that this time might come speedily. Only
here and there arose rare and scattered voices of protest and
pleas for the revival and restoration of council government. The
tide toward mayor government and the exaltation of the execu-
tive seemed to be sweeping ahead irresistibly. The mayoralty
seemed destined to become the center of that centralization in
our municipal democracies toward which De Tocqueville asserted
all democratic governments were tending.
How altered is the situation today ! At the very moment of its
triumph the mayor plan was successfully challenged. Now near-
ly a half thousand vigorous and aggressive municipalities en-
thusiastically proclaim that they have found something better,
and in these the mayor is either largely shorn of his power, or
dispensed with altogether. Every year adds some scores to the
number of cities which relegate to the past the federal analogy
as developed in the field of municipal government. To take its
place the commission plan and the city manager plan have ap-
peared. They have not won recognition without a struggle, but
they have won it. The old order is changing rapidly.
Nevertheless the mayor plan will not disappear. In the course
of the contest for public favor it is being stimulated and purified.
Many of the more important achievements of the past fifteen
years stand to the credit of cities governed under a mayoral
regime. In these accomplishments the leadership of the mayors
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has been conspicuous. Education in local problems has very
often been the product of a mayor's leadership and vision. The
organization of mayors' associations in many states testifies to a
desire and determination to furnish constituencies with intelli-
gent political leadership. The most active members of state and
national organizations for municipal betterment are frequently
mayors of cities. The mayoralty has undoubtedly held its own
in the great cities of the country, and the total number of cities
under mayor government is probably not very many less than it
was at the beginning of the century. Moreover, it must not be
forgotten that there has been a continued development of the
power and position of the mayor, and that its predominance in
the system based upon the federal analogy is more firmly estab-
lished than ever before. The desire to supplement popular con-
trol and clearly defined responsibility with efficiency has caused
the further strengthening of the executive, and the success of
rival schemes of municipal organization has hastened and ac-
centuated this development.
Despite this apparent position and continued growth of the
mayoralty, it must be observed that it is no longer the most strik-
ing feature of municipal life and organization. Tho by no
means inconspicuous, recent surveys of municipal tendencies
have often omitted to mention it, an oversight which would have
been inconceivable little more than a decade ago. It is more dif-
ficult to watch a three-ringed performance and the tendency is
to watch most intently the latest development. It is true, too,
that having set up an organ of government that was both power-
ful and responsible the attention of reformers was turned toward
other problems of municipal life and government, especially that
of securing efficiency in the public service. To the solution of
this problem both the commission and the city manager plans
have rendered signal help. These plans have been the offspring
of the movement for efficiency. The evolution of mayor govern-
ment gradually prepared the electorate for that concentration of
authority which efficient administration demands. The splendid
successes of the newer forms of government have not sprung full-
grown from the fertile womb of disaster; they are rather the
product of earlier struggles, the end of which was the reconcilia-
tion of democracy and efficiency in American city government. It
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now appears that mayor government, commission government,
and city manager government are to participate in achieving
that end. For today each of these forms is potentially and
actively full of promise that the end will be realized. The mu-
nicipal citizen who is still in the prime of life has a reasonable
expectancy of living to see good government become the normal
thing in American cities, whether their executives are mayors,
mayor-commissioners, or city managers.
CHAPTER III
THE MAYORAL CONSTITUTION TODAY
A survey of the mayoral constitution as one finds it today does
not reveal striking dissimilarities with the constitution of the
office fifteen or twenty years ago, at least not in the municipal-
ities retaining the mayor and council plan. Marked changes
have occurred in the constitution of the office in commission and
city manager governed cities, but these will be considered in the
chapters devoted to the executive under these two types. 1
Qualifications
The qualifications for the mayoralty are properly considered
from two standpoints, the legal ones imposed by statute upon the
holder of the office, and the practical requirements imposed by
the exigencies of practical politics. The legal group of qualifica-
tions varies widely in its details, but there is great similarity,
amounting almost to uniformity, in the principles applied. In the
political group the qualifications are almost everywhere the same,
and, on the whole, have operated to produce a mayoral type some-
what different from the other leading executive types of Amer-
ican officialdom. The legal group of qualifications has exercised
an almost negligible influence in determining the kind of men
who occupy the office. The influence of political forces and re-
quirements has been potent and constant and therefore most
effective.
In the legal group of qualifications three are almost universal-
ly required, viz., local residence, United States citizenship, and
suffrage right. In many of the larger urban communities age
and property qualifications are added. The requirement of
local residence has no important exceptions in this country. In
i An excellent short review of the constitution of the office is presented in
the second chapter of Mr. Bayles' monograph published in 1895. The chap-
ter title is "Present Constitution of the Office."
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states where cities operate under general statutes, as in Illinois
and Indiana, the general municipal act usually imposes the resi-
dence requirement. 2 In other cases the requirement is a feature
of the special charter under which the municipal corporation is
operating. Thus the charters of Boston, Philadelphia, Roches-
ter, Baltimore, Detroit, St. Louis, Denver, Kansas City, San
Francisco, and many other cities specifically require local resi-
dence. The New York City charter of 1901 did not specify
residence in the city as a requirement, but the proposed charter
of 1909 inserted such a qualification for the office of mayor. The
specification of the requirement has, of course, been unnecessary
in those cases in which it has been omitted, political availability
heretofore imposing the residence requirement where the law has
refrained.
The length of the residence required varies considerably. In
the city of Rochester but five months suffice to satisfy the legal
requirement. In many cities it is but one year, especially in the
smaller cities and those operating under general state law in
Texas. In Mississippi it is two years. In Louisville, Ky., the
period of residence must have been three years. In Kansas City,
Baltimore, Philadelphia, and St. Louis the residence demanded
of the mayor prior to his election is five years.
The purpose of the residence qualification is not expressly in-
dicated in the charters and statutes which give it force. The
theory underlying it has a twofold basis, viz., local residents are
most familiar with local conditions and every locality has resi-
dents capable of filling the office satisfactorily. The flavor of
local patriotism has not confined its influence to our representa-
tive bodies alone but has heretofore been equally potent in the
effect it has had upon executives in municipalities. No doubt it
has been entirely unnecessary in the past to incorporate a resi-
dence requirement in the charter or general law. Proposals that
residence within the state suffice, or that there be no residence
requirement whatever have scarcely received a respectful hear-
ing at the hands of charter conventions and state legislators, and
indeed, of municipal citizens and electors themselves. A non-
resident, until within the present renaissance, would rarely if
2 Note for example, the provisions of the Municipal Laws of Illinois,
Art. 2, Sec. 21: "The chief executive officer of a city shall be a mayor,
who shall . . . reside within the city limits . . ."
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ever have had any opportunity of even coming before the elec-
tors as a candidate. Partisan politics as developed in American
cities have amply guaranteed local residence. Moreover, there
appears to be no breakdown in this requirement with respect to
the mayoralty. While experts may be sought for among non-
residents this enlightened tendency has not been manifest in the
search for mayors. The force of custom, the weight of inertia,
and the elective character of the mayoralty are large factors in
the maintenance of the residence qualification.
If the residence qualification has any justification it seems rea-
sonable that the practice in some cities of requiring a residence
of from three to five years is to be commended. Whatever force
the residence qualification may have appears to be lost under the
five month requirement of Rochester. In smaller cities three
years would suffice, while in the metropolitan centers five years
does not appear to be unreasonable if familiarity with local con-
ditions is to be presumed on the part of the holder of the office.
The thirty to sixty day residence qualification serves no purpose
except to make sure that the mayor is a qualified elector at the
time of the election.
The requirement of citizenship is imposed upon mayors in
most municipalities, tho not always in specific terms. In St.
Louis, Baltimore, Kansas City, and many other cities there is an
express provision establishing citizenship as a qualification for
the office of mayor. The general municipal act of the state of
Illinois fixes a like requirement for mayors in all cities of the
state. In Philadelphia and Pittsburgh state citizenship is required.
In Cleveland, New York, Portland, and a few other cities citi-
zenship is not made a qualification either directly or indirectly
in the municipal charter. 3 Indirectly citizenship is required by
the provision that the mayor shall be a qualified elector of the
city or state, a method which is effective inasmuch as all but ten
of the states provide that electors shall be bona fide citizens of the
United States. 4 In some of these ten states the charter provi-
s Not even the qualification of being an elector is specified, probably
owing in part to the fact that practically speaking such specification is
unnecessary.
4 Beard, 0. A., American Government and Politics (new and revised edi-
tion of 1914), pp. 454, 455. These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana,
Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Oregon, South Dakota, and Texas.
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sions of the municipal constitution supplement the state electoral
code by specifying citizenship as a qualification for the office. 5
In some of the cities referred to in the foregoing discussion
the qualifications for both citizenship and electorship are speci-
fied. If there is practical value in specifying either, the twofold
requirement is not wholly superfluous, inasmuch as the bases of
the two qualifications are by no means the same and citizenship
is not always a prerequisite to the suffrage. On the other hand
there are in all our cities vast numbers of citizens who are not
qualified electors, and the requirement of citizenship alone might
in some cases admit to the office those who were not privileged to
vote. The first program of the National Municipal League sug-
gested only that a candidate be a qualified elector.6
In general it may be said that the tendency in the states has
been to make citizenship a condition upon which suffrage rests.
It is improbable that this tendency will be relaxed ; certainly we
will not soon witness the extension of the suffrage to larger num-
bers of those who are not citizens. In the case of male citizens
twenty-one years of age and upward the suffrage may usually
be presumed, but this has not been true of female citizens, es-
pecially in those states in which the process of urbanization has
proceeded furthest. The requirement that a mayor be a qualified
elector presumes therefore in most cases that he is a citizen of the
state or of the United States. Many important cities specify the
requirement of suffrage right and this qualification is likely to
maintain its place in the charters of the future. The city of Bos-
ton even limits the eligibility list to the "male qualified registered
voter." The new city charter of St. Louis on the contrary omits
the requirement that the mayor be an elector. No marked trend
toward or away from this qualification is discernable in the mu-
nicipal history of the past two decades.
In addition to the requirements noted above as qualifications
for the mayoral office there are some others which are less gen-
Five of the great metropolitan districts lie wholly or in part within these
states, viz., St. Louis and Kansas City in Missouri, Detroit in Michigan,
Indianapolis in Indiana, and Portland in Oregon.
5 This is true in all but one of the metropolitan centers lying in the states
named in the preceding note. Cf. St. Louis, Charter, Art. 7, Sec. 2 ; Kansas
City, Charter, Art. 4, Sec. 2; Detroit, Charter, Sec. 89.
6 National Municipal League
' '
Program,
' ' Art. 3, Sec. 1.
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erally recognized, but which are still of considerable importance.
The age qualification of twenty-one years, is, of course, quite
commonly recognized either directly or indirectly and may as a
rule be assumed. It is rarely if ever, expressly inserted in the
municipal charter, or in the general laws of the state. The pro-
vision specifying that the candidate must be a qualified voter
indirectly fixes a minimum age limit. The charters of the larger
cities, however, quite commonly fix a higher age, some of them in
express terms, others indirectly. The charters of Philadelphia,
Baltimore, Kansas City, Pittsburgh, Charleston, and the general
law of the state of Montana prescribe that the mayor must be
twenty-five years of age. The new charter of the city of St.
Louis follows the former St. Louis and New Orleans charters in
fixing the minimum age at thirty years. The charter of San
Francisco indirectly specifies the age qualification as twenty-six
years by requiring that the mayor has been an elector of the city
and county for five years.
The property owning and tax paying qualifications, while not
generally imposed, still maintain their places in some of the im-
portant cities of the land. In Baltimore the mayor must for two
years have paid taxes on property in the city to the value of two
thousand dollars. In Kansas City the mayor must have paid
city and county taxes for two years just preceding his election
to the office. The charter of Seattle provides that the mayor
must have been a tax payer of the city for at least four years
preceding his election to the office. The general municipal act
of Montana lays down the qualification for all mayors within the
state that they shall be tax paying freeholders within the limits
of the city in which they hold office. The recently adopted St.
Louis charter provides that the mayor shall have been an "as-
sessed tax payer of the city for two years." Writing twenty
years ago Mr. Bayles thought the imposition of property holding
qualification was "very rare," and concludes that the value of
such a requirement is not apparent, inasmuch as "in practice it
need never disqualify a candidate." There seems to be no ten-
dency, however, to omit this qualification in cities where it has
heretofore existed. Failure to require property ownership and
tax paying has not demonstrably lowered the character of those
holding the municipal executive office in cities which do not re-
quire them. On the other hand these qualifications have not
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given evidence of their power to elevate the standards of the of-
fice in those cities which retain them.
Quite rarely the provision is to be found in the charters that
the mayor is not to hold any other official position during his
term. The new Cleveland charter provides that the mayor
' '
shall
not hold any other public office or employment, except that of
notary public or member of the state militia. ' ' The provisions of
the general municipal act of the state of Illinois and of the
Kochester charter prevent the mayor from holding more than one
municipal office during the term for which he may be elected.
The old St. Louis charter prohibited the mayor from holding any
state or federal office while mayor. By judicial decision a num-
ber of offices have been held in certain states to be incompatible
with the office of mayor. 7 In general, however, the question of
the mayor holding two or more offices is one that takes care of
itself. Tradition in the American municipal democracy is in ac-
cord with the general sentiment of the nation regarding any ef-
fort on the part of one individual to secure an undue share either
of honor or more particularly of emoluments. The number of
those who are willing and anxious to serve the public is too great
to permit their votes or influence to be ignored by prospective
candidates.
In any extensive survey of the mayoral office one finds numer-
ous special qualifications. In New York City the mayor may not
be one who is a pensioner of the city. In Pennsylvania cities
holders of the office may not succeed themselves. The charter of
the city of Detroit prescribes that the mayor be able to read and
write the English language "intelligibly," and authorizes the
council to declare void the election of any person not so quali-
fied. A number of cities prohibit the mayor from having any
interest whatever either as principal or surety in city contracts.
Defaulters to municipal corporations, and those who have been
convicted of malfeasance in office, bribery, or other corrupt prac-
tice or crime are declared to be ineligible in Illinois and in St.
Louis respectively. The Baltimore charter declares that the
mayor shall be a person "of known integrity, experience and
sound judgment."
Despite the imposing array of legal qualifications which are
demanded of those who would fill the office of mayor, it may be
7 Bayles
' The Office of Mayor in the United States, p. 21.
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confidently asserted that few of them serve to bar from office
those who are eligible from a political or partisan standpoint.
Occasionally, it is true, the existence of these legal qualifications
may serve a purpose. The spectacle of San Francisco casting
more than thirty thousand votes in 1915 for a mayoral candidate
who had served a term in prison for being associated with a for-
mer era of corruption in the government of the city would have
been prevented by the presence of legal qualifications which
would have nullified such candidacy had it been successful.
American municipal democracy will not, however, secure the
more desirable type of mayors through the imposition of mere
legal qualifications. The real standards and qualifications which
those who aspire to be mayors must meet are those which exist in
the political consciousness of the municipal electorates. From
the standpoint of practical politics the extra-legal qualifications,
constituting the
"
availability" and "acceptability" of mayoral
candidates, are of vastly greater importance.
Mayoral candidates are usually party men and even when this
is not the case as sometimes happens in the reform and fusion
movements which characterize American municipal political
strife, they must be men either of known or potential strength
with the electors. The qualities that give men such strength vary
considerably with the time and the city. Political activity prior
to the period of candidacy and office holding has been an un-
questioned asset in the great majority of cases. Experience in
public office, especially if the record of service be generally ac-
ceptable, is an advantage not lightly despised. A "safe" candi-
date is always acceptable to large numbers of the electorate.
Inasmuch as a successful candidate for mayor tends to become a
power in the party organization the leaders in established party
circles must be satisfied with a prospective candidate. To this
end recognition won in party endeavor and leadership estab-
lished by successful party work is desirable. An attractive per-
sonality, a known sympathy with many classes in the commun-
ity, a reputation for being public spirited, power as a "mixer"
and as a writer or speaker, an absence of puritanical tendencies
in the enforcement of law, and a capacity for overlooking or for
dealing mildly with the petty delinquencies of humanity, secret
or open acknowledgment of the powerful private interests that
deal directly with the municipal government, a declared regard
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for the safety and liberties of the individual and an avowed de-
termination to curb vice and crime, ability to manage, bluff, or
bulldoze municipal councils, a habit of thinking and willing for
oneself and a sort of courage that dares to counter private and
party bosses or even the public opinion all these qualities in
varied measure go to make up the mayoral type of the American
municipality. Social distinction, wealth, expert traiing for the
work of the municipal executive, and advanced educational at-
tainments have not been conspicuous as characteristics demanded
of the American mayor. Yet the extra-legal qualifications which
he must satisfy have been quite exacting, the extent to which one
group of characteristics or another must predominate depending
upon the circumstances surrounding the campaign, the qualities
of the opposition candidate, and the temper of the electorate.
It should be further observed that such legal qualifications as
those of residence, reasonable maturity, citizenship, and suffrage
right are so powerfully enforced by the purely political exigen-
cies of American public life and by that intensity of local pride
and self-sufficiency as to render their inclusion in charter pro-
visions and general municipal acts almost superfluous. On the
contrary extra-legal conditions have been fostered consciously
by the professional politician class partly for its own benefit, and
partly to check opposing partisans, and partly from a sincere
belief that these conditions are eminently desirable. In general
they have harmonized with the more common legal qualifications
imposed upon mayors and have rendered such qualifications
largely unnecessary.
Nomination and Election
With the exception of the city manager the chief magistrates
of American cities are elected by popular vote. This method of
choice renders necessary the development of adequate systems
of nomination. In the course of American municipal history
there have been five distinct methods of placing in nomination
candidates for the mayoral office. These methods are as follows :
1. Self-announcement by the candidate or an informal cau-
cus of his friends.
2. Nomination by a municipal party caucus or primary.
3. Nomination by a delegate convention composed of repre-
sentatives of a city party or at least of its organized units.
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4. Nomination by petition or nominations papers signed by
a proportion of the qualified voters.
5. Nomination by direct primary.
There have been other methods used especially when the power
of choosing the mayor was vested in the hands of the governor as
in colonial times or in the council as in the early national period
and in Tennessee down until the close of the nineteenth century. 8
But, as Mr. Edward Stanwood remarks in his History of the
Presidency, from the meager materials at hand, it is not easy to
reconstruct the political machinery in use during the first thirty
years under the Constitution. Nor must it be supposed that,
where many communities were developing political institutions
without much help from one another, because not in close inter-
course, any general statement regarding their practice is true at
all. 9 Of the methods named, however, the first three have largely
passed out of use, the second alone being still employed in some
of the smaller cities in states where the general laws have not
standardized the practice regarding nominations and elections
thruout the state. In the case of the third method or nomination
by delegate convention, it appears that until 1913, state law still
permitted its use in cities of the third class in the state of Utah,
but the same law permitted also the nomination of candidates by
the use of nomination papers.10
It is difficult to determine whether relative predominance be-
longs to nomination by petition or to nomination by direct pri-
mary, the two methods which are most common today. In gen-
eral it may be observed that they have an almost equal hold upon
the municipalities, tho the direct primary method appears to
find favor in the larger cities. The practices with respect to
nominations vary so widely in details that it is only with respect
to the more general principles followed that it is possible to make
note in this discussion.
Nomination by petition involves the filing of a request that the
name of the candidate for the mayoral office shall be printed
8C/. Bayles' The Office of Mayor in the United States, p. 21. This is
not the case today in important cities such as Memphis and Nashville, the
latter now operating under the commission form of government.
Stanwood, Edward, A History of the Presidency, p. 170.
10 The earlier systems of nomination overlap so in their use that a gen-
eral statement as to the probable predominance at any given time of any
one of them must be accepted cautiously.
46 THE AMERICAN MUNICIPAL EXECUTIVE [242
upon the official ballot. This petition must be signed by a cer-
tain number or proportion of the qualified electors of the munic-
ipality and must be accompanied by the addresses of the signers
and the attestation, usually a sworn statement, of the one who
secured the signatures certifying that they are valid and are be-
lieved to be in conformity with the election laws. This petition
is filed with the election authorities, its validity investigated by
them, and if satisfactory, certified by them and the nomination
placed upon the ballot. To these general features there are add-
ed many others, the details exhibiting some variation in almost
every important locality. Thus there are opportunities pro-
vided for candidates withdrawing their names, for signers with-
drawing their signatures, and for the filling of vacancies in nomi-
nations. In some places there are requirements that candidates
must accept in writing the nominations made.11 In Boston the
signers must be registered as well as qualified voters.
Certain important questions appear in connection with the
method of nomination by petition. The first of these has to do
with the number of nominating signatures that is to be required.
In Boston the number is three thousand registered voters. There
has been at least one serious effort to have the figure reduced to
one thousand. Apparently this effort was sponsored by the Dem-
ocratic machine tho its purpose in doing so is not clear. Party
organizations find their opportunity in the surmounting of ob-
stacles which serve to deter less united and perhaps less actively
interested citizens. In fact political organizations have filled a
real place in American political life by caring for just such tasks
and thereby relieving the voter of the burden, and too often, in
his thot, of his responsibility. The Boston charter at first re-
quired five thousand valid signatures in order that a few very
good men might have a chance to get their names on the ballot.
But in practice the requirement of this number of signatures
was expensive, some of the petition gatherers charging as high
as twenty cents per name; while to provide against signatures
being rejected there must always be secured a large surplus to
insure acceptance of the petition.
12 The success of the large
11 Cf. Cleveland, Charter, Sec. 7. Failure to file the acceptance as
required causes the name of the candidate to be omitted from the ballot.
12 Cf. a note in the National Municipal Beview for April, 1914, p. 376,
by H. S. Gilbertson. Mr. Gilbertson cites the Boston Globe as authority
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petition in securing for Boston a higher type of municipal exec-
utive has not been conspicuously noticeable. It is true, however,
that the issues in the Boston mayoralty elections have been ren-
dered more clear cut.13
The adoption of the English system of nomination upon the
petition of a comparatively small number of names, or some
other equally simple process has been suggested as a possible
way out of the rather intricate methods now in use. If practical
in American political life such a step would be highly desirable
but one may well question whether a system which is character-
ized by ease of nomination, inexpensiveness of operation, sim-
plicity of procedure would not come to grief in American munic-
ipalities because of the absence of the stabilizing forces which
characterize English and European municipal electorates. The
presence of a highly educated governing class, the long estab-
lished social and political traditions of the communities, the
willingness of men of means and standing to spend and be spent
in the public service these factors are not conspicuous in Amer-
ican municipal democracies. Rather spoils, rotation in office,
large salaries, vast legal power, the conception that almost every
citizen is capable of filling responsible positions in the public
service, and the immensely valuable franchises and concessions
of municipalities have hindered the development of the restraints
which more simple methods require. The transition to some less
complex method of making nominations is one that is probably
now under way. With the collapse of the convention system the
work of experimentation has been undertaken on a large scale
and if the present activity continues some method approximating
for the statement regarding the expensive character of nomination pro-
cedure. The Boston Advertiser is also referred to as pointing out that the
situation thus created is unfair to the poor man who wants to fight the
machine but has no wealthy backers. The charge that the system encour-
ages perjury and fraud is also made though no evidence to that effect is
produced. One may not accept these statements unreservedly; the mayor-
alty in Boston has been continually in the hands of those not aligned with
the well meaning and well-to-do reform element of the Back Bay.
!3 See the discussion of the workings of the Boston plan and the need of
simplification by Dr. W. B. Munro in The Government of American Cities,
pp. 136-139. Dr. Munro concludes that the Boston system of requiring 3000
names has served "the cause of independence in municipal politics better
than any of the nominating systems which preceded it . . ."
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a solution of the problem of placing candidates in nomination
may reasonably be expected to be worked out. The city of St.
Paul has developed a method of "presentation for nomination"
at the direct primary which requires but fifty genuine qualified
signatures.
14 These must be presented in the form of individual
certificates attested and acknowledged before a notary public.
Altho this rather simple method precedes a primary election, ex-
perience may demonstrate that it is applicable on a broader scale.
The practice which is current in Los Angeles of requiring the
payment of a fee at the time the nomination petition is filed may
prove to be of permanent value in connection with the method
of nomination by petition. In the charter which was proposed
for Seattle in 1914, the filing fee was fixed at one per centum of
the annual salary.
Nomination by petition has tended to gain in favor if one may
judge from some of the more important recent charters. The
charter revisions in Boston, 1909, Detroit, 1914, Columbus, 1914,
Cleveland, 1913, Cincinnati, 1914, Minneapolis, 1913, and Seat-
tle, 1914, besides those in many smaller cities, all provided for
nominations by petition. Moreover there was noticeable advance
toward simplifying the procedure. Thus in the Minneapolis
proposals nominations could be made on the petition of one hun-
dred qualified voters, in Detroit of five hundred voters in case of
the mayoralty, in Columbus of two per centum of the registered
voters. Not all of these charters were accepted but in no case
does rejection seem to have turned on the provisions for nomi-
nating candidates.
One of the most widely used methods of making nominations
today is the direct primary or election to nomination under
official supervision and upon an official ballot. The strength of
political organizations has determined that it shall be the closed
or party primary.15 For this reason, in part, it has failed to
achieve all that was expected of it and that was prophesied for
i*St. Paul, Charter, Chap. II, Sec. 12. Further details of the sys-
tem are contained in the Sections Nos. 11 to 19 inclusive.
is A summary description of the direct primary in its various phases and
forms is found in Beard, C. A., American Government and Politics, pp. 691-
699. A discussion of the subject will be found in Munro, W. B., The Gov-
ernment of American Cities, pp. 125-136. A more complete account of
method and its development will be found in Merriam, C. E., Primary Elec-
tions. There has been development, however, since this work was published.
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it in the direction of encouraging independence in nominations.
It was designed to supplant the convention system whose abuses
so frequently scandalized municipal as well as state politics. Yet
it has to no small degree come under the control of the very
forces from which it was hoped it would free the voter. It has
proven costly and has placed heavy burdens upon the electorate.
In the opinion of many it has prolonged the period of domination
of state politics in municipal affairs. There has been a deter-
mined movement, however, toward the non-partisan primary in
municipal nominations, especially in commission governed cities,
the result of which is to render somewhat more difficult the task
of the professional politician to retain his leadership and control,
but the advantages of organization and party backing are too
great to be denied even in the non-partisan primary. As for the
open primary there is little to suggest that it has a future in the
United States.16
The dominating position of the executive in American cities
today finds its fundamental basis in popular election. The price
of leadership and supremacy in municipal democracy as in our
state and national governments is the maintenance of close and
immediate contact with the electorate. The mayor, to a larger
degree than any other officer in city government, is the spokes-
man for the municipality, the mouthpiece of the voters. In New
York, Chicago, Boston, Los Angeles, and many other cities, only
those who register may take part in the elections. In most cities,
however, the elections may be participated in by the qualified
voters. Thus out of thirty representative cities twenty of them
provide in their charters for election at the hands of the ' ' quali-
fied voters. ' ' The San Francisco charter and the "Wisconsin gen-
eral municipal act specify election "by the people." The pro-
visions in Keene, Maine, call for election by the "legal voters."
These various provisions have, in practice, about the same signifi-
cance in that they refer to those who, under the laws of the state,
are qualified to vote. In an increasing number of states, of
course, this includes women.
Mayoral elections, in common with the usual American prac-
tice, are decided by the plurality of votes. Many charters spec-
if Nebraska tried the open primary and reverted to the closed primary.
Wisconsin still retains the open primary together with the non-partisan
primary in an optional form.
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ify that a plurality shall determine elections.17 Others assume
plurality elections in accordance with the general practice in the
state under state law. In general, however, plurality elections
are recognized by students of municipal government and life as
undesirable. In Salem, Mass., in 1909, a mayor was elected by
twenty-four per centum of the votes, so divided was the opposi-
tion. These divisions are not infrequently the product of careful
political scheming and are planned to defeat the will of the major-
ity with regard to a particular candidate. One of the recognized
merits of the non-partisan primary is that it insures majority
elections. The same argument is advanced in behalf of the
majority-preferential ballot. The majority and plurality prin-
ciples are both utilized in the charter of Toledo, Ohio. The
preferential ballot is employed in municipal elections and a ma-
jority of first choice votes elects, but if no candidate has a major-
ity of first choice votes, then a plurality of first and second choice
determines the outcome.
Non-partisan elections for municipal officers including the
mayor imply the absence of partisan designations from the bal-
lots voted. The city of Boston is conspicuous among the mayor
governed cities in this respect, tho it is not uncommon among
commission governed cities.18 There are many municipalities,
however, especially among the smaller cities, that do not permit
the state and national party organizations to dominate local
political life. In their place, however, there appear local party
organizations, often very similar to the state and national branch-
es in their purposes and aims. Aspiring leaders do not hesitate
to use their power in the local organizations to further their am-
bitions in larger fields of political endeavor. In New York, Phil-
adelphia, and Chicago, partisan elections obtain, tho in both
New York and Philadelphia fusion and other independent tick-
ets have always commanded strong support and have frequently
been victorious at the polls. The problem of divorcing local and
state political activity must be successfully solved if the interests
of the city are to be happily served, but the solution becomes
i? Cf. the charters of Hartford, Conn., Chap. II, See. 13 ; New Britain,
Conn., Sec. 10; St. Paul, Minn., Sec. 25, which reads, "In all municipal
elections a plurality of votes shall constitute an election.
' ' Also charter
of Grand Forks, N. D., See. 114.
is See Amended Charter, 1909, Sees. 45, 46. See also Cleveland, Char-
ter, See. 8.
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increasingly difficult to achieve as American cities grow in popu-
lation and consequently in political importance. State and
national parties must retain a considerable vitality in the thot
and attachment of the municipal voter if they are to succeed in
the larger political field. Even in Boston, with its non-partisan
elections, the Democratic organization had not failed to keep its
hand on the city hall and the mayoralty.
Occasionally an election for mayor may result in a tie vote.
Two methods are provided for deciding the election in such a
case. The more common method appears to be that of casting the
lot.19 In other cases the city council elects the mayor, a "more
honest way.
" 20 In Cleveland preferential voting obtains, and a
tie is decided in favor of the candidate having the largest number
of first choice votes.21 This review of the methods of choosing
mayors indicates some dissatisfaction with plurality elections tho
these still prevail in most municipalities. The introduction of
assured majority elections thru the preferential ballot or the
system of non-partisan nominations reveals a determination to
have the mayoral office represent as large a proportion of the
people as possible. It is somewhat early to estimate finally the
effect of substitution of nomination by petition and by the direct
primary for the convention system upon the character and type
of municipal executive produced; on the one hand there have
not been the momentous transformations which were prophesied,
and on the other hand there seems to be no good reason for re-
turning to the convention as an organ for making nominations.
The enlargement of the municipal electorate by the inclusion of
women appears to be eminently justifiable from the standpoint
of the mayoralty, tho the immediate influence is difficult to ana-
lyze and estimate. 22 There is apparent a widespread desire to
is Thus the charter of St. Paul, Sec. 25, provides that ' ' the election
shall be determined by the casting of lots in the presence of the coun-
cil . . . " So also the city election law in Illinois, Art. 5, Sec. 11.
20 As in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia. In the former the vote must be
viva voce.
21 Charter, Sec. 8. See also Toledo, Charter, Sec. 23. The lot is also
utilized in the case of Toledo and Cleveland, in case the tie persists thru
the first, second, and third choices in the number of votes cast for the re-
spective candidates.
22 See an interesting article in the National Municipal Review for July,
1915, entitled, "Are Women a Force for Good Government?" by Edith
Abbott.
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simplify the processes of choosing the mayor and this promises
well in a day when the electors are in a mood to consider experi-
ments. There appears to be no desire to make the office less de-
pendent upon the popular support which has contributed so
largely to making it what it is. Rather, the tendencies toward
simplification aim to increase this dependence and responsibility
to the electorate and to improve the position of the mayor as
regards his relation to the other organs of government. The
three principal objects to be kept in view in future development
are ease of nominations, reasonable expenditures in behalf of
candidacies, and majority elections.
Removal from Office
Mayors may be removed from office, (1) by action of the munic-
ipal council, (2) by judicial proceedings before a court of com-
petent jurisdiction, (3) by a state officer, the governor, or (4)
by recall elections. In his survey of the mayoral constitution in
1895 Mr. Bayles noted briefly that the first three of these proc-
esses were then provided for either in municipal charters or
under the general laws of the state.23 The fourth process, that
of the recall, has developed since that time, and bids fair to be-
come the most generally employed of the four.
The power of the council to remove the mayor has been held to
be a common law power vested in municipal corporations. It
arises out of the recognized right of corporate bodies, public and
private, to select their own officials and to hold them responsible
for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation. In the states
of New York, Tennessee, "West Virginia, and New Jersey, this
power has been recognized as one which may properly be exer-
cised by the representative body or council of the corporation.
Dr. John F. Dillon in his Commentaries on the Law of Munici-
pal Corporations ventures the opinion, in the absence of judicial
settlement on the question, that the municipal council in the
United States possesses the authority to remove, for cause, the
corporate officers of the municipality whether elected or not. 2*
23 Bayles' The Office of Mayor in the United States, p. 23. There is no
serious effort to classify the processes in Mr. Bayles' brief discussion. The
topic is one that has not received large attention from those who have dis-
cussed the mayoralty, yet in recent years its importance has been revealed
on more than one occasion.
24 The New York decision is cited in Bayles ' The Office of Mayor in the
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This may of course be modified in municipalities in which
the charter confers or limits the power of removal in ex-
press terms.
The charters of many cities, however, expressly provide for
the removal of the mayor by the council. Thus the recently
adopted charter of the city of St. Louis authorizes the board of
aldermen to remove the mayor for crime, misdemeanor in office,
grave misconduct showing unfitness for public duty, or for per-
manent disability. So also do the charters of Kansas City and
Seattle.
The procedure for carrying out removal by the council varies
from city to city. The St. Louis charter indicates the principal
steps. The charges must be specific and must be presented in
writing. Accompanying them a notice is required which states
the time and place of a hearing. The mayor shall either be served
with the charges or the notice of these shall be published three
times in a daily newspaper. The charter provides for the public
character of the hearing and grants the mayor the right to appear
and defend himself, either in person or by counsel, and confers
upon him the privilege of the process of the board of aldermen to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. The vote on
the proposal to remove the mayor is to be taken by yeas and nays
and made a matter of record. Three-fourths of all the members
of the board must vote for removal to effect such action. In
Seattle the vote to remove takes effect if two-thirds of the council
support it. In Minneapolis a bare majority suffices to effect re-
moval. In some of the states provision is made by general law
for the removal of the mayor by the council. For example, in
Wisconsin, the General Charter law authorizes the council to re-
move the mayor upon the preferment of charges against him
and a hearing upon the same, the mayor having an opportunity
United States, p. 26, footnote 2. The entire subject is treated from its
legal point of view in Dillon, Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Cor-
porations, Vol. II, Chap. XII, especially Sees. 460-465, 475-477, 484, 485.
The citations to cases and a summary view of them in the states other than
New York are to be found in Dillon, Vol. II, pp. 782, 783, footnotes 3 and
1 respectively. In the state of Michigan it has been held that a city council
derives its powers from express legislative enactment and has no inherent
power to remove for cause a statutory officer appointed by the mayor for a
fixed term, but this would not seem seriously to impair the more generally
accepted view that the authority inheres with respect to corporate officers.
54 THE AMERICAN MUNICIPAL EXECUTIVE [250
to be heard in his defense. A vote by three-fourths of the coun-
cil is necessary to effect removal. In the general law of Michigan
governing fourth class cities the provisions are similar except
that a two-thirds vote of all the aldermen elect is specified.
The second method available for the removal of the mayor in-
volves judicial process before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Of course the safeguards which have been thrown about removal
by the council have tended to give that method the appearance of
a judicial proceeding. 25 The word "impeachment" is used in
the charter of Seattle thus implying the organization of the coun-
cil as a court of impeachment. But procedure in cases of this
kind is very similar to that which obtains in the cities where the
terms "impeachments" and "court of Impeachment" are not
employed. The council really acts as the representative body of
the corporation rather than as a court.
The courts which are vested with the power to remove the in-
cumbents of the mayoral office are not the same in the various
states. In Illinois the circuit courts, or the municipal and city
courts of concurrent jurisdiction, may receive and try an indict-
ment of a mayor for "neglect, oppression, malconduct or mal-
feasance in the discharge of the duties" of his office and upon
conviction the defendant shall be fined not more than $1000 and
be removed from office. In Indiana prosecution may be by affi-
davit instead of indictment.26 In Scranton, Pennsylvania, and
other cities of that commonwealth the court of common pleas of
the proper county has jurisdiction and acts as a court of im-
peachment, the charges being preferred by not less than twenty
freeholders of the city. The court then appoints a committee of
five to make investigation of the charges. This committee has
power to take and compel testimony, and to examine books. It
makes a written report to the court and the latter transmits it
to the select council, which then sits as a court of impeachment.
A judge of the court of common pleas presides and is empowered
with the authority of a court. If the court of impeachment finds
the officer guilty of the charges presented the court of common
25 Thus the power to summon witnesses, compel testimony, etc., the require-
ments respecting notice and hearing, and the provisions that the proceedings
shall be a matter of record all savor strongly of a judicial nature.
26 Cf. Indianapolis, Charter, Sec. 240. This section is a part of the
general municipal laws of the state.
251] THE MAYORAL CONSTITUTION TODAY 55
pleas is directed to enter judgment and to declare the office
vacant. 27 The charter of the city of Norfolk, Va., provides for
the removal of the mayor by the corporation court of the city,
the motion for removal being instituted by a two-thirds vote of
the city council and being prosecuted before the court by the
council. The charter of Rochester, N. Y., substitutes the appel-
late division of the supreme court and requires a three-fourths
vote of the council to institute proceedings.
Numerous examples might be cited to show the liability of the
mayor both to judicial process and to impeachment proceedings.
One of the more recent cases is that of Mayor James Rolph, Jr.,
of San Francisco, who was charged with contempt in the superior
court on August 6, 1916. The charge was not sustained by the
court as indicated in its decision reported in the Municipal Rec-
ord of Aug. 26. The controversy arose over the operation of cer-
tain cars owned by the municipal railways over the tracks of the
United Railways, a private corporation. An earlier decision had
enjoined the city from operating its cars over the tracks on lower
Market street and had thereby seriously impaired the efficiency
of the municipal lines and had put them face to face with a pos-
sible loss in revenue of almost $150,000 per year. The mayor
had refused to obey the injunction. Mayor Bell of Indianapolis
was recently charged with complicity in election frauds in the
conduct of an election within the city. He was acquitted by a
jury ; but the contrast between the position of the governor of the
state and that of the mayor of the chief municipality within the
state was rendered quite clear as far as the jurisdiction of the
ordinary courts of law are concerned.
One of the most conspicuous cases in recent years is that of
Don Roberts, mayor of Terre Haute, Indiana. He was accused
of fraud in connection with elections in the fall of 1914, and was
tried and found guilty. During the course of the judicial pro-
ceedings in which he was involved he used all the power of his
office to coerce witnesses and otherwise influence the course of
matters before the court. For example he promptly dismissed
from office those who pleaded guilty or who threatened to do so.
27.4 Digest of the Laws and Ordinances of the City of Scranton (1907),
pp. 261, 262. It is difficult to see what further obstacles could have been
put in the path of those who might be bent upon effecting the removal of
a municipal officer.
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He threw every possible obstacle in the way of the investigation.
Even when convicted he insisted on the retention of his office
and was impeached by the city council before removal was ef-
fected.
The power of the courts to review the decisions of the councils
sitting as courts of impeachment and of lower courts which are
authorized to make removals is comparatively limited. Usually
appeals may not be taken upon issues of fact, but upon questions
involving the jurisdiction of the removing power, or the legality
of the cause assigned for removal.
28 The charter of Norfolk,
Va., however, expressly reserves to the accused the right of ap-
peal to the supreme court of appeals.
The practice of authorizing a state officer such as the governor
to remove a mayor is current only in the states of New York and
Ohio. It was recommended also by the National Municipal
League in its Municipal Program, but beyond this it has received
no important consideration at the hand of states or municipali-
ties. In the New York charter the governor is authorized to
direct the attorney general to conduct the inquiry respecting the
mayor and pending the investigation he may suspend the mayor
for a period not to exceed thirty days. This feature of the New
York charter dates back to an act of 1882, and has evidently
impressed itself favorably upon succeeding charter commissions,
for not only was it incorporated into the present charter, but
it was also retained in the charter proposed in 1909, and was
expanded to include such other executive officers as the president
of the council, the comptroller, and the borough presidents.
In Ohio a provision was enacted in 1913 by the assembly of
that state in obedience to a mandatory provision adopted in an
amendment to the state constitution in 1912. The charges are
filed in the form of a petition for removal and must be signed
by twenty per centum of the qualified electors as determined by
the vote at the preceding general election. The charges are de-
posited with the judge of the court of common pleas of the county
and the defendant is to be served with a copy thereof either by
the court or by the direction of the governor at least ten days
before the hearing thereon. The hearing is to be had within
thirty days and the proceedings are to be public. The decision
is to be made public with the reasons therefor and is to be filed
zs Dillon, Municipal Corporations, Vol. II, p. 815. (Fifth Edition.)
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for record in the office of the secretary of state. In the case of
the decision by the governor, the decision is final, but in the case
of a decision by the court of common pleas there is an appeal
reserved to the court of appeals. In 1915 complaints were made
to Governor Willis against Mayor Keller of Columbus. The
governor issued a formal statement announcing his refusal to
take any action and stating that he would take a similar attitude
with regard to the mayors of other cities concerning whom ob-
jections had been raised. The position taken by the executive
of the state was that only dangers of a positive nature, such as
pillage, disorder, and the like, would justify the exercise of the
authority conferred upon him. He justified his action by the
necessity of maintaining the right and the responsibility of mu-
nicipalities to govern themselves. Moreover the remedy of judi-
cial process was pointed out as available and the inference is that
this method is more desirable except in rare cases. Such an in-
terpretation of his authority by one governor does not, of course,
bind his successors to do likewise. It establishes, however, a
sound precedent and one that should have a wholesome influence
in the municipal life of the state by discouraging the tendency
of dissatisfied portions of municipal electorates to run to the
state for relief from undesirable conditions instead of working
out their own salvation. As an aid to the latter the removal of a
mayor by the governor has little to offer and constitutes in the
hand of a willing state executive a real menace to municipal self-
reliance.
The recall as a method for getting rid of municipal officers, in-
cluding mayors, whose continued occupancy of public office is
open to serious objections has met with widespread favor among
municipalities in every part of the country and under each of
the principal forms of municipal government. While it is often
associated with the commission form, probably because it has
usually been incorporated as a feature of the commission plan,
yet its origin and earlier development were under the mayor sys-
tem, and it has since been made a feature of the mayor and coun-
cil plan in numerous cities and in a number of the states. The
value of the recall appears to lie rather in the possibility of its
use than in the likelihood that it will be used, tho it has been
used effectively many times. There is no question but that it
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has been an effective means of encouraging a sense of responsi-
bility on the part of municipal executives as well as other holders
of positions of public trust and responsibility.
There are two principal forms in which the recall has been
adopted in cities: first, the original form as it appeared in Los
Angeles, and as it exists with but minor modifications in most of
the cities which have adopted it ; and second, the Boston form of
the recall as expressed in the revised charter of 1909.
The recall as developed in Los Angeles provides for the recall
of both elective and appointive officers in the municipal service,
including, of course, the mayor. The election to recall the mayor
is held upon petition of twenty per centum of the entire vote
cast for all candidates for the office at the preceding mayoral elec-
tion. Such petition is addressed to the municipal council and filed
with the city clerk, and contains a brief statement of the reasons
for which removal is sought. The petition may not, however, be
filed earlier than three months after the incumbent has entered
upon his term of office. The statement of reasons given with the
petition is not subject to review but the petitions are subject to
the examination and require certification at the hands of the city
clerk. In case they prove to be deficient, it is permissible to
amend them. The sufficiency of the petition is in no case sub-
ject to review by the council. The latter body, under the man-
datory provisions of the charter, is required to call a special elec-
tion upon its receipt of a recall petition, properly certified. The
charter specifies that the election must be* held not less than fifty
nor more than sixty days after the date of certification, except
that the recall election may be combined with any other general
or special municipal election that may be held within the sixty
day period.29
The ballot for the recall of mayors in Los Angeles contains the
following question: "Shall (inserting name of officer sought to
be removed) be removed from the office of mayor by the recall?"
Opposite the question appear the words "yes" and "no" with
voting squares. There also appear upon the ballot the names of
those who have been nominated as candidates for the office in
29 See the provisions of the charter of Los Angeles, Sec. 198. For the
provisions regarding the form, mode of signing, filing, examination, and cer-
tification of petitions see the selections dealing with the initiative petitions,
Sees. 198a and 198b.
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case the incumbent is recalled. These nominations are made by
petition, except that the name of the incumbent is placed upon
the ballot as a candidate unless he resigns his office or declines
to be a candidate. If a majority of the electors voting on the
question vote "yes," the officer is removed from office upon the
declaration of the returns by the council, and the candidate re-
ceiving the highest number of votes for the office is elected to
succeed him. The incumbent may be recalled and reflected at
the same election and under such circumstances continues in
office for the balance of the term for which he was first chosen.
If another candidate is elected he serves for the same period.
The recall of a mayor or his resignation in face of a recall bars
him from being appointed to office for a period of two years.30
Such is the recall as applied to the mayoralty in Los Angeles.
The provisions in the charters of San Francisco, Seattle, St.
Louis, and Cleveland are strikingly similar to those in Los An-
geles. San Francisco provides for a petition signed by thirty
per centum of the entire vote cast at the preceding mayoral elec-
tion and requires that the election be held within forty days.
Seattle requires the signature of twenty-five per centum and
makes the election mandatory within forty days. St. Louis re-
quires twenty per centum of the registered vote at the time of
the preceding mayoral election with the further requirement that
twenty per centum of the registered voters in each of at least two-
thirds of the wards of the city must be secured and the date for
the election is fixed at not more than ninety days from the time
the board of election commissioners has mailed notice of the suf-
ficiency of the petition to the incumbent whose removal is sought.
In St. Louis the death or resignation of the incumbent at any
stage of the proceedings stops the election. In Cleveland a peti-
tion for the recall of the mayor must be signed by not less than
fifteen thousand electors and the sixty day time limit for the
holding of the election obtains. In all the above cities except
San Francisco amended or supplementary petitions may be filed
if the first one appears insufficient.
The recall provided for in the Boston Charter is different from
that which prevails elsewhere in that every mayor must face the
possibility of a recall thru a provision which automatically
30 Charter of the city of Los Angeles, Sees. 198q, 198r, 198s, 198t. The
provision regarding the method of nomination is found in Sec. 198u.
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places the question
' ' Shall the mayor be recalled ?
' '
upon the bal-
lot at the end of the second year of his four year term. The
regular November election is used for the purpose of testing the
opinion of the electors upon this question. If fifty per centum
of the registered vote of the city is cast "yes" then the mayor
must stand for a reelection at a recall election following in De-
cember. In practice the Boston plan has never proven effective
enough to recall a mayor, despite a hard fight put up against
Mayor Fitzgerald in 1911. The total vote for the recall was
approximately only one-third of the registered vote, though it
constituted a majority of the vote cast on the recall proposition.31
The results which have been obtained with the Boston recall have
apparently not appealed to municipal charter makers elsewhere
for it has had no vogue outside the city of its origin. The the-
oretical values which attach to the Boston recall are, however,
worthy of consideration. The mayor is assured that he will have
a long enough period in which to inaugurate his policies and
make the preliminary tests thereof. If he is not recalled his
continuance in office and the further development of his plan
cannot be menaced or interrupted by the machinations of his
enemies, either personal or political. The insertion of the recall
proposition upon the ballot automatically obviates the effort to
secure signatures for the recall petition, prevents the intimida-
tion of those who would like to sign such a petition and minimizes
the rancor and bitterness which the application of the recall in-
evitably invites. Opposite tendencies must also be reckoned
with. The successive efforts to put the recall into operation hav-
ing failed, apathy toward such efforts even when most desirable
is likely to result. The failure of a majority of those voting on
the proposition to make their wrill effective because the inertia of
a body of inactive citizens as large in number as their active
opponents has been thrown in the scales against them is most
discouraging. Practically speaking the Boston recall, like that
obtaining in the commission governed cities of Illinois, becomes
effective only when something akin to a political revolution
against the existing authorities occurs. The comment of the
Kansas City Star in 1911 was, "The Boston election proves
si The figures may be obtained by consulting the National Municipal Be-
view, Vol. I, pp. 127, 128.
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. .
. that the public official who makes good need not fear
the recall, even if he offends the politicians and the men who
want to use his office for personal gain. He can trust the people
when he knows the people can trust him." This comment tells
but half the story regarding the operation of the Boston recall.
The other half is that the public official known as the mayor of
Boston does not need to fear the recall even under exceptional
failure to measure up to his responsibilities.
It would probably be unfair, however, to indicate that the
presence of the recall in Boston has accomplished nothing in the
way of restraint. Doubtless the incumbent breathes somewhat
more easily when the usual announcement is made that no recall
has been ordered, for there is the rare possibility that it might be.
This possibility, while not a matter of immediate concern to the
holder of the mayoralty is nevertheless one that is ever present
and politicians as astute as those in control of Boston politics are
reputed to be, would not altogether overlook its presence. Were
the proportion necessary to carry, lowered to a majority of the
total vote cast either at the election or on the proposal to recall
the Boston plan would become an effective weapon with which to
secure responsible and decent city government at least so far
as the recall can ever become such a weapon.
The Term of Office
The mayor's term of office has tended to become longer as the
amount of power entrusted to him has increased. There are nota-
ble examples in which this has been true. The six largest cities
in the country have adopted the four year term.32 There are also
many lesser municipalities operating under the mayor system
which have adopted the four year term. 33 In one the term is five
years.
34 But the most favored term appears to be two years,
except in New England where some cities still retain what was
formerly customary, a one year term. Thus out of thirty cities
selected so as to represent the country geographically fifteen of
them elect their mayors for two years. The general municipal
32 New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, St. Louis, Boston, and Baltimore.
ss These are widely scattered. For example, Los Angeles, Calif. ; Co-
lumbus, Ohio, and Charleston, S. C.
34 Jersey City, New Jersey. Munro, Government of American Cities, p.
214.
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acts of a number of the states such as Illinois, Indiana, Wiscon-
sin, and Nebraska specify a term of two years. 35
Once the longer term has been adopted there appears to be no
disposition to return to the earlier practice of short terms.
38 In
general, the longer term has given satisfaction, though it has not
achieved all that its advocates hoped and prophesied that it
would. It was hoped that the longer term would serve to in-
crease the importance of the office to such an extent that the elec-
tors would be stimulated to see that better men were chosen to
fill it. Yet it is hard to affirm that any such result has been
achieved. The memory of the election of Van Wyck in New
York is fresh as an instance of the failure of the newly created
four year term to do just this thing. The lengthened term has
probably justified itself in that it has made it possible for the
mayor to be more of an administrator and less of an active poli-
tician, it has given the holder of the mayoralty a better chance to
demonstrate his policies and manifest his abilities, and it has
tended to allay somewhat the pressure of frequent municipal
campaigns. On the whole, too, it has prevented the frequent dis-
ruption of the municipal service thru changes in the office of
chief executive and has therefore resulted in more uniform and
perhaps better service. There is a sense, too, in which length of
service tends to produce improved service. Official life and the
constant, tho often feeble sense of responsibility which is ever
present tends to attract so conspicuous an officer as the mayor
toward higher levels of thot and conduct. Respect for de-
cency and the public interest is sometimes acquired thru long
years of service in positions of eminence and trust. The differ-
ence between the two year and the four year term consists partly
in that this factor is allowed opportunity to get in its work, and
in the case of longer service the force of the acquired point of
35 An exception to the rule that one year terms are more common in New
England is Montana in which state there is a constitutional provision against
the term exceeding two years and where the legislature under general law
has provided for a one year term. Laws of Montana, Sec. 4748. (Political
Code.) Also Constitution, Art. 16, Sec. 6.
3 The charter of New York City has undergone one change from the four
to the two year term, but the latter has since been altered to provide for the
longer period.
259] THE MAYORAL CONSTITUTION TODAY 63
view may lead to a practical break with former practices and as-
sociates.37
The number of terms that a mayor may serve is not deter-
mined by any general tradition. In practice reelections are
quite common, tho the number of single terms is sufficiently large
to indicate that second terms do not follow as a matter of course.
The incumbent generally has the advantage of a well organized
group that is immediately interested in his reelection. In small-
er cities opposition parties often go begging for candidates.
Especially is this true where the salaries attached to the office
are not attractive in themselves, and where no vital question of
local public policy has arisen to stir up an active contest. In
Pennsylvania and Indiana reelection is prohibited, at least for
successive terms, but there is no evidence of any wide approval
of this practice. It should be said, however, that the persistence
of the single term notion is but an evidence of the strength which
still characterizes the popular fear of executive power or tyranny
in local administration. The development of longer terms for
the mayoralty will command wider support in proportion as the
methods for effective control over executive action by public opin-
ion are perfected. The advantages of the longer term are pretty
well appreciated in cities of size and importance. It is in these
that opportunity for trying out policies and time for acquiring
skill and mastery in administrative work are most imperative.
The prospect for the future favors the longer term and this, in
turn, promises increased effectiveness and responsibility on the
part of the municipal executive.
The Filling of Vacancies
The subject of vacancies involves a consideration of what con-
stitutes a vacancy and what are the methods by which it is filled.
37 The career of Carter H. Harrison, Jr., former mayor of Chicago, illus-
trates this tendency. During his six terms as mayor of Chicago he alienated
one by one the forces which had been mainly instrumental in enabling him
to acquire public office. At the same time he failed to acquire the positive
attitude toward reform which would bring him new strength. His elimina-
tion from active candidacy in the primaries of his own party by a decisive
majority in favor of his opponent witnessed to his isolation, too good for a
host of former supporters, not good enough for the many who desired more
than negative virtues.
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Vacancies in the office of mayor are of two kinds and they are
usually treated differently. The first kind is the temporary
vacancies. They are those which are caused by the mayor's ab-
sence from the city temporarily, by his being incapacitated for
his duties thru illness or accident of a temporary nature, or by
his suspension from his office during the course of an investiga-
tion. The permanent vacancies are those which occur by reason
of the death or permanent disability of the incumbent, his resig-
nation, his removal from office thru some one of the methods
already described, or, in very many cities, by his change of resi-
dence from the city in which he holds office to some locality out-
side its limits.
Temporary vacancies are commonly filled by the president or
chairman of the council in cities where the mayor does not pre-
side over that body. Thus in Madison and other first class cities
in Wisconsin, in Rochester, St. Louis, and many other cities this
practice is provided for in the municipal charter, or in the gen-
eral law of the state. In the case of St. Louis and Baltimore the
presiding officer of the board of aldermen must meet the same
qualifications as the mayor, a precaution which does not seem to
obtain in all cases. 38 There are exceptions to the practice of per-
mitting the council to fill temporary vacancies in the mayoral
office. In Indianapolis and other Indiana cities which have the
office of controller the latter or the city clerk acts as mayor in
case the chief executive is unable to fulfil his duties. The Cleve-
land charter provides for the temporary performance of the may-
oral functions by the director of the department of law.
Permanent vacancies are not, as a rule, provided for in the
same way as temporary ones. In a few cases no provision is made
for the popular election of a new incumbent, but as a general
thing the practice is to choose a successor at a special election,
ss See charters as follows: St. Louis, Art. 4, Sec. 3; Baltimore, Sec. 214.
The president of the second branch of the council succeeds to the mayor-
alty in case of the absence or incapacity of the mayor. The charter of
Seattle illustrates the failure to require the same qualifications of the tem-
porary successor as are required of the mayor himself. The Seattle charter
imposes a tax paying qualification upon the mayor, but no such qualification
is imposed upon the members of the city council, the president of which is
chosen from among its membership and may succeed to the mayoralty and
all its powers. See Art. 4, Sec. 2, Subdiv. D, and Sec. 6, First; Art. 5, Sees.
1 and 11.
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unless the former mayor 's term is about to expire. For example,
in Minneapolis a vacancy in the mayoral office is to be filled by
special election within twenty days after the vacancy occurs.39
In Illinois the general municipal act provides for the holding of
an election if the vacancy occurs one year or more before the end
of the term. If less than a year of the term remains the council
is authorized to elect one of its members to act as mayor. Prac-
tically the same provisions obtain in Pennsylvania cities, in Los
Angeles, and in the municipalities of Wisconsin and some other
states. In such cases the council is often authorized to make ap-
pointment to fill the vacancy temporarily. Where possible elec-
tions to fill vacancies are made to coincide with the regular elec-
tions; but as in Minneapolis and in Norfolk, Virginia, limits
within which the elections must be held are not uncommon.
On the other hand it is sometimes the practice to fill a vacancy
in the mayoral office by authorizing the council to elect for the
unexpired term. Thus in San Francisco the council is author-
ized to fill the vacancy by election, the incumbent to serve until
the next general municipal election. There is no limitation as
to who may be elected except the qualifications imposed upon
incumbents selected in the ordinary way.
In cities in which the mayor does not preside over the council,
the usual custom is that the president of that body, or of one of
its branches in case there is more than one, shall succeed to the
office of mayor in the event of a vacancy. The charter usually
covers this contingency and provides also that the requirements
and qualifications which are demanded of the mayor must also
be satisfied by his successor. In many cities in which these con-
ditions obtain the president of the council is elected by popular
vote. Baltimore, New York, Rochester, and Seattle fill perma-
nent vacancies in this manner. The new St. Louis charter, how-
ever, provides for the succession of the president of the board
of aldermen only temporarily, tho the president is elected at
large as in the other cities mentioned.
Still another practice is to have the succession fall upon some
officer of the city government outside of the council. Thus in
the cities of Indiana the controller succeeds, except in cities which
39 Charter, Chap. II, Sec. 2. Exception is made so as to permit merging
this special election with a general election if the latter occurs not less than
ten or more than sixty days from date of the vacancy.
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have no such officer, in which cases the councils elect. In the
comparatively recent charter of Cleveland a similar method of
filling a vacancy was adopted, the order of succession being elab-
orated rather fully, and the mantle of the chief executive falling
in turn upon the heads of departments appointed by the mayor.40
This feature of the Cleveland charter is unique in that it is pos-
sible to have a mayor whose selection for public office has not
been submitted to popular vote, a contingency that is guarded
against in almost all charters that do not entrust the choice of a
successor to the council. There seems to be no good reason, how-
ever, for preferring council to mayoral selection of one to whose
lot it falls to carry out the policies approved at the time the
mayor was elected.
There seems to be no tendency toward uniform methods in the
selection of those who succeed to a vacancy in the office of mayor.
Variation in practice may be explained, perhaps, by the fact that
in this country the electorate is content to take a chance on what
it will get in the event of a vacancy in executive office. Only
thus can one explain the nonchalance with which the nomination
and election of weak candidates for the vice-presidency and for
the lieutenant governorships are countenanced in national and
state politics. In fact the question of succession to the mayoralty
was not one of great moment in the earlier history of the office
and the methods of filling vacancies have been largely the inher-
itance from times when the importance of the position was not
as great as it has become today. The proper and most desirable
method of handling vacancies is one that has not yet been found.
There are more or less serious objections to each of the methods
now in vogue. Election by councils which have tended to be-
come less influential and less able appears to be rather anomalous
when the growing power and position of the mayor is considered.
Popular election imposes an added burden of expense upon the
municipality which the financial circumstances of most Ameri-
can cities can ill support. The succession of administrative offi-
cials who have been appointed by the mayor appears to be a step
in the direction of recognizing the increased prominence of the
4 Cleveland, Charter, Sec. 74. The order of succession is as follows :
Director of law, director of public service, director of public welfare, direc-
tor of public safety, director of finance, and director of public utilities.
There is little likelihood that Cleveland will soon be without a mayor.
THE MAYORAL CONSTITUTION TODAY 67
office and the authority of its holder. The succession of the pres-
ident of the council gives no adequate assurance of satisfaction
and serves only to vacate another rather important office, leaving
it to be filled usually by the council. It is not certain that the
election of vice-mayors would meet the situation in view of state
and national experience. On the whole the Cleveland plan ap-
pears to point the way in the right direction, especially where the
method exists in conjunction with efficient methods for insuring
executive responsibility thru adequate process of removal, such
as impeachment, judicial action, or the recall. As these pro-
cesses exist today they do not give entire satisfaction. Their
development as agencies for securing better controlled executives
in mayor governed cities, or the substitution for them of some
better means, is highly desirable.
The successor of the mayor inherits all of his powers in the
case of a permanent vacancy, but in the event of temporary va-
cancies it is not uncommon to restrict the authority of the tem-
porary incumbent. In New York City the president of the board
of aldermen when temporarily acting as mayor during the sick-
ness or absence of the mayor is forbidden to exercise the appoin-
tive and removal powers within thirty days, or to sign, approve,
or disapprove resolutions or ordinances within nine days. The
Seattle charter, on the other hand, expressly clothes the acting
mayor with all the powers of the mayor even during temporary
vacancies while other charters appear to assume that he shall
enjoy full authority.
Salaries and Bond
The mayors of practically all communities of size and impor-
tance now receive a salary. Not so many years ago the office of
mayor was a fee office and the transition to the fixed salary has
become the rule only within the past quarter century. In cities
where the judicial functions of the mayor are still a matter of
some consequence the fees are still collected, tho in case a salary
is paid these fees are usually turned over to the city. In some
communities mayors still serve with little or no pay and in many
states they are dependent upon the will of the council for the
amount they receive.41 The practice which obtains in the larger
cities and in an increasing degree in the smaller cities is to fix
4i This is the practice in states which create municipal corporations tinder
general law, at least with regard to the classes of smaller cities. Compare
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the mayor 's salary in the municipal charter. This is usually the
custom in those states in which cities may draft their own char-
ters under municipal home rule privileges, while it is notable
that in charter enactments for great cities the salaries are always
specified.
42 It does not appear, however, that there is any stan-
dardization in the remuneration paid. With larger responsibili-
ties and greater power the salary of the mayor of New York City
is three thousand dollars less than that paid the mayor of Chi-
cago and but twenty-five hundred dollars more than that paid by
Dayton, Ohio, to its city manager.43 With less than one-fourth
the population of Minneapolis, Minn., Evansville, Indiana, pays
its mayor twice the salary paid in the former. Similar instances
might be multiplied to witness to the absence of uniform stan-
dards in calculating the value of the mayoral services of the re-
ward to be offered for them.
There is some difference of opinion as to whether salaries
should be declared in the charters or left to be determined by
the municipal council. The municipal league program endorsed
the latter plan 44 and safeguarded the executive by providing
that the salary should not be changed during the term of an in-
cumbent so as to operate either against him or in his favor. This
proposal followed in the main the practice which already obtained
for example, the situation in Illinois. Cities under ten thousand commonly
pay their mayors from $300 to $600. Mendota gained some notoriety in
1915 by the generous act of its council in raising the mayor's compensation
from an average of sixteen cents per day to an average of a little less than
one dollar per day or three hundred dollars per year.
42 The mayor of New York City is paid $15,000 ; the mayor of Chicago,
$18,000; the city manager of Dayton, $12,500; other cities pay as follows:
Boston, $10,000; Minneapolis, $2,000; San Francisco, $6,000; Philadelphia,
$12,000; Evansville, Ind., $4,000; Utica, N. Y., $1,600. The list might be
increased indefinitely. Some of these amounts are fixed by charter; others
by ordinance. The charter of Madison, Wis., provides that the mayor shall
receive no salary. Cf. Sec. 26.
43 In general it may be noted that the tendency appears to be to pay
fairly good salaries in those cities which are most alive to the need for
capable administration and which have put forth some effort to secure it.
This, however, hardly explains the fact that Chicago pays its mayor the
largest salary received by any municipal executive in the country. The good
salaries which are paid to commissioners and city managers are, however, in
line with the development noted.
44 Art. 3, Sec. 8.
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in many of the general municipal acts of the states. As far as
the amount of the salaries paid is concerned there seems to be
little in actual practice to indicate that one method has any ad-
vantage over the other. Charters and councils alike are now
generous, now parsimonious. Local conditions and standards
seemed to have played a prevailing part in determining the sal-
aries paid, tho doubtless the present tendency to pay more liber-
ally is having a country-wide influence. Authorities agree that
salaries in American cities compare favorably with those in the
cities of the principal European countries, especially France and
England, in neither of which do the mayors receive substantial
remuneration.
American experience seems to demonstrate one thing with re-
spect to salaries. It is better to pay good salaries, or no salaries,
than to pay low ones. However low they may be they attract the
professional politician, the individual who is in politics for a
living. In smaller communities good mayors will be found who
will serve without salary whereas the same man could not be at-
tracted by a small remuneration. On the other hand where the
office demands the entire attention of the incumbent or any large
part of his time and thot it is wiser to offer a salary commen-
surate with the responsibilities imposed. It will prove cheaper
in the long run, a statement that is abundantly demonstrated
from the experience of commission governed cities.
Many cities and some states thru their general laws require
the mayor to give bond for the proper fulfilment of his duties.
The amount of the bond is sometimes fixed in the state law, 45
sometimes determined by the municipal council.46 The premiums
are as a rule paid from the municipal treasury. In a number
of cities no provision is made for a bond from a mayor, but he is
charged with careful oversight of the bonds given by other mem-
bers of the municipal staff.47
45 The general law in Illinois provides that in no case shall the bond be
less than $3,000.
4 This is the more general practice. See the charter of Cleveland, Sec.
190, and of St. Louis, Art. 8, Sec. 4.
47 Cf. Los Angeles, Charter, Art. 5, Sees. 62, 64. Under Sec. 63 it is
possible the council might compel the mayor to give bond, tho Sec. 64
renders such an effort of doubtful validity. No bond is specified in Kansas
City.
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Induction into Office
The process by which the mayor is inducted into office con-
stitutes a ceremony which is usually regarded with little atten-
tion. In general it consists of the administration of an oath by
some competent or authorized officer in the state or municipal
service. In Boston the oath is administered by the justice of the
supreme judicial circuit or by a judge or justice from some other
court of record. The administration of the oath takes place be-
fore the municipal council and a certification of the act is entered
upon the journal. The custom provided for in Kansas City dif-
fers from the above in that the oath is administered by the city
clerk or other municipal officer, in the presence of the common
council and citizens who may desire to attend. The oath to be
taken is the same as that required of common councilors. In New
York and Cleveland the practice is similar to that of Boston,
except that the oath must be subscribed to and filed in the office
of the city clerk. In Philadelphia the record of the oath having
been taken must be filed with the controller.
The content of the oath or affirmation appears to differ among
municipalities. The New York charters require that the mayor
take and subscribe to the declaration ' ' faithfully to perform the
duties of his office. ' ' The following declaration is used in many
cities: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm as the case may be) that
I will support the Constitution of the United States and the Con-
stitution of the State of
,
and that I will faithfully
discharge the duties of the office of Mayor according to the best
of my ability. " 48 A recent variation from this form is that re-
quired by the St. Louis charter which specifies a declaration in-
cluding the following items : (1) The mayor has all of the quali-
fications for the office named in the charter ; (2) he is not subject
to any of the disqualifications for the office; (3) in addition to
the United States Constitution and that of Missouri he will sup-
port the St. Louis charter and ordinances; (4) he will be influ-
enced in the appointment, promotion, demotion, suspension, or
discharge of officers or employees by the consideration of fitness
only; (5) he will not expend or authorize the expenditure of
48 Los Angeles, Charter, Art. 2, See. 10. See also the municipal laws of
Illinois for the same statement.
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money otherwise than for adequate consideration and efficient
service to the city.
49
While the constitutional oath appears to be the general prac-
tice, supplemented here and there by special provisions inserted
by charter makers, it has not been unknown for councils to be
authorized to demand an additional oath, or for no oath what-
ever to be necessary.50 On the other hand many charters specify
that failure to take the oath of office works forfeiture of the title
which the mayor elect may have to it.
Miscellaneous Features
In addition to the foregoing constituent features of the may-
oral office there are miscellaneous items which are more or less
common and which are properly noted at this point. In all cities
of size or importance it is customary for the mayor to have sec-
retarial assistance of a private and confidential character pro-
vided for him. The extent of this assistance varies according to
the size of the city and the conditions which obtain. In San
Francisco the mayor appoints a stenographer, an usher, and a
private secretary to aid him in caring for his duties. The mayor
of St. Louis under the old charter was given an office force of
five : a secretary, an assistant secretary, a stenographer, a page,
and a janitor, 51 and over them his power was complete. But no
provision for a staff as formidable in numbers was made in the
charter adopted in 1914. In fact the matter appears to have
been left to the determination of the municipal council. Char-
ters, indeed, quite frequently omit to mention this custom. Often
they declare that the mayor shall have his office in the city hall ;
and in Indiana the mayor is expected to devote regular periods
of the day to office hours.
Moreover the mayor may frequently call to his assistance those
who are specially qualified to render aid, either in the capacity
of citizen groups with advisory functions or as in the case of St.
Louis a certified public accountant to help him maintain the
annual audit of the financial affairs of the city, a duty imposed
upon him by charter. The creation of "the mayor's eye" in
49 St. Louis, Charter, Art. 8, Sec. 3.
so Bayles, The Office of Mayor in the United States, pp. 25, 26, with cita-
tions, especially those in the first and last paragraphs,
si The salary budget of the five was $5,220 per year.
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New York witnesses to the tendency to augment the organization
of the mayoral office so as to enable the holder to perform his
duties more effectively.
52
The mayoral constitution today gives evidence of some devel-
opment when compared with what it was in the last decade in
the nineteenth century. While there have been few changes in
the legal requirements imposed upon candidates, the extra-legal
qualifications demanded have been appreciably elevated owing to
the increasing alertness and intelligence of influential and pub-
lic spirited citizen groups. Nomination by petition or by direct
primary have practically displaced the delegate convention, tho
the influence of organized political parties has not been greatly
weakened. Some gain has been achieved thru non-partisan elec-
tions, but it is a gain that is maintained by eternal vigilance.53
On the whole there has been progress in the direction of ease of
nomination and the establishment of a direct and immediate
bond between the mayor and the electorate. In part this is due
to the application of the recall to the office as a means of sup-
plementing the processes of removal which were available a quar-
ter of a century ago. Other methods of removal do not appear
to have increased in importance or effectiveness. The movement
for longer terms has continued unabated and two and four year
terms are the most common today, with the four year term gain-
ing in popularity. Coincident with this has been the disposition to
increase salaries until today the American mayor is well in the
lead of his contemporaries in other countries. On the other hand
there is an impressive want of standardization, many cities re-
maining parsimonious, others paying more than the circumstan-
ces seem to require. In general the constitution of the office exhib-
its no such radical changes as characterized its progress in the
latter half of the nineteenth century. The changes that have
been observed have rather seemed to popularize and strengthen
the office and to accentuate its tendency to displace the council
as the most effective organ in municipal democracy. These
changes further witness to the demand for responsible and re-
sponsive organs of government in American cities.
52 This institution is discussed more fully in a later chapter.
53 The Municipal League of Seattle in the spring campaign of 1916 re-
fused its endorsement to Socialist candidates for municipal office on the
ground that they were running on a party ticket and thus violating the
spirit of the non-partisan elections act.
CHAPTER IV
THE MAYOR AND ADMINISTRATION
' 'An administration which should neither court the few, nor stand in awe
of the many, which should identify itself exclusively with the rights of the
eity, maintaining them not merely with the zeal of official station, but with
the pertinacious spirit of private interest; which in executing the laws,
should hunt vice in its recesses, turn light upon the darkness of its haunts,
and wrest the poisonous cup from the hand of the unlicensed pander; which
should dare to resist private cupidity, seeking to corrupt ; personal influence,
striving to sway; party rancor, slandering to intimidate; . . . "1
In American cities the mayor is the head of the administration,
a position which he holds by reason of charter or statutory pro-
visions. It is a responsibility that is the product of his compara-
tive successes and the occasion of his most lamentable failures.
It was clearly defined by the end of the nineteenth century, but
has not ceased to develop since that time, except in those cities
now quite numerous in which the mayor plan has been sup-
planted by other forms of government. Thru the relation which
exists between the mayor and administration municipal govern-
ment has become more sensitive and more responsive to the pub-
lic will. If, as one prominent observer of American government
says, the cities of the United States are today better governed
than are the states of the Union, the explanation must be sought
in their administration. 2 The purpose of this chapter is to de-
scribe the nature and extent of the mayor's responsibility in ad-
ministration, to define the powers he enjoys and the methods by
which they are exercised, and to note the forces which continue
to augment the importance of the mayor as an administrative
officer.
1 This excerpt is taken from Josiah Quincy's farewell address as mayor
of Boston. See his Municipal History, pp. 261, 262.
2 An assertion made by Mr. Elihu Koot to the N. Y. Constitutional Con-
vention in 1915.
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General Authority
The nature of the relation which the mayor bears to admin-
istration may be either advisory, supervisory, or active and man-
agerial. Quite commonly, indeed, the actual practice of incum-
bents of the office will exhibit all of these characteristics. In the
case of one department the relations maintained between the
mayor and the head of the department are chiefly advisory. The
supervision is casual or perfunctory. Active interference is not
dreamed of. In the case of another department the supervisory
relation of the mayor is constantly felt. In still other cases the
interference of the mayor in the direction, plans, and operation
of municipal departments is so constant as to make his relation
an active one and his counsel become orders rather than advice.
The advisory position of the mayor is illustrated by the career
of Mayor Blankenburg of Philadelphia. When he appointed
each of his directors he said to them: "You have absolute con-
trol of your department. The responsibility must be yours.
Come and consult me whenever you wish, but for results I look
to you.
' ' 3 Mayor Mitchel of New York expressed this con-
ception of the relation of the mayoralty to administration chiefs
in somewhat different terms as follows : ' ' The theory of the re-
lation of the mayoralty to these departments in the past has been
this : That the mayor should appoint the head of the department
and send him out to make good, send him out to administer; if
he got into trouble then try to help him out ; if he got into too
serious trouble or failed to make good or did something calling
for such action, then remove him and appoint a successor. That
theory has been due very largely to the enormous amount of time
which the mayor must devote to other duties of his office, to his
participation in the work of ... various boards and com-
missions, to the time he must devote to interviews in his office.
' ' *
Municipal charters define the mayor's responsibility for su-
pervision in the broadest terms. In Baltimore it is provided that
s Quoted from an article entitled "What ia the City?" by Mr. Blanken-
burg and published in the Independent, Vol. LXXXV, pp. 84, 85 (January
17, 1916).
* ' ' The Office of Mayor, ' ' by John Purroy Mitchel, mayor of the city of
New York, published in the Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science
in the City of New York, Vol. V, pp. 479-494. (April, 1915.) See p. 491
for the quotation.
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the mayor has "general supervision over subordinate officers."
These provisions are typical of very many other charters. A
variation is found in the charter of Tacoma which provides that
the mayor has supervision of
' '
departments, officers and employ-
ees" and which charges him to "vigilantly observe the official
conduct of all public officers.
' ' 5 The degree with which this
duty is complied with depends very largely upon the local tradi-
tions of the office in the case of ordinary men, and upon the force
and personality of men of unusual talent and determined pur-
pose. Local conditions also determine the degree of supervision
which is exercised. Quite frequently it is active and intelligent
with respect to departments in which matters of immediate polit-
ical or community interest are being dealt with, and at the same
time it may be quite indifferent with regard to departments and
officers further removed from the public eye. In larger cities
it is small wonder that the supervisory duties of the mayor are
not performed with equal effectiveness thruout the entire organ-
ization of government. The means which have been placed at
his disposal have made it impossible in most cases to comply
with the provisions of the charter in a literal and active sense.
In some places the deficiencies have been more keenly appreci-
ated than in others and the means supplied. But in view of the
characteristic American belief in the all sufficiency of mere dec-
laration of desire in law the majority of the cities are still with-
out those agencies which enable a mayor to become a real super-
visor in administration. It is for this reason that in practice
his advisory relationship is more commonly in evidence. The the-
ory of his supervision as expressed in charters implies an omni-
science and a capacity for being in several places at the same
time that taxes the strength and ability of the most gifted in-
cumbents of the office. Adequate personal supervision becomes
impossible except in spots or at odd seasons. Effective man-
agerial machinery is largely wanting, and perfunctory oversight
or casual review is the inevitable result.
Nevertheless the mayor's part in administration is sometimes
more than advisory or supervisory in its character. Occasions
arise which appear to demand his participation in it. At other
s Tacoma, Charter, Art. 4, Sec. 51. The San Francisco charter states
that the mayor shall "vigilantly observe" the official conduct of all public
officers. Art. 4, Chap. I, Sec. 2.
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times he participates whether the occasion seems to warrant his
action or not. 6 Such activity is more likely to occur in connec-
tion with police administration. Charters very often lay upon
the mayor the express duty to see that proper measures are taken
to preserve peace and order, 7 or by investing in him complete
power of removal from office, make possible his interference in
all parts of the administration if he is so minded. It is note-
worthy that one of the most successful mayors in recent years
believed in this direct participation. Said Mayor Mitchel of
New York City, ". . . it has seemed to me that the mayor
ought to be more than merely the head of the city government
sitting in the City Hall ready to receive the public, appointing
the heads of the departments and sending them out to make
good independently, or to fail independently; that he ought to
be really the business manager of the city of New York, that he
ought to have the close contact that would enable him to become
an effective business manager. There are problems of pure ad-
ministration in the departments that ought to come back to the
mayor for settlement. There are problems of policy in the de-
partments that ought to come back to him for settlement. ' ' 8
One can, without strain, imagine the spirit of Josiah Quincy,
to whom active participation in administration was of the es-
sence of his oath of office, rejoicing in the utterance of doctrine
like the foregoing. It is a doctrine that becomes increasingly
difficult of application as the city grows in size and as the prob-
lems of government become more numerous, complex, and techni-
cal. The mayor of the smaller community quite commonly takes
an active part ; for the mayor of millions the possibility of inter-
ference is limited, unless special instruments are provided for
that purpose.
The extent of the administrative authority of the mayor is,
indeed, almost as great as that conferred upon the city itself.
It would be incorrect, however, to say that he exhausts this au-
thority even where he is most powerful. On the other hand there
o The mayor of Aurora, 111., attained something more than local fame in
1916 by taking charge of some of the municipal departments and announc-
ing that he was
' '
king.
' '
7 Note for example the charter of San Francisco, Art. 4, Chap. I, Sec. 2.
& Proceedings of tJie Academy of Political Science in the City of New
York, Vol. V, p. 492. (April 1, 1915, p. 14.)
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are few lines of municipal activity that do not feel his power and
influence, either directly or thru his appointees. General grants
of authority are everywhere the rule, tho usually supplemented
and defined by specific enumerations. The definition of those
powers is of course far from being uniform thruout the country,
tho certain powers are generally recognized in some form or
other. Of these the most far-reaching is that of appointing the
heads of administrative departments, and, in many cases, mem-
bers of municipal boards and commissions and minor officials.
Complementary to this power is that of removal, assuring the
mayor of the continuance of harmony and cooperation in his
official family. In almost all cases he is empowered to call meet-
ings of the most important officials, and in some cases this is
made a duty. He enjoys the privilege of investigating all official
acts, records etc., and with this is associated the power to require
regular and special reports. By some charters the mayor is
made a member ex officio of appointive boards, tho not always
with the right to vote. The mayor may institute and maintain
suits in behalf of the city against delinquent officials. He may,
in most cities, reinforce the ordinary police by calling upon the
governor for the aid of the militia. In the administration of
justice he is not so important as he once was; but he is still in
many cities clothed with the authority of a justice of the peace,
an authority that is exercised with varying degrees of activity.
He may remit fines and penalties imposed for violation of munic-
ipal ordinances.
The actual importance of the mayor's power in the field of
administration is of course affected also by his relation to the
council. The favor of the latter body is rarely disassociated
from his policies, and is secured by dealing gently with this con-
stituent and by generous distribution of the patronage of his
office, a situation which most municipal executives accept as
unblushingly as has the President of the United States in his
dealings with Congress. Finally the position of the mayor in
local politics has a direct bearing upon his administrative influ-
ence and authority. If he is but the figurehead for the real and
dominating personality in local politics, if he serves simply as
the decoy to attract the electors or to receive their wrath, if it is
his part to dream and prattle over impracticable schemes of
municipal development while the real political leaders direct the
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performance of the work at hand, his position as head of the ad-
ministration becomes a source of danger to the public interest.9
Power of Appointment
A consideration of the powers enumerated, one by one, and in
further detail, will aid in gaining a clear appreciation of their
significance. The power of appointing other officers in the mu-
nicipal service is not only the most important but it is generally
the most highly developed. Where it has gone furthest in its
evolution the administrative chiefs stand in the relation of cabi-
net members grouped about the mayor. The principle followed
is similar to that of presidential government as differentiated
from ministerial government. The recognition of this cabinet
form of organization has gone much further in American cities
than it has in the state governments, and the term "mayor's
cabinet" is frequently used in describing the relationship which
is established by reason of his appointing power and the conse-
quent responsibility to him of the departmental heads. 10 The de-
velopment of the appointing power has not, however, been uni-
9 Such was the situation in the case of Philadelphia from 1907 to 1912.
The mayor's "principal interest in municipal affairs was in a series of mag-
nificent dreams, which he called comprehensive plans," for a splendid art
gallery; a huge "convention hall" with a stadium and aviation field; the
moving of the Sehuylkill river, which bisects the city; the laying out of
boulevards and diagonal thorofares; and the creation of a great system
of wharves, warehouses, and industrial establishments. Not one of these
grandiose plans ever got beyond the paper stage; but while the mayor
mooned and dreamed over them the political leaders who had put him in
office and named the subordinates whose commissions he signed were busy
with practical things. From "Philadelphia's Strabismus," by George
W. Norris, The Outlook, Vol. CXI, pp. 1049, 1050 (December 29, 1915). On
the whole this picture is not overdrawn, tho Mr. Norris was a member
of the Blankenburg administration which succeeded the one described. The
danger to the public interest in this case arose from the activities of two
contractors who were then and are now the real political leaders in Phila-
delphia's administration and whose activity in exploiting the municipality
has become notorious.
10 The report of one of the National Municipal League committees at
the meeting held in Los Angeles in 1912 advises that in every large city
the mayor ought to have cabinet officers to advise him and applies to the
group described by the term "the mayor's cabinet." From a reprint of
the report published in the Cleveland Municipal Bulletin, p. 16, September,
1912
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form in American cities, and the variations which obtain are
sufficiently diverse to warrant description and comparison. Es-
pecially is this the case with regard to the restrictions which in
the majority of cases are imposed upon its exercise.
In many cities the mayor's power of appointment is discre-
tionary. He is unrestrained by the legal necessity of securing
confirmation of his appointments. The entire responsibility for
the character of the administrative personnel, at least in the
higher offices, is upon him. He becomes in fact as well as in
theory the center of the municipality's executive services. This
situation obtains most conspicuously in New York City and in
Cleveland and represents the extreme concentration of executive
power in the hands of the mayor. In another and larger group
of cities the mayor's power of appointment is restricted by the
necessity of having its exercise confirmed. This confirmation in
most cases must come from the city council, or, in bicameral
councils, from the board of aldermen. A most important excep-
tion is the city of Boston, where the appointments must be con-
firmed by the Massachusetts Civil Service Commission, a state
authority.
The extent of the mayor's appointing power is determined by
three sorts of provisions. The first vests in him the appointment
of department heads and all other charter officers, boards and
commissions, etc., not elective by the people, and other munici-
pal employees as they may be provided for by ordinance. The
second recognizes the authority of the mayor in the appointment
of departmental chiefs, but grants to the latter the power of
appointing their own subordinates. The third restricts the ap-
parently wide sweep of the power of appointment by erecting
a civil service commission the function of which is to examine
and test the fitness of applicants and to select qualified individ-
uals. The appointments to subordinate positions in the service
must then be made from eligible lists supplied by the commission.
The three types of provisions cited above will be discussed in
turn.
Los Angeles is typical of those cities in which the appointment
of all officers for whose selection the charter does not make spe-
cific provision is vested in the mayor. The exceptions specified
are not numerous, but include such officials as the superintendent
of the city schools who is appointed by an elective board of edu-
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cation. The appointments, however, are subject to confirmation
by the majority of the council. 11 In voting, the council members
must record their votes, publicly given on roll call. Broader
powers of appointment are conferred upon the mayors of New
York and of St. Louis. "He shall appoint ... all non-
elective officers and all employees" excepting those whose selec-
tion is expressly provided for in other ways by the charter. In
these cases the consent of the council is not required. Similar
provisions appeared in the charter proposed in the report of the
Cambridge, Mass., charter commission of 1913. 12 Except where
the confirmation of appointments by the council is retained, the
power vested in the mayor under these provisions represents a
tremendous concentration of authority in the hands of a single
individual.
The second type of provisions is illustrated in the case of the
Cleveland charter. The mayor is vested with the power to ap-
point directors of all the administrative departments, and the
officers and members of commissions not included within the reg-
ular departments. The directors of the departments appoint the
commissioners in charge of each of the divisions in the depart-
ment; and the commissioners in turn, with the approval of the
director, appoint all officers and employees in the division. Most
of these positions belong to the classified service and the appoint-
ing authority is restricted to the eligible list presented by the
civil service commission to the city, but the appointing power
of the mayor is unrestricted inasmuch as it lies wholly in the
unclassified service.13 The provisions proposed for the city of
Toledo, Ohio, by the charter commission of 1914, were very simi-
lar to these in the Cleveland case, but excepted all heads of divi-
sions and all ordinary unskilled labor from the classified service,
thus increasing the authority of the directors and division heads
respectively. These provisions undoubtedly recognize a tendency
11 Cf. Scranton, Pa., Digest of Laws and Ordinances, p. 23 ; Seattle,
Charter, Art. 5, Sec. 4.
12 Sec. 10. Note also the charter of San Francisco, Sec. 4 ; The Munic-
ipal League program, Art. 4, Sec. 1.
is Charter, Sees. 71, 77, 80, 83, 129, 131, 134. It will be observed that the
directors of departments have some discretion in appointments as provided
for in Sec. 131 (1), (c) and (f), relating respectively to the selection of
advisory boards and certain heads of divisions.
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which is present under the first set of provisions, viz., for the
mayor to entrust the selection of deputies and subordinates to
his department heads, or to rely upon them for recommendations
as to who should be appointed.
A third sort of provision found in charters and of importance
in determining the appointive power of the mayor is that which
relates to the selection from minor officers and employees by the
merit system. These provisions are usually found in cities that
have charters embodying the second sort, and in almost all mod-
ern charters whether drawn by states or cities the merit prin-
ciple finds recognition. The customary practice is to divide
the entire civil service into two groups, one the unclassified list
and the other the classified list of officers. In the unclassified
list are placed the elective, departmental, and other important
places, the list being generally specified in the charter itself.14
The effect of the application of the merit principle is to restrict
the exercise of the appointive power within the bounds of proved
fitness for the place. The appointing authority is assisted in the
intelligent performance of its duty, a duty that is by no means
a simple undertaking, but inasmuch as the assistance must be
accepted the restriction is real and to some degree effective. It
should be observed, however, that these restrictions are often
only partially able to exert their influence and that sometimes
the restraint exerted is more apparent than real. This is partic-
i* The following list from the recently adopted St. Louis charter illus-
trates the offices in the unclassified service:
"
(a) all officers elected by the people;
" (b) all heads of departments, offices and divisions;
' '
(c) the members of all boards appointed by the mayor, or serving with-
out compensation, however appointed;
" (d) one secretary, deputy or assistant and one stenographer for each
officer or board in the unclassified service, who are or may be provided by
ordinance with such subordinates;
"(e) all officers of the board of aldermen;
' '
(f ) surgeons, physicians or other experts serving in a consulting or
other capacity without compensation.
"(g) In addition to the above, on unanimous vote of the board (of
Public Efficiency), there may be included in the unclassified service such
other offices or positions requiring exceptional scientific, mechanical, pro-
fessional or educational qualifications as may be ordered by rule of the
Board."
See Charter, Art. 18, See. 3.
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ularly true where the power of appointing and removing the
members of the civil service commission is vested in the mayor. 15
The temptation which political pressure brings to the municipal
executive proves beyond the power of many to resist. This fact
accounts for the tendency to except the civil service commission-
ers from the removal power of the mayor, even tho appointed by
him, or to make their removal possible only upon adequate cause
being established. In New York State the municipal commis-
sions are subject to a supervisory authority vested in the state
civil service board, an authority which in 1914-1915 was exer-
cised by an investigation of the New York City commission. 16
The conviction is deepening that the permanent administrative
service of the cities should be placed beyond the reach of the local
appointing authorities. Various suggestions have been advanced
to achieve this end by relieving the mayor and his staff of the
power to use the patronage as a reward for party service. Among
these are the appointment of the local civil service board by the
governor and the selection of local commissioners by the merit
system under the auspices of the state commission.17
Opinion is divided as to the advisability of putting practi-
cally the whole of the administrative service, including depart-
ment heads, into the classified service. So eminent a student of
municipal government as William Dudley Foulke, for five years
president of the National Municipal League, affirms that civil
is As for example, in Chicago under Mayor Thompson. Cf. The New
Republic, Vol. VII, pp. 36-38, for article on "The Fall of a Mayor." The
civil service commission was made the pliant tool in the demoralization of
the municipal service, and conservative friends of good administration have
been led to protest against the obvious and flagrant attempts to intrench
the adherents of a political machine in the municipal civil service. Within
four months Mr. Thompson had made 9,163 temporary appointments "the
spoils men's method" of evading civil service restraint.
is The investigation and its results is described fully in the National
Municipal Review, VoL V, No. 1 (January, 1916), pp. 47-55. Although
the investigation assumed the nature of a persecution, and failed to estab-
lish a serious case against the New York City commission, its work will
probably aid in correcting practices which have been tolerated, both in city
and state. The Mitchel administration was vitally interested in the in-
vestigation inasmuch as in New York City the mayor may appoint and
remove civil service commissioners at pleasure.
IT In Massachusetts the state commission exercises a direct control over
the work of the city commissions.
279] THE MAYOR AND ADMINISTRATION 83
service "rules could be well applied" to department heads.
18 On
the other hand there is the view that "there is no objection to the
higher positions being filled with party men.
' ' 19 The point of
view of an experienced and responsible administrator is well
expressed by Mayor Mitchel of New York, who selected his staff
of assistants solely on the basis of training and fitness, from
within party lines if possible, from without them if necessary.
20
Under the conditions which obtain in the political life of most
American cities at the present time the introduction of the non-
is Presidential address before the National Municipal League in 1915.
Published in the National Municipal Eeview, Vol. V, No. 1 (January, 1916),
p. 15.
!9 Quoted from an address by Augustus Lynch Mason before the Eco-
nomic Club of Indianapolis, delivered January 25, 1915. Published in
pamphlet form. The quotation is taken from p. 18.
20 Mr. Mitchel said : ' ' The theory of selection upon which the fusion
[which nominated and elected him as mayor] . . . was predicated, was
that appointments to the headship of ... departments should be based
solely upon qualification, training and fitness to discharge the duties of the
office, and without regard to political service rendered. . . There had
been a number of political parties contributory to the fusion movement.
Each of these parties felt that, subject, of course, to the prime requirement
of competency and efficiency, it ought to receive recognition in these ap-
pointments. My point of view toward the selection of the heads of depart-
ments was that, first of all, I had to find men qualified; that if qualified
and trained men could be found within the lines of these political parties
contributory to fusion, I should be glad to find them, to select them, and to
appoint them. But if I could not find them within the lines of those parties
within a reasonable length of time, or if I could find better qualified men
outside the organizations of these parties, I felt that it was my duty to
select those men."
Mr. Mitchel selected some organization men for positions on his staff;
a great many were not party men. The position in which he was placed
would, however, have proved the undoing of a man less resolute. He thus
described the temptation to which he was subjected : ' ' The pressure, the
perfectly natural pressure, that comes from each one of the parties is great.
You are urged that this particular applicant recommended by the party is
quite as good as any other you may find elsewhere. He may, in fact, have
some excellent qualifications. Perhaps the balance is almost even between
him and the other man; and yet that other man may have some particular
qualification or some particular experience, that recommends him more
strongly; and when the selection is made, then the party that recommended
the other feels aggrieved, because it says, 'After all, he was pretty nearly
as good.'
' See Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the
City of New York, Vol. V, No. 3 (April, 1915), pp. 2, 3.
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partisan expert would be inopportune. Municipal electorates
will have to be brought to the point of supporting such a policy
thru gradual education and as the result of experiments made
in the more progressive and enlightened centers. The respon-
sible executive, appointing his principal assistants only from the
best qualified of his party associates is the intermediate stage
which municipal administration has now generally reached in
its evolution and it is a step far in advance of conditions a half
century ago. It constitutes the justification of continued en-
deavor toward the goal set by Mr. Foulke. When that goal is
reached the appointive power of the mayor will be less significant
than it now is, but until then it will continue to be of the utmost
importance, despite the restrictions in the filling of subordinate
positions.
Perhaps the most promising development of recent years in
the direction of restricting the appointing of the mayor as re-
gards department heads and other major officials is the use to
which the Massachusetts State Civil Service Commission has
been put in the effort to secure expert administrative chiefs for
Boston. Upon the commission is imposed the duty of passing
upon the appointments made by the mayor. The charter pro-
vides that the latter shall appoint all heads of departments and
members of municipal boards. The confirmation of the council
is not required. It is specified, however, that the appointees
shall be recognized experts in the work that shall devolve upon
them, or that they shall be specially fitted for the performance of
their duties by reason of their education, training, or experience.
To secure this expert service the mayor is required to present
certificates giving in writing his opinion of the appointee. These
certificates are in one or two forms as follows:
"I appoint (name of appointee) to the position (name of of-
fice) and I certify that in my opinion he is a person specially
fitted by education, training or experience to perform the duties
of the said office and that I make the appointment solely in the
interest of the city.
' ' The certificate is to be signed by the mayor
and filed with the city clerk. 21 The latter forwards a certified
21 The mayor has the option of which certificate he will use. The inclu-
sion of the second form as one which might be used indicates some diver-
gence of opinion among the framers of the charter as to whether the head
of a department or the member of a board need always be a "recognized
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copy of the certificate to the state civil service commission. The
commission inquires into the appointee's qualifications, and if
satisfied as to the character of the appointee's qualifications it
becomes its duty to file a certificate similar to that of the mayor's
in the office of the city clerk. When this is done the appoint-
ment becomes operative, subject to the usual provisions govern-
ing the induction of appointees into office. If, however, the com-
mission is not satisfied as to the qualifications of the mayor's
appointee, it may void the appointment by failing to file a certi-
ficate within thirty days of the time when it received notification
from the city clerk. The operation of the foregoing provision in
Boston has commanded the attention of students of municipal
organization thruout the country. The city has been spared many
poor appointments thru the failure of the commission to approve
the certificates submitted by the mayor, and doubtless executives
have been deterred from submitting some names for which there
was obviously no hope of approval. The plan has been suggest-
ed for adoption in Cincinnati and in a somewhat modified form
in Indianapolis. Doubtless it is a step in the direction of state
control and for that reason fails to attract the support of ardent
believers in municipal home rule. Experience in Boston leads
one to surmise that the mayors of that municipality take some
long chances, and in an effort to pay off political debts submit
names for which they must realize there is little hope of approv-
al.22
A choice between the three principal methods of exercising the
expert." As a matter of experience the forms have meant but little, ap-
parently, to the mayors who have filled them in and signed their names. In
his book, The Government of American Cities, p. 231, Professor W. B.
Munro points out that from the very first the mayor of Boston has attempted
to appoint those who ' ' under the broadest interpretation of the terms ' '
could not be considered qualified. The commission which investigates the
appointments has failed to approve a very large percentage of them. In
explaining the reasons which led to the adoption of the plan Mr. Munro
says: "The Boston plan rests upon the conviction that aldermanic con-
firmation as a check upon the mayor is an open farce, if nothing worse;
that the average mayor cannot be trusted to appoint competent heads of
departments if he has sole responsibility in the matter; and that the system
of competitive civil-service examinations does not procure, for department
headships, men of adequate administrative capacity or political vision."
22 The reports of the Boston Finance Commission contain many illustra-
tions of this practice. Cf. especially Vol. V, pp. 18-20; Vol. IX, pp. 17-20.
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appointive power of the mayor should be made with due regard
to conditions obtaining in respective cities. On the whole the ex-
perience of Boston does not appear to have secured a higher
grade of public officials than have been secured in cities like
Cleveland and New York where the appointing power of the
mayor is comparatively free from all except the more formal
restrictions. The record of the Boston plan indicates that it
will serve to check the improper use of the appointing power in
the hands of a man who is willing to prostitute his office by plac-
ing in positions of authority and responsibility men who are in-
capable, untrained, and unscrupulous. It will not assure the
appointment of highly desirable chiefs. It fixes a minimum
standard below which appointees must not go, but it does little
to raise that minimum, the power of the commission is inade-
quate for that purpose. The maximum qualifications in public
servants cannot be established by any cut and dried charter de-
vice. It is the product of citizen interest, activity, and support.
Cleveland has enjoyed a long period of honest and relatively
efficient government and will not tolerate anything else. Politi-
cal conditions in Boston are less favorable than in many other
cities. The persons who could be expected to back such efforts
quite often live in adjoining cities and do not participate in the
municipal politics of Boston, and among those who reside in the
city there is wanting the degree of cooperation between different
social groups that is necessary to success. The Boston plan is
not one that commends itself to those cities willing to undertake
their own redemption without the interference of state authori-
ties. It does not contribute to the establishment of that clear
and definite responsibility in administration which is so desirable,
especially when the appointive authority of the city is elected by
one great party, while the state civil service board may be ap-
pointed by a governor elected by the opposite party. Of the
three methods, that of confirmation by the council seems to be
the least desirable, tho still the most prevalent, especially in
cities operating under general state laws and in the smaller urban
communities.
There are further restrictions upon the appointive power
which do not at first appear. Commonly the terms of the mem-
bers of boards and commissions and sometimes of officers created
by law or charter do not all expire with an outgoing administra-
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tion. It is thus possible for the dead hand of one administra-
tion to be powerfully felt in a succeeding one. 23 An interesting
restraint is found in the Los Angeles charter which permits the
recall of appointive officers. In the qualifications which are fixed
for the incumbents of many offices there are also restrictions
which operate with greater or less degree of effectiveness. More-
over there can be little doubt that the exercise of the appointing
power is more and more being subjected to close and searching
scrutiny by organized groups of the electorate and public spirit-
ed agencies. Public opinion as well as political and partisan
considerations also tend to narrow down the field of the appoint-
ing power.
Power of Removal
In close connection with the power of appointment is that of
removal. In fact the latter, with certain limitations, almost sup-
plements the power of appointment and gives to the latter much
of its significance. It makes it possible for the mayor to enforce
the responsibility to him which the power of appointment is
presumed to create. In general the removal power is exercised
in one of three ways: (1) at will, (2) for cause only, (3) with
the consent of the council, or other confirming authority.
Removal of incumbents from office at the discretion of the
mayor is the goal toward which the development of this power
has been tending. Thus Baltimore permits the removal of an
appointee in this manner during the first six months of his serv-
ice, but restricts the exercise of the removal power following
that date. Superior, Wis., authorizes the mayor to remove watch-
men, policemen, and firemen at will. The city of New York
vests in the mayor complete power to remove heads of depart-
ments at any time.24 In Toledo, Ohio, the removal power is
practically discretional with regard to all public officers except
members of the civil service commission or of the commission of
23 Thus in the charter adopted by Toledo in 1915 the terms of some of
the officers appointed by the mayor are five years. For example, the mem-
bers of the Commission of Publicity and Efficiency (Sec. 181), and of the
City Plan Commission (Sec. 189).
2* In New York City the members of the Board of Education and of the
Aqueduct Commission and trustees of the College of the City of New York
and of the Bellevue hospital and the judicial officers of the city are excepted
from the removal power of the mayor.
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publicity and efficiency, but laconically adds: "A removal by
the mayor shall be final.
' ' The Boston charter confers this power
of complete removal upon the mayor only with regard to the
employees of his office, who are excepted from the civil service
rules and denied all protection. 25
Eemoval by the mayor for cause only is the practice most gen-
erally recognized in charters of late years. The mayor's author-
ity is variously affected by these efforts to avoid giving him
arbitrary power. In Boston the method of removal for depart-
ment heads and board members, except in the case of election
commissioners, school committeemen, etc., is for the mayor to file
a written statement of the removal setting forth in detail "the
specific reasons" which prompted him to the act. A copy of the
statement is delivered to the person removed from office. If the
latter so desires he may file with the clerk a written statement in
reply. This reply does not, however, have any other value than
that of bringing the mayor's action into publicity. It does not
affect the action taken by him unless he himself so determines.
There is little difference between this situation and that which
exists in Toledo. In the Boston case the filing of the reasons is
mandatory; in Toledo it is necessary only upon the demand of
the party removed. In both cases the action of the mayor is
final. The Boston type of removal is the most powerful now
employed under the restriction that causes may be assigned.
Very inadequate reasons may be given, so that the power is after
all restrained principally by the degree of publicity which is
likely to follow its exercise.
26
25 Amended City Charter, Sec. 15. The paragraph is unique among char-
ter provisions and reads:
"The civil service law shall not apply to the appointment of the mayor's
secretaries, nor of the stenographers, clerks, telephone operators and mes-
sengers connected with his office, and the mayor may remove such ap-
pointees without a hearing and without making a statement of the cause
for their removal." Cf. San Francisco, Charter, Art. 4, Chap. I, Sec. 1.
26 Amended City Charter, Sec. 14. One mayor of Boston has used the
power of removal rather vigorously. In March, 1914, Mayor Curley ousted
sixty-three employees from the department of public works, justifying the
act by announcing the saving of approximately $76,000 per annum to the
city, that sum representing the total of their salaries. In 1914 also the
entire board of appeals was removed. The only other case under the pres-
ent charter was the removal of the fire commissioner in 1912. The same
party has, however, been in control since the amended charter was adopted.
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The recently adopted St. Louis charter indicates a slightly
more conservative development. The mayor may remove all
non-elective officers and all employees; "but shall not remove
from any office, department or division head appointed by him,
except for cause.
' ' Another provision in the charter follows the
Toledo plan, and enables the employees of the city other than
those excepted above to require a statement of the reasons for
discharge to be filed with the efficiency board of the municipality.
The charter does not specify the nature of the causes or the man-
ner of their presentation, and in its practical operation there
appears to be but a shade of difference between the St. Louis
provisions and those obtaining in Boston. The St. Louis pro-
visions, indeed, expressly authorize the appointing officer to
' '
sus-
pend or discharge or reduce in rank or compensation any officer
or employee under him, with or without cause," cases specified
in the charter alone excepted. 27 These instances, however, rep-
resent a very weak survival of the requirement that removals
may be for cause only.
Earlier practice is indicated by the general municipal law of
Illinois and the general charter statute for Indiana cities. In
these states any officer appointed by the mayor may be removed
by him, but the reasons for the action must be reported to the
city council and in Indiana to the person removed.28 The Illinois
statute empowers the mayor to act whenever the interests of the
city demand it, but protect an officer against removal from office
a second time for the same offense. The reasons must be filed
with the council within ten days. If this is not done or if the
council by a two-thirds vote disapproves of the removal, the offi-
cer is restored to his position. It is easy to see, however, that
many cases might arise in which the opposition of the mayor's
action could not command the necessary two-thirds majority and
the action of the executive would stand with or without satisfac-
tory reasons. Of all the requirements that provide for removal
for cause only those similar to the provisions of the Baltimore
charter guarantee that the cause will have something of reality
27 In classified service, removals, etc., on account of religious or political
opinions or affiliations are prohibited. Art. 18, Sec. 12.
28 General Municipal Laws of Illinois, Art. 2, Sec. 27. It is interesting
to observe that in the Chicago charter convention of 1904 this feature of
the removal power of the mayor was retained intact.
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in them. After the appointee has held office for six months of
his term he may be removed only for cause and after a hearing
upon the case.
The third method of exercising the removal power is with the
consent of the council or other confirming power. The situation
in Los Angeles is typical. There the charter provides that with
regard to appointed officers the appointing power shall have the
power of removal in all cases, but "where confirmation is re-
quired, the assent of the confirming body shall be requisite for
removal." The action of the council or other assenting body is
to be taken by an open ballot or call of the roll and the respective
votes made a matter of record. The number of cities which re-
quire procedure of this kind in effecting removals is compara-
tively small and is diminishing. None of the later charters pro-
posed or adopted include this method, although it was quite the
usual method when the power of removal was first being vested
in the mayor.
29
There are other methods of removing officers extant, but the
number of cities in which they apply are limited. One of the
methods denies to the mayor the power to remove but enables
him to prosecute charges before the council or other competent
authority.
30 In some cities the subordinate officers may be re-
moved from office by the recall and are ineligible for reappoint-
ment if recalled. In still others the council alone may remove,
but in these cases it still retains the power of appointment.31
The last method to be mentioned is that of vesting the power to
2 Other cities which still retain this method are Waltham, Mass., Charter,
See. 30; Detroit, Mich., Charter, See. 162, but this requires a majority vote
only; Worcester, Mass., and Newton, Mass., kept this method until 1903 and
1910 respectively; cf. also charters of Providence, E. I., Sec. 9, Clause 9;
Pawtucket, E. I., Sec. 7, Clause 7, requiring two-thirds and three-fifths
votes respectively to remove; and for Butte, Mont., the Political Code of
Montana, Sec. 4781.
so See Kentucky General Act for the Government of Second-class Cities,
Sec. 184. The mayor, however, may dismiss officers who are found to have
been interested in contracts with the city without the consent of the alder-
men. The ordinary method of reaching this practice of municipal officers
being interested in public contracts is to declare that such contracts are
void.
si Milwaukee, Charter, Chap. XIX, Sec. 7; Minneapolis, Charter, Chap.
II, Sec. 1; cities of the fourth class in the state of Michigan, General Act
of Incorporation, Sec. 103.
287] THE MAYOR AND ADMINISTRATION 91
remove in the mayor, but authorizing an appeal from his action
to the local courts, the decision of the latter to be final.
32 This
list may not be exhaustive, but it is at least indicative of the vari-
ety of the processes that still obtain in the exercise of the power
of removal. The centralization of administrative authority in
the mayoral office is by no means so complete as the survey of
the more important cities would lead one to think. In scanning
the numerous methods by which the removal power is called into
play one sees the weak mayoralty of a century ago side by side
with the most highly developed and powerful executive of the
twentieth century.
As has been noted, removal power is intended to enable a
mayor to bring the rest of his administration into harmony with
his own policy, or to curb maladministration. But many times
it proves difficult to bring the power into play. The mayor often
hesitates to offend powerful groups or interests that may be in-
terested in the misconduct of an officer. The existence of the
power of removal, however, enables the public to fasten responsi-
bility upon the mayor and in that respect its development has
been eminently justified. There are of course instances of its
gross abuse. It was most notoriously employed in Terre Haute,
Indiana, during the election fraud cases in 1915. The mayor
announced that those city employees who pleaded to the indict-
ments for election fraud returned in the federal court would be
dismissed from the service. The mayor himself being under in-
dictment at the time and later being found guilty of charges
which revealed him as the leader in the fraudulent practices
charged, the threat to remove could be interpreted only as an at-
tempt to coerce his fellow defendants into a more vigorous de-
fense. There can be little doubt that the power to remove is one
that is frequently employed to bulldose employees of the city into
subservience that is far from the kind of harmony which the
power was intended to promote. Despite this situation one can-
not seriously question that the power has produced the results
which were expected of it and has been a potent element in mayor
government. The cause of good government appears to be best
served where the power of removal is complete or nearly so, at
least with regard to heads of departments and other important
32 Cf. Norfolk, Va., Charter, Sec. 11. The mayor must specify his reasons
to the party removed.
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functionaries not included within the permanent civil service of
the municipality. The best guarantee for its proper exercise is
the publicity which must inevitably attend its application to im-
portant offices.
Power of Suspension
Closely allied with the power of removal is that of suspension.
Frequently it is not mentioned in the municipal charters, 33 but
often it is conferred in connection with the power to appoint and
the power to remove.34 In Newport, Rhode Island, the mayor
may suspend any city official. If the action is sustained by the
aldermen, the officer is removed from office. 35 In Superior, Wis-
consin, the mayor may suspend and reinstate any employees in
the police and fire departments, and may suspend other officials
against whom charges have been preferred until the latter have
been disposed of. In some cities those of Indiana for exam-
ple the reason for the suspension must be sent to the city
council. The party suspended must be notified of the action,
but the decision of the mayor seems to be final. In all of the
foregoing cases the power of suspension is expressly conferred
but its use and application to individual cases lie within execu-
tive discretion. In San Francisco the exercise of this power be-
comes a duty and the authority conferred upon the mayor is
couched in mandatory terms.36 In general the power to suspend
depends upon its being explicitly bestowed, but in case the ap-
pointive P9wer of the mayor is complete and exclusive and the
terms of appointive officials are not fixed, as in New York or
Cleveland, the power to suspend becomes a part of the measure
of executive discretion vested in the mayor.87
There has been a disposition in a number of cities to extend
33 For example the charters of Boston and Baltimore.
s* Cf. the charter of Indianapolis, Sec. 80 ; of Superior, Wis., Sec. 22.
35 Vide description of the Newport plan by E. E. Chadwiek in the Pro-
ceedings of the Providence Conference on Good City Government, p. 172
(1907).
3 Charter, Art. 4, Chap. I, Sec. 2. The language is as follows: "When
any official defalcation or wilful neglect of duty or official misconduct shall
come to his (the mayor's) knowledge, he shall suspend the delinquent officer
or person from office pending an official investigation."
37 This feature of the power of suspension is discussed from the stand-
point of administrative law in Bayles' The Office of Mayor in the United
States, pp. 55, 56.
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the mayor's power of suspension to elective officers as well as
to subordinate appointive officials. It was retained in the new
charter of St. Louis and is found in the charter of San Francisco.
The former charter of St. Louis permitted the mayor to suspend
elective officers for cause. He must then file charges with the
register and convene the council for the purpose of stating his
ground of action. The approval of the council removed the in-
cumbent from his position. Failure to approve operated to re-
instate the one suspended. The provisions in the new charter
are very similar. A three-fourths vote of the board of aldermen
is necessary to sustain the charges and fix the time and
the place of the hearing. A rather formal trial ensues. The
members of the board must record their vote by the yeas and
nays and their action is certified to the mayor. If the suspension
is not sustained the immediate reinstatement of the defendant
is mandatory. The provisions in the case of San Francisco are
practically identical with the foregoing. In both cities the mayor
enjoys the power of appointing some person to perform the
duties of the office vacated by the suspension.
In general the power of suspension with regard to an elective
office is vested either in some state authority or it is vested in
the council.38 When vested in the mayor it signifies a develop-
ment of the doctrine of centralization in administrative power
and responsibility that is cumbersome and on the whole undesira-
ble. It has none of the advantages that are to be gained by the
adoption of the short ballot and the concurrent recognition of
the mayor 's power of appointment and removal. Nevertheless it
may be accepted as an evidence of a tendency to exalt the posi-
tion of the mayoralty in administration, even at the expense of
the elective principle.
The power of suspension can hardly be viewed except in rela-
tion to the power of removal. In the case of appointive officers
in the administration it is often used but chiefly as a preliminary
to the more vigorous discipline of complete removal, not with a
view of chastening the individual affected. Occasionally a re-
instatement occurs but it is not the rule.
The powers of appointment, removal, and suspension have been
the center of prolonged controversy, and the discussion over them
ss See the charter of the city of Los Angeles, Art. 2, Sec. 9.
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is worthy of brief consideration. The municipal charter of the
National Municipal League placed in the hands of the mayor
the power of appointing practically all subordinates. 39 The
wisdom of this feature of the charter was questioned by some of
the conference which adopted it, and has been questioned since
that time on the ground that this power over department heads
is sufficient. It also has been urged that any further extension
of his control has a demoralizing effect on the municipal service,
while the moral effect of responsibility on the part of subordi-
nates to department heads
' '
is great and should not be sacrificed
except for very cogent reasons.
' ' In the address by former Gov-
ernor W. E. Kussell of Massachusetts, he expressed the opinion
that the power of the mayor to appoint should be limited, but
his power to remove, complete.40 Municipal practice has tended
to invest the mayor with complete authority over department
chiefs and to create a subordinate service that is chosen under
the merit system and responsible to department heads.
Power of Investigation
One of the most universally recognized powers which the may-
or possesses is that of investigating all branches of the adminis-
tration and the conduct of departmental and subordinate officials.
Upon no other feature is there such unanimity in municipal
charters, unless it is upon the provision that he shall be the chief
executive officer of the city. By far the most generally employed
phraseology for conferring this power is that which declares
that the mayor "shall have the power at any time to examine
any books or records of any employee of the city." These
words or their equivalent are found in scores of municipal char-
ters and in many general charter statutes.41 Slight variations
39 Municipal Corporations Act, Art. 4, Sec. 1. The provisions were that
the mayor should appoint all heads of departments except the controller;
also subject to civil service regulations the subordinate administrative offi-
cers and employees except that laborers were to be appointed and removed
by the heads of departments. In New York City the direct and indirect
appointing power of the mayor affects approximately seventy thousand per-
sons, drawing salaries totaling more than sixty-five and one-half millions of
dollars. Cf. Short Ballot BuMetin, Vol. Ill, No. 7 (February, 1916), p. 7.
40 Quoted in Keinsch, Readings in State Government, pp. 8, 9.
*i Cf. the General Law relating to the Incorporation of Cities of the
Fourth Class in Michigan, Sec. 50; The Cities and Villages Act of Illinois,
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occur: the word "inspect" is used in place of the word "exam-
ine
;
' ' the words ' ' papers
' '
and ' ' manner of doing business
' '
are
added now and then; the phrase "without notice" appears occa-
sionally; now and then the employment of experts for the in-
vestigation is authorized; and in some cases "departments" are
specified as coming within the power of investigation.42 Indeed
these provisions have been common in charters since the emer-
gence of the mayoralty into more than merely nominal leader-
ship. Taken by themselves, however, they have provided for
little more than nominal powers of investigation and to assume
that the authority is or has been diligently or intelligently exer-
cised appears to be very largely unwarranted. Occasionally, as
in the case of Josiah Quincy, a mayor has taken this power seri-
ously, but its vigorous exercise is not popular among municipal
employees ; it demands a large measure of tact on the part of the
executive; it lays heavy tribute upon the mayor's time and en-
ergy ; and finally it presumes a training and a knowledge of what
constitutes "legal and proper" methods of doing business, keep-
ing records and accounts that many mayors do not have. In this
matter of inspection, too, local tradition has had no little to do
with actual practice, and very frequently the sudden introduc-
tion of adequate inspection or examination has been regarded as
casting unwarranted suspicion upon the official concerned, or as
evidencing an unjustifiable and prying concern on the part of
the mayor. Doubtless, too, there have been cases in which
mayors did not care to employ this authority, vaguely realizing
that it might not cast credit upon the record of their own admin-
istration.
It should be observed, on the other hand, that the mayor has
actually enjoyed no such sweep of authority as the general lan-
guage employed would seem to indicate. To remedy this situa-
tion and to render the mayor capable of conducting investiga-
tions efficiently the National Municipal League program advised
that the mayor be empowered to compel the attendance and tes-
timony of witnesses in connection with his investigations. Some
Art. 2, See. 31; Baltimore, Charter, Sec. 21; Tacoma, Charter, Art. 4, Sec.
51; Rochester, Charter, Sec. 49.
42 Baltimore specifies
' '
departments, sub-departments, municipal board,
officer, assistant, clerk, subordinate or employee." Sec. 21. The Illinois
act specified any "agent" of the city.
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of the more recent charters recognize this suggestion. The char-
ter of Cleveland, for example, provides that "the mayor may,
without notice, cause the affairs of any department or the con-
duct of any officer or employee to be examined. Any person or
persons appointed by the mayor to examine the affairs of any
department or the conduct of any officer or employee, shall have
the same power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the
production of witnesses' papers and other evidence and to cause
witnesses to be punished for contempt, as is conferred upon the
council or a committee thereof by this charter." Substantially
the same provisions are found in the Toledo and St. Louis char-
ters. There is also created in the case of Toledo, a commission of
publicity and efficiency whose functions are: (1) to investigate
any and all departments and offices; (2) to make semi-annual
reports of its conclusions to the mayor and to other municipal
authorities; (3) to recommend improved methods to the council;
(4) to publish or to furnish to any person at its discretion any
reports, recommendations, or information it may have concerning
affairs; (5) to investigate and publish information concerning
the improvement and development of municipal administration
elsewhere; (6) to publish all municipal records and reports; and
(7) to collect information for and to advise with all offices and
departments. This commission not only furnishes the mayor
with the means of conducting an investigation, but maintains
such an investigation constantly and by the publicity secured
stimulates his constant interest and activity along the same lines.
A somewhat similar provision is found in Cleveland in the
bureau of information and efficiency, but its powers are less
apparent.
Two very interesting developments in the direction of vitaliz-
ing the mayor's power of investigation have appeared in New
York and Boston respectively. In New York the mayor is made
responsible for the administration, an obligation that involves
the oversight of some twenty-nine departments and nearly sev-
enty thousand employees. The interests cared for by these de-
partments are vast and important and involve an annual ex-
penditure running up into hundreds of millions. Obviously the
mayor needs some efficient agency for exerting his power of
investigation. "The Mayor's Eye" has been created for this
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purpose, a commissioner of accounts employing almost one hun-
dred skilled persons who ' ' day in and day out ' ' furnish the chief
executive with information that enables him to keep in touch
with all branches of the administration. It has proven a most
effective instrument for aiding the mayor in his efforts to secure
good government.43
The Boston charter creates a finance committee whose duty it
is
' ' from time to time to investigate any and all matters relating
to appropriations, loans, expenditures, accounts, and methods of
administration affecting the city of Boston or the county of Suf-
folk, or any department thereof, that may appear to the com-
mission to need investigation, and to report ... to the
mayor, the city council, the governor or the general court.
' ' An
annual report to the state legislature is required. It is also pro-
vided that "whenever any payroll, bill or other claim against the
city is presented to the mayor ... he shall, if the same
seems to him to be of doubtful validity, excessive in amount, or
otherwise contrary to the city's interest, refer it to the finance
commission, which shall immediately investigate the facts and
report thereon . . ." The commission is made independent
of voluntary appropriations by the municipal council and is
authorized to incur such expenses "as it may deem necessary"
and the city is made liable for the payment of these expenses to
an amount not exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars upon
requisition by the commission. The city is obliged to make an
annual appropriation of twenty-five thousand dollars for investi-
gations, besides the salary of the chairman of the commission.
The commission is clothed with authority adequate to enable it
to do its work effectively. It will be observed that the Boston
plan provides the mayor with an effective agent for carrying on
such investigations as he may care to inaugurate; it further
makes sure that investigation will proceed whether the mayor
initiates it or not. These two features are highly desirable and
will doubtless find place in many future charters. But the
finance commission is appointed by the governor and is a state as
well as a municipal agency. It is hardly to be anticipated that
municipal charter commissions will incorporate these latter pro-
visions into the charter drafts which they submit. The Toledo
See pamphlet, The Mayor's Eye, pp. 3-5.
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plan appears much more likely to commend itself, strengthened,
perhaps, by the acceptable features which the Boston charter
offers.
The mayor's power of investigation is frequently enlarged by
the council thru ordinances empowering him to act along
specific lines. One has but to turn the pages of the numerous
volumes of compiled ordinances which are accumulating so rap-
idly today to discover that the council is defining with great
detail the inspectional duties of the mayor. Every new regula-
tory ordinance provides for records to be kept, conditions of one
or many sorts to be maintained in stores, shops, industrial
establishments, etc., and the mayor's office is charged with the
investigation of such records and conditions. This tendency is
especially marked in smaller cities where the departmental estab-
lishment is not highly organized, or where the council still re-
mains a very powerful organ of government ; 4* but it is far from
absent in the more important municipalities.45
Reports and Conferences
An important element of the mayor's administrative authority
is his powers of calling meetings of department heads, members
of boards, commissions, and bureaus, and the allied power of call-
ing for reports from them either at regular intervals or at his
pleasure. These powers are frequently conferred in express
terms in the municipal charters, while in cases in which ap-
pointees hold office at the pleasure of the mayor the latter has
ample authority to make such demands. The phraseology in
which these powers are bestowed varies greatly. The Cleveland
charter provides for annual reports from the directors of depart-
ments to the mayor and for the furnishing to the mayor "at any
time" such information as he may desire. The Baltimore char-
ter employs somewhat happier phraseology. An annual confer-
** See for example, the Principal Ordinances of Superior, Wis., pp. 187,
188, 197.
is The Eevised Code of St. Louis furnishes many examples. In larger
as well as smaller cities mayors make personal tours of inspection from time
to time. It may be observed that the increasing accessibility of municipal
ordinances opens up a wide field for study in municipal legislation. In some
of the more important branches of it such as franchise legislation the trails
through the wilderness have been blazed, but the larger part of this field
has received little attention beyond spasmodic attempts at local codification.
295] THE MAYOR AND ADMINISTRATION 99
ence is mandatory, but the mayor may summon heads of depart-
ments "to a conference on municipal matters . . . oftener,
if he thinks the public interests will be promoted thereby." Re-
ports either oral or written, as the mayor may prefer, are to be
made once every month. The St. Louis charter enables the
mayor to require any department, board, or officer to "make
reports to him," besides requiring annual reports and the fur-
nishing of information
' '
at any time.
' ' An example of the exer-
cise of the mayor's power of calling for information is given by
Mayor Mitchel in a discussion of the office of mayor. Prior to
his administration, department heads had been submitting
budget estimates to the board of estimate and apportionment.
Upon his accession department heads were instructed to submit
their estimates to the mayor, enabling the latter to review them
and to present to the board of estimate and apportionment an
executive budget. The result was that the amount asked for in
the budget represented a decrease from the actual appropria-
tions of the year before.
46 In this case the exercise of the mayor's
authority secured not only economical estimates of departmental
needs, but it made possible the inauguration of a desirable fea-
ture in municipal budget making. The mayor system has con-
siderable to learn regarding the value of frequent meetings of
heads of departments with the executive, a value which is being
demonstrated in cities under commission and manager governed
systems. It is equally true that the power to call for informa-
tion and reports may be made the means of securing more re-
sponsible and enlightened administration.
On Boards and Commissions
In some cities the position of the mayor in administration is
enhanced by his being made ex officio a member of local boards
and commissions, or in case membership is denied him, being
privileged to attend and take part in board meetings. In San
Francisco, for example, he is a member of the board of library
trustees and is privileged to attend the meetings of any other
boards and to offer suggestions during their proceedings. Cleve-
land makes the mayor president of the board of control and of
the sinking fund commission; and Cleveland and Toledo make
48 Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New
York, Vol. V, No. 3 (April, 1915), p. 8.
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him president of the board of revision and assessments. In New
York City the mayor sits as chairman of the boards and commis-
sions of which he is a member, viz., the board of estimate and
apportionment, the sinking fund commission, the banking com-
mission, the armory board, and the board of city record.47 St.
Louis and Rochester, New York, follow the practice of making
the mayor a member of the board of estimate and apportion-
ment,
48 and Baltimore places the mayor on the board of esti-
mates. The latter city also makes the mayor a member of the
board of charities and corrections, of the art commission, and of
the board of review and assessment. Occasionally, as in some
Illinois cities which retain their special charters issued before the
constitution of 1870 was adopted, the mayor is a member of the
board of education.
It should be observed that the policy of making the mayor a
member of municipal boards and commissions may easily be car-
ried to the point where it imposes an unnecessary burden upon
him. Except in the case of boards whose function it is to unify
and direct the work of important branches of administration or
to coordinate the efforts of various administrative districts, such
as the boroughs of New York City, or to prepare the budget and
apportion the distribution of the annual revenue, there seems to
be little gained by making the mayor a member of a board that
could not be gained by giving him adequate powers of appoint-
ment and removal, supervision, and control. The later charters,
in so far as any tendency may be said to exist, appear to recog-
nize this fact, and it cannot be said that there is any disposition
to extend the practice.
Power of Approval
Perhaps the power which lays the heaviest demand upon the
time of the mayor is that of approval. At his discretion literally
hundreds of measures and acts that feature the conduct of ad-
ministration are subject to his approval. A complete enumera-
tion of these would serve no good purpose, but the following
47 See article by Mayor Mitehel in Proceedings of the Academy of Polit-
ical Science in the City of New York, Vol. V, No. 3 (April, 1915) , pp. 4, 7.
48 Charter, Art. 16, Sec. 1. One of the criticisms made of the St. Louis
charter before and after its adoption was that it did not make the mayor
powerful enough. Eochester, Charter, Sec. 61.
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classification of matters subject to the mayor's approval indi-
cates the range within which cities confer the power of approval :
1. Blanket provisions that the mayor may approve all matters
requiring approval for which the charter has failed to provide
some other method.
2. The bonds of city officers and bidders and contractors for
city work, and of those holding licenses and permits.
3. The settlement of disputes as to jurisdiction between offi-
cers or branches of the administration.
4. The institution of suits at law on behalf of the city.
5. The appointments made by the controller and other officers
of the administration.
6. The assignment of rooms and offices to the departments, or
renting of additional space for administrative purposes.
7. The inauguration or extension of special administrative
undertakings such as investigations.
8. The adjustment and settlement of claims against the city.
9. The rules and regulations of municipal departments,
boards, and commissions.
10. Multitudinous and varied matters upon which the ap-
proval of the mayor is required by city ordinances. Market
leases, settlements made by street commissioners, deposits of city
funds, the release of mortgages, water rates, and the like.
It is worthy of observation that in more recent charters the
amount of this work requiring the approval of the mayor has
decreased, at least so far as incorporation of the requirements in
the charters themselves is concerned. At the same time the
power itself remains practically intact through the larger and
more immediate control which the mayor has gained over the
administrative service by the elimination of the council as a
factor in appointments and the development of a complete power
of removal. Exceptions to this tendency may be noted in iso-
lated paragraphs in such charters as those of Cleveland and
Toledo. For some of the exceptions there appear to be reasons,
especially in the expenditure of public funds. Thus in Toledo,
contracts which involve the expenditure of five hundred dollars
or more may not be entered into unless approved by the mayor
and the head of the department interested.
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Public Safety
In the administration of departments which involve the public
safety the mayor usually enjoys exceedingly broad powers and
the charters freely specify that the position of the mayor is one
of supremacy in this particular. In the Cleveland charter, for
example, the director of public safety who is the executive head
of the police and fire divisions is specifically "under the direc-
tion of the mayor." In the San Francisco charter it is pro-
vided that the mayor "may use and command the police force."
The Los Angeles mayoralty is not as imposing in its authority
as that of many other cities, but a charter amendment of 1911
gives the chief of police the supervision and control of the police
force "subject only to the orders of the mayor." In cities like
Boston, Baltimore, and St. Louis, where the police are under the
control of commissioners responsible to state authority, the
mayor's powers are limited except in cases of extreme danger.
In the smaller fourth class cities of Michigan, and in other cases,
the control of the local police is vested in the council.49 The
mayor is frequently clothed with the powers of a sheriff for the
purpose of enforcing law and suppressing disorder. It is obvious
where the chief of police or the police commissioner hold office
at the pleasure of the mayor that the latter 's authority is both
immediate and effective, even though special provisions are not
incorporated in the charter to that end.50
The relation of the mayor to the fire department is not by any
means uniform thruout the country. In general the prac-
tices fall into one of two groups, those in which it is on the same
basis as the police department, and those in which there is a
distinct differentiation. Cleveland and Seattle furnish very
good examples of the first group, tho widely differing from each
other. In the former the chief of the division of fire is respon-
sible to the mayor as well as to the director of public safety, and
the mayor enjoys the sole power of suspension prior to a hearing
49 Michigan, laws relating to the incorporation of cities.
so The administrations of Mayors Whitlock in Toledo and Gaynor in
New York indicate the influence of the mayor in police affairs; even in a
city like Chicago with the council occupying a strong position, the mayor is
the dominating figure in police administration. The Newburgh Survey, pp.
43, 44, found that the discipline of the police department was largely in the
hands of the mayor and the chief of police.
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by the civil service commission. The determination of the pol-
icies of the department are subject to the will of the mayor
thru his effective control over the director of public safety.
The mayor of Seattle appoints the chief of the fire department
from those who have qualified under the civil service rules. The
mayor is charged with the prescription of rules for the depart-
ment, and may remove the head of the department in accord-
ance with the rules of the civil service code. The Kansas City
charter gives to the mayor the appointment of the board of fire
and water commissioners. To this board is given the authority
to appoint the fire chief and to organize the water supply system
as well as the fire fighting system. The board consists of three
members, one retiring each year, a fact which materially lessens
the effectiveness of the mayor's control, tho he is ex officio a
member of the board and may, therefore, exert a great personal
influence. New York City offers the best example of a city in
which the mayor may dominate completely if he so desires; he
may remove the head of the department of fire commissioners,
at pleasure. An interesting variation is found in Los Angeles
where the mayor is by charter made a member ex officio and pres-
ident of the board of fire commisioners, there being two other
electors appointed by him subject to the confirmation of the coun-
cil. The chief engineer or fire chief, is however, appointed by
the mayor and expressly subject to being removed by the latter.
San Francisco takes great pains to establish a non-partisan board
of fire commissioners, by providing that not more than two out
of a membership of four may be of the same political party.
The mayor, however, may attend the meetings and take part in
the board's deliberations, tho without a vote.
The twentieth century has witnessed an increasing tendency
to vest in the mayor an authority over public safety commen-
surate with the responsibility imposed. In states like Illinois,
where the elected chief of police or city marshal was found
frequently thirty or forty years ago, the almost universal prac-
tice today is appointment by the mayor, subject to confirmation
by the council. Elsewhere the tendency has been to free the
police force from political influence through the adoption of civil
service reform measures, but to retain the mayor's control over
the head of the department and to give the mayor either inde-
pendent, supervisory, or concurrent police authority. With re-
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spect to the fire department differing tendencies are noticeable
and the place of the mayor is certainly not so clear and com-
manding as is his position in police administration. The dis-
position indicated in the Cleveland, Toledo, and St. Louis char-
ters, the amendments to the Los Angeles charter in 1911, and
the practice that obtains in New York and Boston reveal a
decided trend toward concentration of power in the mayoral
office; on the other hand the system of board control has been
retained in important centers such as Baltimore, Kansas City,
and San Francisco, the mayor enjoying at best a somewhat lim-
ited authority.
51
Normally it may be said that the mayor's power in respect to
the conduct of departments such as police, fire, and health, is
not conspicuously exercised. The major part of the task is com-
mitted to the heads of the departments, or directors or boards
entrusted with the immediate performance of the work. There
are many occasions, however, when the mayor takes an active
part in the formation of the plans and policies of these depart-
ments and in supplying the energy and vigor with which they
are put into execution.52 The problems connected with the public
safety offer large opportunity for gross abuse of the vast powers
conferred. Not a few municipal executives have either proven
incapable of dealing with these problems, or have permitted the
agencies which were intended to protect the public to be con-
verted into instruments for personal or partisan advantage, par-
ticularly in the field of police administration. The best that can
be said for the mayor's relation to these agencies is that condi-
tions have materially improved, thanks to the efforts of cour-
ageous mayors like Jones, "Whitlock, Johnson, Gaynor, Mitchel,
and others, and the tendency to call into directorship men of
vision and training. On the other hand, the mayoralty has un-
doubtedly failed to furnish the consistent, enlightened, pro-
gressive, and efficient leadership that the measure of its authority
has in many places demanded of it.
6i In Minneapolis the mayor has powers concurrent with those exercised
by the chief of police.
52 See for a recent example, the account of Mayor Mitchel 's handling of
the police problem in the National Municipal Review, Vol. V, No. 1 (Jan-
uary, 1916), pp. 30, 31.
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Finance Administration
The special powers of the mayor in the field of finance admin-
istration call for a more individualized consideration than their
previous mention in association with other powers indicates. It
is in this field that many conspicuous developments in mayoral
authority have taken place during the last two decades. In New
York and St. Louis the mayor is a member of the board of esti-
mate and apportionment and participates in the work of financial
direction and control entrusted to that body. In New York City
he is also a member of the sinking fund commission, and in that
capacity acts as one of the trustees of all the sinking funds of the
city and helps to determine the interest rate on public bond
issues. As chairman of the banking commission the mayor shares
the responsibility of selecting the depositories of city funds ; by
creating an executive budget he has assumed an immediate con-
trol over the finances of the various municipal departments.53 In
Cleveland and Toledo the mayor prepares the annual budget, in
performance of which duty he is obliged to know the conditions
obtaining in each department, and to pass upon numerous ques-
tions of departmental finance and administration. Within cer-
tain limitations the mayor of Boston is not only authorized to
prepare the annual budget, but may approve the transfer of
appropriations from one fund to another. The importance to
Boston of the mayor's financial powers is revealed in the report
of the Boston finance commission on the administration of Mayor
Fitzgerald in 1912. The mayor is held responsible for extrava-
gance in payrolls, his neglect of the fire department, his tendency
to permit increases of appropriations and his approval of prop-
ositions which would have wiped out the margin of the city's bor-
rowing power ; on the other hand it was noted that he had given
more funds to the permanent improvement projects, had checked
the increase in the municipal debt, and had bettered the condi-
tions under which contracts were awarded.
In many cities, of course, it is still true that the power of the
mayor in finance administration is comparatively limited. The
usual power to inspect books and accounts obtains, but the real
ss Charter, Sec. 204; also Proceedings of the Academy of Political Sci-
ence, etc., Vol. V, No. 3 (April, 1915), p. 9.
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authority in finance administration still vests in the council.
54
Yet even in council governed Chicago the mayor appoints the
city comptroller ; in Kansas City the mayor is one of a committee
of three to select the depositories of city funds ; in Baltimore the
mayor must approve the appointees of the elective controller and
is a member of the board of estimates and of the advisory depart-
ment of review and assessment. In Seattle he is merely a mem-
ber of the auditing committee. On the whole it appears that his
power in financial administration is increasing, a conclusion
which is borne out by a survey of the recommendations of prac-
tically all the recent charter commissions.
Judicial Administration
The survey of the relation of the mayor to administration
would not be complete without some consideration of his position
in the work of meting out justice. Formerly the mayor actually
possessed considerable judicial authority, traces of which are still
abundant.55 It has been very generally held that this judicial
power of the mayor is tending to disappear, and there is much
to confirm this opinion. Later municipal charters do not recog-
nize former practice in this particular and generally omit pro-
visions which confer such power upon the executive. 56 In some
cases, however, this loss of judicial authority is more apparent
than real, for, as in Ohio, the law of the state may do what the
charter makers have refused to do. In Ohio the judicial author-
ity of the mayor was actually increased by legislative enactment
of April 28, 1913. The mayor was given jurisdiction in coun-
ties over such subjects as food adulteration, the protection of
children, the enforcement of liquor laws, the laws governing food
54 For example in Los Angeles, Chicago, and the cities of Illinois, Kansas
City, and Seattle.
ss A rather detailed description of the judicial authority of the mayor
will be found in Fairlie, Municipal Administration, Chap. XIX, p. 421.
Cf. also Bayles' The Office of Mayor in the United States, Chap. V. In
brief the mayor was a justice of the peace, possessed of some civil and
criminal jurisdiction, and held court. In 1895 Mr. Bayles prophesied that
his judicial authority would in the future either be ignored or expressly
withdrawn (p. 74). Earlier practice is illustrated in the code of N. C.,
See. 2934.
se Cf. the charters of St. Louis, Los Angeles, Cleveland, the proposed Cin-
cinnati charter, those of Kansas City, Seattle, and many more.
303] THE MAYOR AND ADMINISTRATION 107
stuffs, sanitation in dairies, bakeries, and restaurants, and the in-
spection of weights and measures. In the charters of New York
and Baltimore the mayor still is vested with the power of a
magistrate and a justice of the peace respectively. 57 The Mis-
souri legislature confers upon the mayor the power of the county
courts with respect to specified matters. State law in Minnesota
makes the mayor one of a group of three who are authorized to
prepare the list of those who are to act as jurors in the municipal
courts. The power and duty of holding court regularly still
exists in Indiana and some southern states
;
and to be married by
the mayor is still regarded by some seekers after marital bliss as
the most desirable method of solemnizing the marriage contract.
On the whole, however, the position of the mayor as a judicial
officer appears to be declining, owing largely, perhaps, to the
development in the cities of other and better agencies for the
administration of justice, and to the pressure of other matters
upon the mayor 's time and strength.
Of much more immediate consequence is the mayor 's authority
to modify the results of judicial findings through the remission
of fines and penalties and the release of persons imprisoned for
violation of municipal ordinances. Thus in New York and Illi-
nois the mayor may suspend sentences, release prisoners, remit
fines, etc. ; the same under restriction is true in Kansas City and
many other places.58 The power is often abused, especially when
administrations are under pressure to "enforce sumptuary and
liquor laws." Great display is made -of the searching out of vio-
lators; their prosecution, conviction, and the penalties imposed
are heralded to the public. The wrath of the public, aroused to
57 New York, Charter, Sec. 116; Baltimore, Charter, See. 21. The New
York provision is laconic: "The Mayor is a magistrate." For Ohio see
Act of April 28, 1913.
ss Cf. New York, Charter, See. 707, Par. 3. The mayor enjoys this power
by reason of being a magistrate. In Illinois the mayor is expected to report
to the council the release of prisoners. See Municipal Laws of Illinois,
Art. 2, Sec. 29. The Chicago charter convention of 1904 proposed to con-
tinue vesting this authority in the mayor and incorporated a provision to
that effect in the instrument it drew up. The mayor of St. Louis is by
ordinance given the power to remit fines, penalties, etc. In Kansas City the
word ' ' Forfeitures ' ' is added to the list enumerating the penalties to which
the mayor's power of remission extends. In Madison, Wis., (Charter, Chap.
XII, Sec. 21) the mayor may grant pardons, commutations, etc.
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demand such actions, is appeased, and the mayor may safely slip
around to the scene of the recent prosecution and enter his order
of remission in behalf of those convicted. Notwithstanding the
temptation to pervert this power in order to curry political favor
there is not sufficient evidence to warrant the claim that its abuse
is the normal condition. In the first place the power itself has
disappeared from many charters ; in the second place the mayors
of larger cities seldom interfere personally, preferring to act
upon the recommendation of subordinate investigators or boards
created to look into applications for clemency; and finally the
more liberal interpretation of sumptuary legislation in large
cities has tended to limit the occasion for the abuses to the smaller
municipalities.
Miscellaneous Powers
In addition to the foregoing powers of the mayor there is a
large group of miscellaneous powers conferred upon him either
in state statutes, city charters, or municipal ordinances. These
powers include the prescription of parade routes, granting con-
sent to place building material in the street, the inspection of
pawn brokers' registers, the designation of local holidays, the
authorizing of municipal officers to appear before state legisla-
tures, the sending of indigent sick to hospitals at public expense,
the deportation of resident insane, contracting for the care of
foundlings, the direction of the employment of the workhouse
prisoners, the issuance of death certificates, the abatement of
nuisances, the arrest of lawbreakers, and the muzzling of dogs;
and the more important powers of revoking licenses, directing
a secret service, mediating strikes, and so on. The number of
these powers which lie in the discretion of the mayor for their
exercise is very great. They relate to every branch of municipal
life and service. There are literally a thousand and one duties
imposed upon the mayor and calling for the exercise of his au-
thority. One marvels at the detail with which this vast multitude
of powers has been set forth; at the folly which believes that
good government and efficiency are to be found in the direction
of one man power ; at the comparative success which many may-
ors have achieved in the wise exercise of the varied authority
thus committed to them.59
B Cf. almost any of the older municipal charters, the general municipal
laws of Missouri, Illinois, or Michigan, the revised codes or compiled ordi-
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There are certain matters with respect to which the exercise
of mayoral authority is mandatory. Thus in Evansville and In-
dianapolis the mayor shall, upon three days notice, hear any
complaint against a person to whom a license has been issued.
In Boston the mayor is obliged to issue licenses for theaters and
public halls if the applicants comply with the prescriptions laid
down. In Minneapolis, at the request of the board of park com-
missioners the mayor must appoint park police. The charter of
Kansas City requires him to proclaim to the inhabitants any
danger from malignant, infectious, or contagious disease that may
threaten to become prevalent or the occurrence of public calamity
from flood or other disaster. The list might be continued. In-
deed in the case of many powers previously cited such as the
power of appointment, the power to call meetings of heads of
departments, etc., mandatory provisions are to be found in some
charters. Thus in Baltimore the mayor is obliged to hold an an-
nual conference of his chief subordinates, and in appointing
boards and commissions he must recognize a minority party. In
New York City the mayor must exercise his power of appointing
officers to fill vacant offices. The usual method for calling these
powers into operation is for some interested citizen to sue out a
writ of mandamus in a court of competent jurisdiction. Another
method employed to bring recalcitrant mayors to time is that of
indicting them for failure to fulfil their manifest duty. The
former offers a positive means of reaching the incumbent, the
latter merely a negative one.
The exercise of the foregoing powers does not by any means
exhaust the duties of the mayor. There are numerous clerical
or ministerial duties that he must perform. His signature must
be affixed to numerous public documents, such as the council
journal in those cities in which he presides at council meetings,
"council enactments, certificates of election to municipal office,
commissions, licenses, warrants, drafts or other evidences of ob-
ligation," such as bonds and mortgages, "leases, deeds and all
other instruments for the conveyance of real estate to which the
corporation is a party.
' ' 60 He represents the municipality in
nances of any of the following cities: St. Louis, Kansas City, Minneapolis,
Indianapolis, Evansville, Ind., and the statutes relating to Boston.
so Numerous citations might be given to indicate the extent to which
the mayor's signature is required. Mr. Bayles discusses its importance espe-
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projects for the annexation of contiguous territory, especially
suburban cities, and in the settlement of controversies between
the city on one hand and private individuals or corporations or
public service corporations on the other. He receives and ap-
proves claims not chargeable to any department. In some places
he must give his entire time to the work of his office, in others
but part time is expected. His correspondence is enormous in
the metropolitan centers, and the demands upon his time, ener-
gies, and wisdom due to the personal calls and solicitations of
citizens is exhausting.
61 His social duties as chief executive
threaten to become oppressive. He is expected to attend local
meetings of one kind or another and to support movements and
enterprises of a public character and he must represent the city
in associations of municipal officials and in its dealings with the
state and nation.
General Estimate
It is difficult to say how far the mayor is actually held responsi-
ble for the character and efficiency of his administration. Many
things promote confusion of responsibility. The lines of author-
ity between him and his subordinates vary considerably in their
directness and their distinctness. The effectiveness of his control
depends as largely upon his political leadership as upon his legal
authority. In many cases it is sadly true that legislative, council-
manic, or machine or boss interference cut roughly across the
mayor's authority, and materially lessen the degree to which he
is actually responsible for the administration. It is true, never-
theless, even in cities in which the council is as strong as it is in
Chicago, or in which the legislature interferes as actively as it
does in New York, or in which the rule of the boss is as well es-
tablished as it is in Philadelphia or Cincinnati, that the electorate
cially as affecting the validity of these documents. He points out that there
is a broad distinction between the mayor 's signature and his approval ; also
that in the case of ordinances, the omission of the signature may not in-
validate the ordinance especially where the omission is due to clerical error,
etc.
61 Cf. statement by Mayor Mitchel of New York in Proceedings of the
American Academy of Political Science in the City of New York, Vol. V,
No. 3 (April, 1915), p. 14. Among other things Mr. Mitchel says:
"There are a thousand things that consume time and effort and there is
not enough time left for the mayor to supervise the work of the departments
and to be actually as well as theoretically responsible for it. ' '
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holds the mayor responsible for the conduct of the administra-
tion. Indeed the mayoralty, even where it is weakest, has been
marked for responsibility. The office is exposed to the influences
of public opinion as is no other municipal office. It is unable to
escape answering for its use of power, at least in matters upon
which the public has made up its mind. To this scrutiny the
mayoralty has responded. The following observations on the ex-
tent to which the mayoralty feels its responsibility were made
more than a decade ago, but are more true today than when they
were uttered : "In every city in which the mayor has been given
independent powers of appointment and has been made the real
head of the administrative organization of the city, the sensitive-
ness of the government to public opinion has been considerably
increased. When rightly viewed the change (from council gov-
ernment) involves possibilities of popular control which we have
hardly begun to realize. Almost every city in the country offers
instances in which the mayor, when supported by popular opin-
ion, has been able to withstand the combined influences of the
council and any machine organization that attempted to direct
his action. The lessons of this experience have left their impress
upon the political thinking of the American people and explain
the tendency to look to the executive rather than to the legisla-
tive authority for the solution of every difficulty." "To an in-
creasing extent the American people are looking to the executive
not only for the execution but also for the planning of municipal
improvements . . ." "The vital interest of the citizen in
strengthening the administration.
' ' 62 The record of the past
decade has not tended to impair this estimate of the responsible
character of the mayoralty. The appearance of many able and
gifted men in the mayor 's chair, the achievements they have been
able to realize in administrations like those of Rolph, Hunt, Mc-
Cormick, Head, Baxter, Johnson, Whitlock, and Mitchel, and
above all the gradual augmentation of the powers entrusted to
the mayoralty all these bear testimony to the larger degree of
responsiveness which the mayoralty begets in municipal govern-
ment when its leadership and authority is established in admin-
istration.63
62 See address by L. S. Eowe in the Proceedings of the New York City
Conference on Good City Government (1905), pp. 174-175.
63 Rolph of San Francisco, Hunt of Cincinnati, McCormick of Harris-
112 THE AMERICAN MUNICIPAL EXECUTIVE [308
While one recognizes the foregoing facts, and admits the decid-
ed betterment which mayor government has meant to municipal
administration, it is nevertheless true that this betterment has
come chiefly with respect to the larger, more obvious, or more im-
portant features of municipal administration. There is still very
much of irresponsibility, still many opportunities to dodge or
shift liability for policies and promises not realized, for appoint-
ments not the best, for petty graft not eliminated, and for oppor-
tunities not seized. The problem of administrative responsibility
is not adequately solved by the mayor system, even where its pow-
er is most nearly complete. The strength of the mayoralty is also
its weakness
;
it is a political office and may be won by the popular
as well as by the worthy ; the people must ' ' trust to luck to get
a paragon" of virtue as well as of ability.64 If the mayor system
has done much to lift American city government out of the
"hodge-podge of responsibility," inefficiency, and extravagance,
it has at the same time fallen far short of producing and assuring
in administration that liability for results, that skill and effi-
ciency in administration, and that economy in operation that
should normally characterize good government. The mayor sys-
tem contains no guarantee that trained, expert, and professional
talent will always be in charge of the interests and services of the
municipality.
In concluding this survey of the mayor and administration it
should be noted that on the whole the power of the mayor has
tended to increase if the later charters which have adopted the
mayor systems may be taken as the basis for judgment. The
power of appointment and removal has been strengthened, and
burg, Pa., Head of Nashville, Tenn., Baxter of Portland, Me., Johnson of
Cleveland, Whitlock of Toledo, Mitchel of New York.
s* To put the matter concretely the election of administrators cannot fail
to open the question of whether a city is to be governed by a political ad-
venturer like Thompson of Chicago, or a trained administrator like Mitchel
of New York. The opportunity for making a choice between these two
types is not always presented, the elector sometimes being confronted with
the job of selecting the lesser of the evils from the list of undesirable can-
didates. At best, the elector has not always demonstrated his ability to
pick able and competent administrators, tho this apparent inability can-
not be separated from the necessity under which he now labors of passing
at the same time upon questions of public policy for which the respective
candidates stand.
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is now very widely recognized; the power of investigation has
now been effectively developed in some cities; and with the ex-
ception of his judicial authority there seems to be little deteri-
oration, if any, in the other administrative authority with which
he has been clothed. The increase which is thus indicated in the
mayor's position, does not, however, reveal the true extent of the
development which has taken place. The latter can be appreci-
ated only by taking into account the growth of American cities
in size and importance. The mayors of many of our cities are
today the administrative heads of corporations that include larg-
er populations than some countries and many states. The may-
or of New York City guides the destinies of a larger population
than did the President of the United States a century ago. This
element of size and growth of population promises to continue a
more or less constant factor. Another development that will
ultimately affect the position of the mayor is the movement for
municipal home rule. But whatever the future has in store the
directive force and power of the mayoralty in administration is
today one of the most conspicuous features in our municipal sys-
tem. This is in keeping with the trend in state and nation, es-
pecially in the latter where the dominance of the executive is
largely established. It should not be forgotten, however, that
American cities are in the midst of a season of almost feverish
activity in experimentation with municipal forms and adminis-
tration reconstruction. Approximately five hundred municipali-
ties have altered their charters in the past fifteen years, and in
the larger proportion of these alterations the mayor as the author-
itative head of the administration has passed away. It is evi-
dent that the mayor system in administration is not only on
trial, but has before it a struggle for existence.
CHAPTER V
THE MAYOR AND LEGISLATION
The development of the mayor's influence and power in munic-
ipal legislation has kept pace with the expansion of his authority
over administration. The English doctrine has been that the
mayor as an integral part of the municipal corporation must be
present at council meetings if the latter are to be considered
valid. Altho this rule does not obtain in the United States, ex-
cept where specifically provided for, yet the actual position of
the American mayor is relatively much more important in respect
to legislation than it is in England, or than it has ever been here-
tofore in this country.
1 Not only does the mayor enjoy the grow-
ing authority which he exercises in the work of the city council,
but he has, in some places, acquired important influence in the
enactment of state legislation affecting municipalities. In cer-
tain cities he also has clearly defined powers with respect to the
ordinance making function of boards and commissions which
have tended to supplant the council. In this chapter the rela-
tions of the mayor to legislation, both in the legal and the politi-
cal aspects will be considered. Attention will be directed in turn
to his relations with the city council, with the municipal boards
or similar agencies of local government, and with the state legis-
lature.
THE MAYOR AND THE COUNCIL
First in importance and interest is the relation of the mayor
to the city council, the representative body of the municipal cor-
poration. This relationship may be viewed from three different
angles: (1) the general status of the mayor as a factor in munic-
ipal legislation; (2) the powers of the mayor with regard to
i The word legislation is employed here to cover all enactments that have
the force of law in municipal government, whether they emanate from the
state legislature, the city council, or other bodies vested with ordinance
making power.
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council procedure and action; and (3) the extra legal influence
exerted by him as party leader or administrative chief.
General Status
The general status of the mayor in legislation approaches uni-
formity in its fundamental characteristics. As has been pointed
out the English doctrine which would make him an integral part
of the municipal legislature is not recognized in this country.
This is due to the general theoretical acceptance of the principle
of the separation of powers. Yet in practice American city gov-
ernments of the mayor and council types nearly agree the mayor
shall exert large influence upon legislation. The measure of his
influence depends upon a variety of considerations. Among
them are the following: (1) his charter powers and preroga-
tives; (2) his personality and party standing; (3) his posi-
tion as contrasted with that of the council and other municipal
authorities 2 in the general scheme of organization ; (4) his legal
relation to the council as a part of the legislative mechanism.
The last two considerations demand our further attention at this
point ; the treatment of the first two constitutes the main body
of the chapter.
The position of the executive is effectively contrasted with that
of the municipal council or other local authorities in the organi-
zation of city government by indicating his relative position in
the more important organizations which embody the mayor and
council form. Thus New York, Baltimore, Chicago, and other
cities differ greatly in the relative positions assigned to the dif-
ferent organs of government. In New York City, for example,
the board of aldermen is relatively less important than is the city
council in Chicago. This situation is produced by the powerful
mayoralty which the New York charter creates, and is accentu-
ated by the establishment of the board of estimate and apportion-
ment and by its tendency to become the policy making body of
the municipality. The result is that even the legislative func-
tions of the council are limited to a marked degree. In New
York City also the mayor's relation to municipal legislation is
2 Such as boards of estimate and apportionment, borough presidents, and
state controlled commissions or like agencies operating in the field of local
government. In New York City the first two of these are especially im-
portant.
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important, not only because of the weakening of the council, but
by reason of his strong position on the board of estimate and
apportionment, in which he has two votes. In Chicago, on the
other hand, despite a strong mayoralty, the council continues
relatively vigorous, insomuch that in municipal campaigns voters
are urged to pay special attention to the election of councilmen
rather than the choice of mayors, on the ground that a weak or
vicious mayor can do comparatively little harm if the council is
made up of clean and able men, while a good mayor would be
more or less helpless if confronted by a council dominated by
"gray wolves."3
The mayor of Baltimore is less powerful in legislation than
is the executive in either Chicago or New York. The charter of
Baltimore provides that
' ' The mayor and City Council of Balti-
more shall have power to pass all ordinances," etc., phraseology
which recognizes the mayor as a distinct branch of the municipal
legislature and which requires the coordinate action of both
mayor and council to validate enactments.4 In Seattle the legis-
lative function of the mayor is even more clearly defined in the
words, "The legislative powers of the City of Seattle shall be
vested in a mayor and city council. " 5 A similar situation exists
s This was especially noticeable in the campaign of 1915 when many vot-
ers felt that there was little choice between the candidates for mayor, both
being something less than desirable. Those who were concerned for the char-
acter of Chicago's government centered their energies on the aldermanic
contests. Their foresight has amply justified its exercise in the determined
opposition which the council has offered to many of the policies of the
mayor, especially those representing a distinctly backward step such as the
partisan exploitation of the civil service. The controversy between the
mayor and the council led in 1916 to one of the most bitter aldermanic
campaigns in municipal history, the mayor throwing the whole force of his
administration into the struggle in order to defeat certain "rebel" council-
men. The result was the vindication of the council.
* See the charter of the city of Baltimore, Sec. 218. Note also Sees. 1, 6,
220, and 221, the last two especially. To quote, "The style of all ordi-
nances shall be: 'Be it ordained by the Mayor and City Council of Balti-
more,'
" and "Every legislative act of the mayor and the City Council of
Baltimore shall be by ordinance or resolution." See, however, the discus-
sion of the veto further on in this chapter.
5 Charter, Art. 4, Sec. 1. This statement is subject, however, to the
reservation that the people of the city of Seattle may legislate through the
initiative and referendum.
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in the cities of Milwaukee and Madison, Wis., in the last of which
the mayor and aldermen form the common council, while in Mil-
waukee the mayor and common council form the "Municipal
Government. " 6 In general it may be observed it weakens the
mayoralty to integrate it so closely with the legislative mechan-
ism. This is true both in the mayor's legislative and administra-
tive relations. Comparative independence is essential to strength
in his legislative activity, while administrative interests seldom
fail to suffer when swept into the legislative vortex. On the other
hand the absence of close association of the mayor with the coun-
cil, as in the recent St. Louis charter, does not necessarily pro-
duce relative superiority for the mayoralty.7
There have been many efforts to set up municipal governments
that would comply substantially with the theory of the separa-
tion of powers. Two conspicuous examples are Philadelphia and
Pittsburgh. The bicameral council obtains in both cities. The
mayor occupies a much less favorable position, however, than
does the president in the national model. The council is strong
in both cities; in Pittsburgh the city council possesses all legis-
lative power not expressly conferred on some other body or offi-
cer.
8 The mayor appears to somewhat better advantage in Phila-
delphia, but does not possess the means or the authority to dic-
tate and control municipal legislation.9 Perhaps the most strik-
ing instance of the incorporation of the doctrine of Montesquieu
in a city charter is to be found in the case of Quincy, Mass. It
is provided that
' ' The executive department shall never exercise
any legislative power, and the legislative department shall never
exercise any executive power.
" 10 In more recent charters, how-
In each of the two charters consult Art. 4, Sec. 1.
7 The failure to create a powerful mayoralty was one of the criticisms
urged against the St. Louis charter. The charter, on the other hand, ap-
pears to have gone as far in this direction as the laws of the state would
permit.
s Cf. Pittsburgh, Charter, Sec. 1494. In Sec. 1492 it is affirmed that the
council possesses "the power of the corporation."
9 One of the principal defects in the recent Blankenburg administration
was the inability of the mayor to get results from the council. The latter
became increasingly hostile and contributed not a little to the defeat of the
reform administration. The powers of the mayor in legislation are to be
found in the charter, Chap. II, Sees. 11-31.
10 Charter, Title 1, Sec. 2. With a minimum of exceptions such as pro-
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ever, the recognition of the federal analogy has been accompanied
by modifications that have tended to obliterate the formal inde-
pendence conferred upon the legislative and executive depart-
ments. On the whole the executive has gained as a result of
these modifications. The charter of Cleveland serves as an exam-
ple. The council and the mayoralty are distinct and in the or-
ganization of their respective fields are independent of each
other. In the conduct of their work, however, they are closely
related, and on the whole the advantage in the cooperation pro-
vided for is decidedly with the mayor. While losing his position
as presiding officer with the privilege of voting in the case of a
tie, he gains for himself and his department chiefs the right to
sit in council meetings, to take part in discussions, and to intro-
duce ordinances. In addition the preparation of the budget is
given to the mayor. Charter commissions in Los Angeles, De-
troit, Baltimore, Toledo, Cincinnati, Newark, and other cities
have recognized the desirability of increasing the influence of the
mayor, generally at the expense of the council.
Various explanations have been offered for the decline of the
municipal council as an organ of government and the corre-
sponding increase in the position of the mayor. Quite generally
the incapacity and corruption of the council is proffered as the
reason for the rise of the mayor. The query inevitably presents
itself why are the councils incompetent ? Inadequate systems
of representation, the presence of corruption, and other reasons
given hardly suffice to explain an incompetency that is thoroly
established, especially in those cities whose problems of govern-
ment have changed rapidly and have acquired increasing com-
plexity. The explanation may, in part, be found in the nature
of the council. It has many members, and numbers constitute
a source of weakness in a period of readjustment. The average
mind is not easily adjustable especially at the age when men be-
come councilors
;
and councils are composed mostly of men with
average minds. There may be some men in a council who are
able to adapt themselves to the rapidly shifting exigencies of
modern municipal life and social change, but they are compara-
tively few and always in a hopeless minority. The majority make
its adjustments very slowly, sometimes not at all. The stimuli
viding for cooperation in laying out of streets, the charter adheres to this
principle.
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which may be applied to assist members in extending their vision
and readjusting their conceptions lose much thru being diffused
upon many minds. There is a far better chance of finding one
man gifted with a creative mind, one whose back is to the past,
not to the future, and who is not wanting in moral and intellec-
tual courage. Not nearly all mayors, nor even any large propor-
tion of them have shown marked qualities of initiative and leader-
ship. But in cases where these qualities are not wholly wanting,
stimuli may be applied with some degree of success. The average
mayor is of a somewhat higher type than the average councilman.
The problem of readjustment is not so formidable. The pressure
of increased responsibility, the demand for leadership, and the
ease with which public opinion may concentrate upon him, com-
bine to call into activity whatever imagination, whatever power
of constructive thinking, and whatever capacity for leadership
the mayor may possess. The expansion of the field of municipal
activity and the consequent growth of administration have of-
fered a fruitful field for the best he had to give. Handicapped
by the millstone of checks and balances which the eighteenth cen-
tury political theory bequeathed to municipal organization in
this country, the mayoralty and its incumbents have nevertheless
achieved a success which, when compared with the record of the
councils, largely justifies the confidence which the public has
come to repose in them.
In comparing the status of mayor in relation to legislation
today with that of a quarter of a century ago, one must conclude
that there has been a distinct advance in the position which he
occupies. In those cities in which the most noticeable steps have
been taken to increase his importance there is evident a tendency
to establish some degree of responsible relationship between the
mayor and the council, with the mayor as the acknowledged
leader. It cannot be said, however, that this tendency is very
far developed, and in no case does the mayor appear as a branch
of the legislative organ. Finally, the continued decline of the
council has served to augment somewhat the relative importance
of the mayor, even in cities where no legal or charter alterations
have occurred.
Legal Powers
The legal powers of the mayor in respect to legislation are
those which relate (1) to the initiation of municipal legislation,
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(2) to the enactment of municipal legislation, (3) to the enact-
ment of state legislation affecting municipalities.
In the initiation of municipal legislation the mayor has the
authority to call special meetings of the city council, the power
of sending messages to the council in which the affairs of the
municipality are presented and in which measures may be recom-
mended for dealing with the conditions described, the right to
introduce bills for the consideration of the council and the power
to prepare and submit the annual budget.
The power of the mayor to call special meetings of the council
is almost universally recognized.
11 Its exercise lies, practically,
in the discretion of the mayor. In Kentucky a general law pro-
vides that a call may be issued "when the interests of the city
demand it, " or " for special reasons. ' ' 12 In some charters oc-
casions are specified when this power must be exercised. In St.
Louis the organization of a new administration and the instal-
lation of officers-elect constitute such an occasion
;
in Beardstown,
Illinois, after an election, the mayor is enjoined to call a special
session of the council "to ascertain the outcome of the election."
In the majority of cases, on the other hand, there is no effort to
limit or prescribe the exercise of this power. It is very common,
however, to provide that the reasons for the calling of the special
meeting shall be communicated to the council members in writ-
ing.
13 The method of making the call is defined in a number of
cities and includes personal service, the leaving of notices at the
residences of councilmen, or publication in the official news organ
of the city.
14 In the case of New York City the notice may also be
11 Los Angeles' charter is an exception.
12 Kentucky, General Charter Law for Second Class Cities, Sec. 56.
is This is true in New York (Charter, Sec. 37), Cleveland (Charter, Sec.
31), San Francisco (Charter, Art. 4, Chap. I, Sec. 5), Detroit (Charter, Chap.
7, Sec. 12) ; but assignment of reasons is not specified in the case of St.
Louis, Seattle, Baltimore, and a number of other cities.
i* Cf. New York, Cleveland, and Detroit charters, Sees. 37, 31, and 148
respectively. The New York provisions are typical and read :
' ' Three days
before any special meeting of the Board of Aldermen is held, notice of the
time of the intended meeting and of the business proposed to be transacted,
signed by the mayor, shall be published in the City Record, and at the same
time the city clerk shall cause a copy of such notice to be left at or sent by
post to the usual place of abode or of business of each member of the board
of aldermen, but want of service of a notice upon any member shall not
affect the validity of a meeting.
' '
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sent to the alderman's place of business, or may be sent by mail,
tho failure to notify any member does not invalidate the meeting
held. The latter provision does not appear in other city charters.
In addition to the foregoing, the business specified in the call for
a special meeting is usually the only business that may be con-
sidered. There are exceptions to this rule, however, as in the
case of Kansas City, in which it is within the power of the coun-
cil, when called in special session by the mayor, "to transact
business as at a regular meeting.
" 15 In calling special meetings,
the mayor must frequently observe certain requirements as to
the time that must expire between the call and the time of meet-
ing. There is no uniformity in this particular. Somerville,
Mass., leaves the matter to the mayor; the general law of Wis-
consin fixes six hours, Cleveland twelve hours, and the city of
New York three days as the time which must elapse between the
call and the meeting. In many cases, of course, no mention is
made of this feature. On the whole there seems to be a disposi-
tion among charter makers to elaborate the clauses which bestow
upon the mayor the authority to call special meetings, tho it can
hardly be said that municipal executives have exploited the
power to initiate legislation which this authority places within
their reach.
The mayoral message is the second important means by which
the municipal executive may initiate legislation. The message
serves two purposes. In the first place it is used to inform the
council as to the state of municipal affairs or to report upon local
conditions. This use of it appears to be almost universal and is
frequently enjoined as a duty.18 The employment of the message
is Kansas City, Charter, Art. 2, Sec. 14. An interesting call for a special
session of the council of Kansas City was sent out by Mayor Henry Jost on
July 14, 1915, in which he convened the two chambers "to remain in con-
stant and continued session until the council shall have passed requisite
ordinances appropriating money adequately and properly to care for the
entire business of the municipality," appropriations which the lower house
had previously refused.
is The submission of such reports would appear to be mandatory in many
cases, even the time for the submission of the annual report or message be-
ing specified. Cf. Seattle, Charter, Art. 5, Sec. 7; Baltimore, Charter, Sec.
22; Los Angeles, Charter, Art. 4, Sec. 41. The charter of Quiney, Mass.,
omits mention of such a duty, though as in the case of Charleston, S. C.,
the council is probably able to impose such a duty.
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as a means of information or for the purpose of conveying re-
ports has in a very large proportion of cases become more or less
perfunctory, and in the hands of the majority of municipal exec-
utives appears to have developed no particular importance. A
perusal of many of them reveals the fact that the majority are
dull and colorless. They amount to little more than letters of
transmittal accompanying departmental reports, or summarizing
the latter. Many are made the means for comparing the work of
one party with its predecessor in power, portraying the evil con-
dition in which the administration found things and the great
progress that has been made since the incumbent assumed the
direction of affairs. In not a few cases these reports are either
misleading or uninforming. On the other hand a considerable
and respectable proportion of these reports on local conditions
are worth reading. They are vigorous and illuminating, and
betray a grasp of local conditions that is comprehensive and at
the same time conscious of the significant features, as viewed
from the standpoint of the public interest.17
IT For examples of messages that are wanting in color see the following:
Message of Louis P. Fuhnnann, mayor, to the city council of Buffalo, Jan-
uary 3, 1910; message of Hon. Win. J. Gaynor, mayor, to the board of
aldermen, New York City, January 23, 1912. This message is quite typical
of a large group of mayoral messages, tho it should be said that not all
of Mayor Gaynor 's were of this type. See also the message of Wm. Thum,
mayor, to the city council of Pasadena, Calif., May 5, 1913; and the mes-
sage of John Sehon, mayor, to the city council in San Diego, Calif., April
30, 1906, and May 6, 1907. The sixth annual message of Mayor George W.
Tiedeman of Savannah, Ga., on January 22, 1913, will illustrate the ten-
dency to compare the achievements of an administration with the conditions
which had existed under a prior regime. Of messages that are uninforming
that of Charles F. O'Neall, mayor, to the common council of San Diego,
Calif., on May 5, 1913, is a good example. The annual message of Mayor
John F. Miller of Seattle, dated January 4, 1909, dealt with the cost of
operating the departments of the city government and represents a good
piece of work; likewise the two annual reports a'nd messages of Mayor
"George F. Cotterill of the same city, dated January, 1913 and 1914 re-
spectively, are worth while efforts. On the other hand messages often rep-
resent little but bombast. Note the following from a message by Mayor
J. G. Utterback of Bangor, Me., during the year 1913-1914: "In most
convincing tones the voice of the people has been heard demanding a strict
business administration of their affairs." The message suggests the crea-
tion of the office of city auditor and then near the close is to be found this
choice specimen: ". . . consider Bangor 's interests first. Eat Bangor
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Of greater importance is the second purpose which the mayoral
message serves, that of being a vehicle thru which the mayor
piay make recommendations regarding measures which he deems
to be expedient for the welfare of the city. In the majority of
cities the submission of recommendations is laid upon the mayor
bread, smoke Bangor-made cigars, trade with Bangor merchants.
' ' Even
this is somewhat more definite in the way of a recommendation than the
suggestion of Mayor George Alexander of Los Angeles to the city council
on January 6, 1913. He was discussing municipal markets and the high
cost of living and by way of recommendation said,
' 'Why not return to the
good old-fashioned way of carrying baskets to the market only make it a
public market and cut down the high cost of living. ' ' Some messages,
however, carry recommendations that give evidence of constructive thot
and a program, the parts of which are clearly related. See the message of
Mayor Kudolph Blankenburg, dated September 19, 1912, relative to the
problem of increasing the current revenues and the borrowing capacity of
Philadelphia. It was well worked out both in conception and presentation.
Also the special message of Mayor George F. Cotterill of Seattle, dated
March 17, 1913, relative to public utility regulation and administrative
efficiency and economy illustrates the importance of adequate and readable
treatment and executive vision. There are many examples of messages that
have been intended for other audiences than the city council, and one of
the most striking messages of this character was the annual message of
Mayor James C. Haynes of Minneapolis, dated June 14, 1912. The mes-
sage was a plea for municipal ownership and the data compiled showed
painstaking effort. Copies of the message were mailed together with a
letter of explanation and a return post card, to many citizens. The letter
was signed by the mayor and read as follows: "Herewith I am sending
you copy of the mayor's annual message for the current year. It is ad-
dressed to the people as much as to the city council on the assumption that
each citizen is as much interested in the future of this city as is the mayor
or any other public official.
"This message points out how the city council can save annually over
one million dollars and use the same to beautify and improve the city, there-
by making Minneapolis preeminent among American cities within the next
decade; and it contains information and ideas which if true are vitally im-
portant to every citizen, and if wrong should be corrected at once. May I
therefore request you to give it early and careful consideration and to for-
ward any criticism or suggestion you may have to offer as soon as con-
venient. Also to fill out and return the enclosed card. The latter requires
no signature."
The enclosed card provided for a sort of straw vote on the question of
municipal ownership. Three questions were asked, upon the first two of
which the person filling it out was asked to answer "yes" or "no." They
were, (1) Do you favor municipal ownership and operation of all public
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in directory language, especially in connection with the annual
message. For example the Seattle charter provides that "It
shall be the duty of the mayor annually ... to recommend
the adoption of such measures as he may deem expedient and
proper." In this and similar cases, however, a clause is added
authorizing the sending of special messages
' ' from time to time ' '
as the mayor may deem useful and proper. It is apparent at
once that in the opportunity which the message in this form
offers there lie large possibilities. In effect, it has "become a
right to initiate measures" in the council; "for a message from
the mayor is invariably referred to the appropriate council com-
mittee for report, and this report puts the matter squarely before
the council for action. ' ' 18 Moreover, it enables the mayor to
utilities using the streets, and (2) Do you favor such ownership of both
of the plants of the lighting companies. The third question asked the
recipient to indicate which of the lighting plants he preferred for municipal
ownership if he favored the ownership of but one on the part of the city.
Not infrequently the mayors use their message power in the way just
described, but a development of this power is to be found in the disposition
to address messages to the "citizens" of the municipality. Occasionally
mayors publish and distribute their messages at their own expense.
There is available today a large body of material comprising mayoral
messages and the reports that mayors make from time to time. Much of it
is fugitive but the work of collecting it has been begun. Within a few
years it should be possible to make some intensive studies within the field
which this material covers. Indeed this material, together with much other
material in the form of municipal documents, is beginning to assume for-
midable proportions. It has yet to be thoroly explored and so retains
something of the character of a "primeval forest."
is Cf. Munro, The Government of American Cities, pp. 222, 223. Mr.
Bayles in The Office of Mayor in the United States, rather takes the con-
trary views and intimates that the recommendations made by mayors in
"conventional" messages are buried in committees. It must be acknowl-
edged that the force of the mayor 's communications is often less than might
be desired. The mayors of Providence have for half a century urged the
acquisition by the city of the water front, but the matter has never received
serious consideration by the councils. Even when the mayor presents bills
already drawn, and places the administration squarely behind them the
councils often fail to face the issue presented on its merits. On the whole
it appears that Professor Munro 's statement describes the prevailing ten-
dency accurately, though there are many exceptions to this tendency. Some
of these are indicated by Dr. Munro in the paragraph following the one
from which the quotation is taken. It seems, too, that the situation is
somewhat modified in the smaller cities where the council retains a some-
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select the policies and measures about which his friends and par-
tisan supporters in the council may rally, a situation which be-
comes increasingly significant in proportion as the mayor is a
party leader, or as his proposals coincide with or antagonize the
views of the majority party organization.19 Finally, the power
of making recommendations regarding municipal affairs permits
the mayor to attract public attention to the more important is-
sues and to focus public opinion upon the council while these
issues are under consideration. Indeed, by means of special mes-
sages the main issues may be taken one by one so that a mayor
gifted with political insight and devoted to the public interest
may rally to his assistance such citizen support as is available
in behalf of his proposals. Some mayoral messages read as tho
they were intended for another audience than the respective
councils to which they were addressed.20
Not only may the mayor call special meetings of the municipal
council, and deliver reports, send communications, and make
recommendations by means of the mayoral message, but he is in
many cities authorized to introduce measures. The presentation
of administration measures has, indeed, been frequent enough in
cities where the mayor lacked express authority for pursuing
such a course. Nevertheless, it is significant that the power to
offer measures, full drawn, and with the stamp of administration
upon them, is now being expressly conferred upon the mayor by
municipal charters. The charter of Cleveland, for example, pro-
vides that "the mayor shall have the right to introduce ordi-
nances. Practically the same phraseology is to be found in the
charters of Toledo and St. Louis, both twentieth century char-
ters. Whether this development will be followed by other cities,
what more important place in comparison with the mayoralty than it does in
larger centers where the development of administration has tended to over-
shadow it. For the reference to Bayles see the work cited, pp. 35, 36.
19 For a somewhat fuller discussion of this point see Munro, W. B., The
Government of American Cities, pp. 222, 223.
20 See reference to the message by Mayor Haynes of Minneapolis. A
direct appeal to the electors was made by Mr. Blankenburg in "A New
Year's Letter to the Citizens of Philadelphia" on January 1, 1913. It
was a readable account of the work of the administration during the pre-
ceding year. A perusal of some of the messages of Josiah Quincy almost
a century ago reveals the fact that he appreciated keenly the value of writ-
ing for a larger audience than the municipal council.
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in the amendment and revision of their charters, it is too early
to say. It may foreshadow the ultimate establishment of some
sort of responsible government, tho the path of its evolution
promises to be materially different, from that followed by the
English parliamentary type. In effective leadership the Boston
charter of 1909 appears to be far in advance of any others in
this country. Indeed, its provisions are almost revolutionary, in
that the mayor may force the early considerations of measures
which he proposes. In the words of the charter (Section 2) : "The
mayor from time to time may make to the city council in the
form of an ordinance or loan order filed with the city clerk such
recommendations other than for school purposes as he may deem
to be for the welfare of the city. The city council shall consider
each ordinance or loan order presented by the mayor and shall
either adopt or reject the same within sixty days after the date
when it is filed as aforesaid. If the said ordinance or loan order
is not rejected within sixty days it shall ~be in force as if adopted
by the city council unless previously withdrawn by the mayor.
Nothing herein shall prevent the mayor from again presenting
an ordinance or loan order which has been rejected or with-
drawn." In commenting upon the operation of the charter
amendments the finance commission in its report of January,
1914, remarked: "Only those provisions which were intended
to restrain the abuse of power have been fully tested
The provisions which afford an opportunity to conduct the city's
business upon a high plane of efficiency and morality have not
been properly utilized." With respect to the passage of loans,
however, there was noted a "marked improvement." One need
hardly marvel at the failure of the ordinary mayor to exploit all
the powers which the Boston charter bestows. Indeed, it is quite
pardonable in the municipal executive modestly to doubt his
sufficiency for all the opportunities opened up to him by those
who see in the mayoralty the hope of city government, in the field
of legislation as well as administration. The Boston charter,
however, presents a logical development of mayor government, a
development which makes him responsible for the government of
the city and clothes him with powers adequate to meet his respon-
sibility.
The power of the mayor to prepare the municipal budget is
properly classed among his more important prerogatives with re-
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spect to the initiation of legislation. There has been a decided
tendency toward vesting this power in the mayor, tho in some
cities such as New York and St. Louis the authority is shared by
the board of estimate and apportionment.21 But in Boston,
Cleveland, and a few other cities the mayor prepares and pro-
poses the budget to the council. In the case of Boston this power
becomes very important because the council may neither origi-
nate a budget, nor increase any item in the one proposed, nor
increase the total of the mayoral budget.22 It has power only to
reduce or reject the proposals made to it. In Cleveland the
charter specifies the nature and extent of the duty which this
power to prepare and propose the budget carries with it.23 The
drafting of the appropriation ordinance is specifically reserved
to the council, in Cleveland and Toledo, tho in Boston, St. Louis,
and some other cities the appropriation bill is drafted either by
the mayor or by the board of estimate and apportionment.2* In
practice also, the mayor, even in cities where he is not vested
21 Cf. St. Louis, Charter, Art. 16, Sees. 1, 2, 3 ; New York, Charter, Sec.
226. The situation in New York City has not been materially altered so far
as the mayor and the board of aldermen are concerned by the mayor's
decision to present an executive budget to the board of estimate and ap-
portionment.
22 Boston, Amended Charter, Sec. 3. The mayor may also submit sup-
plementary budgets any time prior to the date upon which the annual tax
rate is determined.
23 The budget is expected to set forth the following: (1) an itemized
estimate of the expense of conducting each department; (2) comparisons of
such estimates with the corresponding items of expenditure for the last two
complete fiscal years and with the expenditures of the current fiscal year
plus an estimate of expenditures necessary to complete the current fiscal
year; (3) reasons for proposed increases or decreases in such items of ex-
penditure compared with the current fiscal year; (4) a separate schedule
for each department showing the things necessary for the department to do
during the year and which of any desirable things it ought to do if possible;
(5) items of payroll increases as either additional pay to present employees
or pay for more employees; (6) a statement from the director of finance of
the total probable income of the city from taxes for the period covered by
the mayor's estimate; (7) an itemization of all anticipated revenues from
sources other than the tax levy; (8) the amounts required for interest on
the city debt and for sinking funds as required by law; (9) the total amount
of outstanding city debt with a schedule of maturities of bond issues; (10)
such other information as may be required by the council.
2* Cf. Cleveland, Charter, Sec. 42 ; also St. Louis, Charter, Art. 16, Sec. 3.
The mayor of New York has assumed responsibility for the preparation of
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with budgetary authority, does really exercise a very powerful
influence. The Chicago budget of 1916 was known as the mayor's
budget and was adopted by the council after an exceptionally
bitter struggle.
25 There seems to be general agreement among
students of municipal government that the mayor should be
largely responsible for the budget in preference to having it pre-
pared by the council itself. As yet, however, no general or char-
ter acceptance of this principle obtains but there has been a de-
cided trend toward it or some modification of it, especially in the
larger centers.
Enactment of Legislation
In the enactment of municipal legislation the mayor's author-
ity includes the following powers: (1) to preside over the ses-
sions of the council; (2) to sit in council meetings and take part
in the discussion of measures; (3) to cast the deciding vote in
case of a tie; (4) to approve and sign ordinances; (5) to veto
acts of the council. The first four of these are positive in their
nature; the last and most important is negative.
The power of the mayor to preside over meetings of the council
is evidently passing away. Writing in 1895 Mr. Bayles said : "It
is very generally today an express duty of the mayor to preside at
meetings of the city council. The exceptions are found chiefly
among the largest cities such as Boston, New York, Brooklyn,
Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Detroit, and Omaha, and where the
strictly executive powers of the office have been most developed.
' '
In 1913 Professor Munro observes: "It is true that in a few
cities, notably in Chicago, the mayor is the council 's presiding offi-
cer; but this is a practice quite out of accord with the general
rule, for in by far the larger number of American cities the coun-
cil chooses its own presiding officer, and the mayor does not take
any part in its sessions, or even attend them." An examination
of the charters of a representative number of cities, and also of
general state laws, indicates that the number of large cities in
which the mayor presides at council meetings is very small, Chi-
cago and San Francisco being the most important. 26 There are,
an executive budget which he submits to the board of estimate and appor-
tionment.
25 The state legislature by act of June 29, 1915, authorized the council
to create a board of estimate, but the act had not yet gone into effect.
26 Chicago operates under the general state law of Illinois; the position
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however, many cities operating under general state law in which
the mayor still acts as the presiding officer. In the states of
North Dakota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, and Idaho, for exam-
ple, the mayor presides over the council meetings. 27 It should
be observed, however, that, despite the number of cities which
come under the general law cited and others similar to them, it
can no longer be said that it is "very generally" "an express
duty" of the mayor to preside. But the survival of this power
serves in many places to bring the mayor into an important rela-
tion with regard to the enactment of legislation. On the other
hand it is highly improbable that this power or duty materially
strengthens the mayor's position. Indeed if one compares the
real authority of the mayor in cities where the mayor presides
over the council with his influence in legislation in cities like New
York, Boston, Cleveland, Seattle, and many others where he does
not preside, one is led to conclude that the power to preside con-
tributes no strength to the mayor's position in legislation except
under circumstances where the council possesses substantially
greater authority than it does in most of the larger cities. More-
over, this authority of the mayor in legislation is secured at the
expense of his independence in administrative affairs especially
when he becomes enmeshed in the logrolling methods of the coun-
cil.28 It is significant that in none of the more important modern
charters is the mayor expected to function as the presiding officer
of the council.
of the mayor in San Francisco is declared in the charter, Art. 4, Chap. I,
Sec. 5. In New York and San Francisco ex-mayors may sit in council meet-
ings but have no vote.
27 The charter law in North Dakota provides that the mayor shall '
'
pre-
side at all meetings" of the city council. In Wisconsin he presides in cities
of the
"second, third and fourth classes" (General Charter Law, Sec. 38) ;
in Indiana he presides in cities of the "third, fourth and fifth classes" (An
Act Concerning Municipal Corporations, Sec. 49).
28 In his dissertation on Tlie Office of Mayor in the United States,
published in 1895, Mr. Bayles favors the passing of the mayor's right to
preside over municipal councils. He says: "The exemption of the mayor
from this tiresome and often uncongenial task of acting as presiding officer
will surely develop many advantages. The executive and legislative depart-
ments of municipal government will become more distinct, and their influ-
ence upon each other will broaden and deepen, and responsibility, that neces-
sary balance wheel for all political machinery,' will become more and more
a factor to be relied upon.
' ' In another place he indicates that such exemp-
tion would be an advance in administration (pp. 36, 37).
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While the mayor has thus been losing the right to preside in
council meetings he has in many cases the right to sit in these
meetings, and to discuss the measures which are presented. This
practice has met with recognition in such cities as Cleveland, St.
Louis, and others, and was proposed by the charter commission
of Cincinnati in 1914.29 In Boston the mayor is privileged to
attend council meetings to address that body "upon such sub-
jects as he may desire. ' ' 30 He may also be required to attend for
the purpose of answering inquiries previously submitted in writ-
ing.
31 The right of attending council meetings and of taking
part in the discussion appears to offer all the advantages that
may flow from the right to preside, except that of applying the
rules and of voting in case of a tie. It enables the mayor to re-
tain his administrative independence and at the same time exert
upon the council directly whatever measure of personality, in-
fluence, and argumentative ability he may possess. The separate
organization of the legislative and executive departments are
more clearly maintained and yet an important and effective re-
lationship between these departments is established.
The power of the mayor to vote in the enactment of ordinances
is usually vested in him as presiding officer and is restricted to
cases in which the council has balloted to a tie. Thus in Illinois
cities, including Chicago, the general law of the state provides
that the mayor "shall not vote except in case of a tie, when he
shall give the casting vote.
' ' Provisions that are similar in form
or substance are found in the general laws of other states.32 In
29 See Cleveland, Charter, Sec. 75:
" the mayor shall have the right
. . . to take part in the discussion of all matters coming before the
council
;
" St. Louis, Charter, Art. 7, Sec. 1 ; the charter proposed for Cin-
cinnati but defeated on July 14, 1914, Sec. 66; Toledo, Charter, See. 70;
Utica, N. Y., Sec. 32.
so Amended Charter of 1909, See. 7. The mayor may be represented by
the head of a department.
si Ibid. This development is interesting inasmuch as it recognizes the
principle of the interpellation as employed in European governments. It
has not been copied in any of the later charters. The distinction between
it and the council's right of investigation has, perhaps, not been clearly
appreciated.
32 Indiana, An Act Concerning Municipal Corporations, 1905, Sec. 49.
This is true of the cities of the third, fourth and fifth classes only. North
Dakota, The Municipal Charter Act, Sec. 17. See also Wisconsin, General
Charter Law, Chap. VII, Sec. 49. Cities of the first class are not included.
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Charleston, South Carolina, where the mayor is an integral part
of the council, his voting power is apparently not restricted, tho
he does not have a veto. A number of cities expressly prohibit
the mayor from voting in meetings of the council and where ex-
mayors are permitted to sit in the council the right to vote is de-
nied.33 Broadly speaking there has been no gain in the impor-
tance of this power during the last twenty years. Certainly it has
no place except where the mayor continues to function as the
presiding officer, or where the council shares in the appointment
of administrative officials. It does not contribute to the mayor's
position and strength in the municipal government to compensate
for the confusion of legislative and administrative functions to
which it leads in actual operation. In common with the power
to preside, the right to vote is rejected by more modern charters.
Approval and Veto
The first three of the mayor's powers in the enactment of
council measures, viz., the right to preside, the right to a seat and
to discuss, and the right to give the casting vote may be de-
scribed as his powers of immediate or active participation. There
remain two other powers which are very closely bound up with
each other inasmuch as a refusal to exercise the one is in a few
cases tantamount to an exercise of the other
;
these are the power
of approval and signature and the power of veto and may be
described as powers exercised in detachment from the actual pro-
ceedings of the council.
The power of approval and signature is almost universally
recognized by municipal charters and general laws as a feature
of the mayoral system. In some cases it extends to every act of
the council except those which relate to its own organization, or
internal affairs. Thus in Somerville, Mass., ''every ordinance,
order, resolution or vote of the board of aldermen
' '
with the ex-
ception just noted, "shall be presented to the mayor" for his
approval.
34 His approval is indicated by his signing the record
It is interesting to note that in this law the mayor is not to be counted in
determining whether or not there is a quorum. Compare with Charleston,
S. C., where the mayor and a proportion of the aldermen do constitute a
quorum. (Act of December 23, 1879.)
ss St. Louis, Charter, Art. 7, Sec. 1 ; Cleveland, Charter, Sec. 75.
s* Somerville, Charter, Title 3, See. 16. Cf. also the charters of the fol-
lowing: Quincy, Sec. 17; Baltimore, See. 23; Covington, Ky., Sec. 60;
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of the council. It is not generally agreed, however, that all
council acts other than those relating to its own internal affairs
shall be submitted to the mayor. The Kansas City charter speci-
fied the submission of ordinances only. 35 The charter of Detroit
expressly excepts from presentation to the mayor,
"
resolutions
making appointments to or removal from office" and "ordinances
and resolutions for the fixing of the annual estimates and sal-
aries, and for the payment of debts and liabilities previously
and lawfully contracted.
' ' 36 The question of what constitutes
' '
approval
' ' by the mayor is one upon which the courts have not
been entirely agreed, some holding that the mayor's signature was
essential to indicate his approval. The specific provisions of some
charters warrant this view. The New York charter, for example,
provides that if the mayor "approve it (an ordinance or resolu-
tion) , he shall sign it.
' ' The language is directory, but the signa-
ture is the evidence of the executive's approval. In some states
other acts such as an affirmative vote, publication as having been
approved, the attestation of the minutes, etc., have been accepted
as indications of the mayor's approval of council acts.37 The
exercise of the power cannot, however, be delegated and "in-
volves in the highest degree the exercise of the discretion of the
chief executive. ' '
There has been little change in the mayor 's power of approval
in the last two decades. The language employed in conferring
this authority is very much the same in the later charters as in
those of a quarter of a century ago.
38 The extension of the
mayoral veto to include items in bills or ordinances has, of
Lewiston, Sec. 119; Boston, Amended Charter of 1909, Sec. 4; New York
City, Sec. 40.
ss Charter, Art. 3, Sec. 5. In Rochester, New York, and Seattle, all legis-
lative acts must be by ordinance and these are to be presented to the mayor.
Rochester, Charter, Sec. 122.
se Detroit, Charter, Chap. VII, See. 13.
37 New York, Charter, Sec. 40. Bayles, The Office of Mayor in the
United States, pp. 40-44, contains a summary of the power of approval from
the standpoint of administrative law, and cites numerous decisions affecting
the method by which the power is exercised in the various states.
ss Cf. the charter of Cleveland, Sec. 40; St. Louis, Art. 4, Sec. 17; pro-
posed charter of Cincinnati, Sec. 59. The phraseology in the Boston char-
ter of 1909 is similar to that which obtains in the Quincy charter of 1888,
except that the latter enumerates as additional exceptions the following:
measures relating to council
' '
officers or employees, to the election or duties
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course, enlarged the power of approval to the extent that it may
now be applied to parts of measures and denied to other parts.
The actual importance of the power is difficult to determine. In
nearly all cases want of approval by the mayor does not invali-
date the measures, and, indeed, the latter usually go into effect
within a fixed time, unless the mayor expresses his disapproval
by the veto. In practice it may be said that the power, coupled
with that of the veto, assures the mayor that he will be consulted
in municipal legislation, it secures an opportunity for a review
and consideration of enactments aside from that given in the
council chamber, and it calls forth the opinion of the administra-
tion with regard to legislative proposals and ordinances.
The time which has been granted to the mayor for the consid-
eration of council enactments is usually ten days,
39 but there is
some disposition to lengthen this period. Thus in Boston he is
given fifteen days, and in St. Louis twenty days. With the in-
creasing mass of legislation the exercise of the power of approval
becomes largely perfunctory with respect to much of it unless
the executive is given a longer period.
The power of approval when exercised with respect to items
in appropriation bills gives to these items the full force of an or-
dinance ' ' in like manner as a bill approved.
' ' 40 The value of
this power is apt to be overlooked in contrast with the more ob-
vious importance of the power to veto items in such bills.
Of the legal powers of the mayor in respect to legislation none
except the power of approval is more widely recognized than
is the veto power.
41
Copied from the executive veto in the na-
tional and state governments it has been applied to municipal
government wherever the mayor and council type of organization
has undergone serious development. Municipal charter makers
of the auditor of accounts or comptroller, to the removal of the mayor, or
to the declaration of a vacancy in the office of mayor." Charter, See. 17.
39 Ten days is set in New York, Baltimore, Cleveland, Kansas City, Se-
attle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, while in Illinois, North Dakota, and
Norfolk, Va., the period is but five days. Many other cities might be added
to this list but enough have been cited to show that the ten day period is
by far the most common one.
*o Cf. St. Louis, Charter, Art. 4, Sec. 17.
4i Twenty years ago as well as today the only important exceptions under
the mayor and council plan were the cities of North Carolina and Tennessee.
The mayor of Charleston, S. C., does not have the veto power.
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have experimented with it in many forms, from that which re-
quires but a majority vote to overrule it, to the absolute veto,
with the pocket veto, the selective veto, and the most common
qualified veto in which from two-thirds to three-fourths of the
council is necessary to overrule it. In all of its forms it ex-
presses some active and positive disapproval of legislation by the
executive and has become his most important means for the con-
trol of such legislation.
The suspensive veto, or that which requires a bare majority
vote of the council to overrule the mayor's negative, exists in
some cities of Texas. The veto of the mayor merely operates to
delay an ordinance from going into force, pending repassage by
the council. At best it is a check upon hasty legislation and
gives opportunity for a determined opposition to make its power
and influence felt. The suspensive veto also exists in the selec-
tive form, applicable to ordinances and resolutions making ap-
propriations. It is evident, however, that the creation of a
strong mayoral control and responsibility in legislation is not to
be effected under veto provisions of this sort. The suspensive
veto, except for its selective power, is the earliest form in which
it was employed in American cities and the whole history of its
development has been in the direction of requiring a larger pro-
portion of the council than a mere majority to overrule it.
The pocket veto has rarely been found in municipal govern-
ments though it has not been unknown. In Kentucky, for ex-
ample, the general law for second class cities under the federal
plan provides that
' '
should the mayor fail to approve a proposed
ordinance or resolution within twenty days after presentation to
him, he shall be deemed to have disapproved the same, and there-
upon the same course shall be pursued in the council with refer-
ence thereto, as if he had in fact disapproved the same.
' ' 42 On the
other hand most city charters expressly deny the pocket veto, by
providing that if the mayor fails to approve a measure or to re-
turn it with his objections it shall "take effect as if he had ap-
42 General Charter Law, Sec. 60. The existence of the pocket veto in city
government has usually been ignored or denied. Cf. Munro, The Govern-
ment of American Cities, p. 224. There are now no cities operating under
this act, since 1915 all of them having adopted the alternative commission
form.
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proved it."
43 The pocket veto appears to be without justifica-
tion either in experience or theory as far as the field of municipal
government is concerned. It has existed only in isolated cases,
and has failed to commend itself to those responsible for draft-
ing the charters under any one of our principal municipal sys-
tems. It may properly be considered ?0s an unusual and unprom-
ising feature.
The most generally accepted form of the veto is that which
requires a vote of from two-thirds to three-fourths of the council
to overcome the negative of the mayor. The proportion varies
considerably, tho the large majority of cities operating under
individual charters and many general laws provide that two-
thirds of all the members elected to the council must vote to set
aside the veto.44 In Baltimore and Rochester and under the gen-
eral laws of Wisconsin the proportion is fixed at three-fourths of
the entire council. In San Francisco fourteen out of eighteen
supervisors are necessary to defeat a mayoral veto. But whether
the proportion is two-thirds or higher the result is an effective
executive veto. It is difficult to overcome and in the hands of
a determined mayor becomes a powerful factor in the relations
between the municipal legislature and the executive. Strength-
ened as it usually is by the selective feature it illustrates very
clearly the disposition of municipal charter makers to trust to
one man power in the control of legislation as well as of admin-
istration. The selective veto permits the mayor to veto items in
appropriation ordinances,45 an authority which when combined
with his power to initiate the municipal budget, is of imposing
proportions, and certainly impairs the responsibility of the coun-
cil in the field of municipal finance. With the exception of some
smaller cities and a few general state laws the selective veto is
today an established feature in municipal charters. The propor-
*3 gan Francisco, Charter, Art. 2, Chap. I, Sec. 16. This provision is
typical in substance, tho the phraseology frequently differs.
4* Cf. the charters of Los Angeles, Seattle, Kansas City, Detroit, St.
Louis, Cleveland, Toledo, Indianapolis, and the general charter laws of
North Dakota, Illinois, and Indiana for the requirement that a vote of two-
thirds of the council is necessary to overcome the veto.
45 See the Kansas City charter, Art. 3, Sec. 6, for examples of provisions
conferring the selective veto. Also the St. Louis charter, Art. 4, Sec. 17.
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tion of council votes necessary to overcome it is the same as for
the ordinary veto.
An absolute veto is vested in the mayor in the cities of New
York and Boston. In the former the strength of the veto power
varies according to the kind of measures under consideration.
Ordinary measures, if vetoed, may be reenacted by a vote of two-
thirds of the aldermen. Financial measures give to the mayor a
power which it takes three-fourths of the members of the board
to overcome. In the case of franchise measures the negative of
the mayor is final. Boston has gone one step further. In the
amended charter of 1909 it is provided that every appropriation,
ordinance, order, resolution, and vote of the city council must be
presented to the mayor, and if returned by the latter within fif-
teen days with objections, or if in the case of appropriation
measures he objects to any items either in whole or in part, the
actions of the council to which he objects "shall be void." This
is the absolute veto. Coupled with the mayor's control over
financial legislation,
46 the veto tends to make the mayor the dic-
tator in municipal legislation.
The development of the veto in the American municipal system
is unique. It has run the entire gamut from the weak suspensive
veto, to the qualified, selective, and finally now the absolute veto.
Its growth in importance has kept pace with that of the mayor's
other prerogatives, and there can be little doubt that it has con-
tributed very largely to the exaltation of the executive over the
council. The veto power was originally intended to be the means
by which the executive might protect itself from the encroach-
ments of the legislative branch of the government. The power
does not now need to be justified on this ground in municipal
government, if indeed there was ever such warrant. In fact, no
one imagines that it was meant to serve that purpose in present
day charters. It is rather intended that it shall be used to check
and curb municipal legislation, and its increased use in this
direction has been followed by the enlargement and further
strengthening of the power itself.
46 This control enables him to initiate ' ' all appropriations ' ' either in the
annual or supplementary budgets and only permits the council to "reduce
or reject any item, but without the approval of the mayor" not to "in-
crease any item in, nor the total of a budget, nor add any item thereto,"
nor
"originate a budget."
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A perusal of many of the veto messages penned during the past
fifteen years by mayors of a dozen representative cities reveals no
flagrant abuses of the power entrusted to them. Some vetoes
are defended on broad grounds of public policy, some for reasons
of economy, some because of non-compliance with charter provi-
sions or state law, some on account of poor drafting and the
incorporation of vague or indefinite provisions, and occasionally
a veto for the purpose of protecting some other organ of city
government, such as a board of estimate and apportionment, in
its functions. A study of these vetoes and the acts which gave
rise to them together with the circumstances surrounding them
in so far as they could be ascertained indicated that on the whole
the mayoral power had been wisely exerted. Mr. D. B. Eaton
in his The Government of Municipalities suggests that the
veto power of the mayor tends to secure careful deliberation on
the part of the council and large majorities for measures enacted.
He contends also that its possession renders the mayoralty more
dignified and responsible and therefore more attractive to men
of high character and honorable ambition.
It is apparent, on the other hand, that the executive veto as
employed in actual practice is not to be understood or described
merely by a consideration of the veto messages delivered, nor by
the observations and conclusions offered in charter conventions,
nor by comparing it with its prototypes in federal and state gov-
ernment. The veto messages show the power at work under the
most favorable conditions, charter makers' speeches are apt to be
little more than expressions of personal opinions based on theory,
and comparisons are likely to be misleading. The mere threat
of the veto may be as effective as its actual use and may render
the latter entirely unnecessary; and its effectiveness is scarcely
diminished because the threat is directed against a good measure,
or is employed for trading purposes to gain support for the
executive, or is used to befog issues and shift responsibility to
the confusion of the electorate. Indeed, the real significance of
the veto power lies not so much in its exercise as in its existence
and the possibility of its being exercised. This fact has led Pro-
fessor "W. B. Munro to question whether ''the veto has, or ever
had, any proper place in the domain of local government," a
question which he answers by denying the necessity of the veto
to maintain a theoretical balance of power as long as the power
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of the state is at hand to effect readjustments. He further
indicts the abuses of the power in actual practice, abuses char-
acterized by the bulldozing and browbeating of councils "in
cases without number," and by trading and "political jug-
glery." These defects, he suggests, warrant the relegation of
the mayoral veto power to
' ' the political scrap-heap.
' ' 4T Occa-
sionally there have been proposals made for taking the veto
power from the mayor, as in the Chicago charter convention of
1906. In this case it was proposed that the veto be lodged with
the president of the council, but the proposal received little con-
sideration, and in fact the mayor's veto was retained without
roll call.48 On the contrary, in cities having the mayor system
the tendency is to strengthen the veto either in its qualified form
or by the adoption of the absolute veto.49
47 The Government of American Cities, pp. 224-226. An earlier discus-
sion of the veto power by Mr. Bayles contributes almost nothing to settle-
ment of the question raised by Dr. Munro, being content with viewing it
from the standpoint of administrative law. See The Office of Mayor in the
United States, pp. 45, 46, and 47.
48 In fact there was no discussion. Following a motion that the proposal
to transfer the veto to the president of the council be laid on the table, a
proposal that the veto be made suspensive in character and subject to being
overruled by a majority vote was rejected without discussion. The qualified
veto proposal was then reached. A motion to adopt it prevailed without
argument. Cf. The proceedings of the Chicago Charter Convention, 1906,
pp. 74, 93, 94.
* The Boston Finance Commission in its recommendations for the adop-
tion of the absolute veto said:
"If there is to be but one elective council, there should be a check upon
its action more effective than the qualified veto power now possessed by the
mayor. Such a check can be secured by enlarging the power of the mayor
over appropriations, loans, franchises and ordinances. The commission rec-
ommends that the mayor be given a concurrent vote in all matters passed
on by the city council. This means either an absolute veto, or the right of
initiative on his part. The commission recommends a combination of the
two plans. The annual appropriation bill or budget should originate in
legal theory, as it does now in practice, with the mayor ; while all other acts
and votes of the city council should be subject to his approval."
"Appropriations from revenue and taxes should be submitted by the
mayor to the city council, which should have the power to eliminate or de-
crease items, but not to increase or add items. A similar provision, but
varying in details, is found in the charters of New York, Baltimore and
Cleveland, and is recommended by the National Municipal League for gen-
eral adoption by the cities of the country. All other acts, votes and reso-
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In concluding this survey of the mayor's actual authority to
participate in municipal legislation one is forced to recognize
that the positive powers which he possesses are with few excep-
tions much less important, either singly or collectively, than is
the power to veto the acts of the council. In a few cases this
power has been one of the important means by which the charter
makers have sought to establish responsible organs of legislation ;
almost everywhere it has been recognized as a desirable feature.50
Despite the attacks made upon it the veto power appears to be
thoroly intrenched in the municipal constitution of the mayor
type, a type which continues to seek good government thru
the creation of executives who are dominant both in legislation
and in administration.
EXTRA-LEGAL INFLUENCE
The legal powers which are bestowed upon the mayor in regard
to municipal legislation are by no means the sole measure of his
influence in this field. Indeed, it may often be doubted whether
they constitute the most important factor in determining his
position. His personal influence, his standing in his party, the
patronage which he controls, and his ability to direct public
attention to favored measures either thru the press or thru
pamphlets and addresses are sources of extra-legal power that
are not only difficult to define but are incapable of accurate
measurement as to their potency in operation. Yet it is well rec-
ognized that the power and influence which flow from these
sources not only determine the character of city government dur-
ing any given mayoral term, but frequently override entirely,
now for good and now* for ill, the ordinary legal provisions laid
down in municipal charter and state law.
lutions and orders of the city council should require the affirmative approval
of the mayor.
' '
Cf. The Finance Commission of Boston, Eeports and Com-
munications, Vol. II, p. 244. Dated January 29, 1909.
By an act of November 10, 1908, the mayor of Boston is also given a
veto power over all appropriations and votes of the board of aldermen,
acting as county commissioners.
so Except in commission or city manager governed municipalities. As a
rule commission charters do not recognize the veto power, tho there are a
few that do. The absence of the mayor's veto has been pronounced "not
the least among the merits of the commission plan" by Dr. Munro. Cf.
The Government of American Cities, p. 226.
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The personal influence of the mayor in legislation rests upon
numerous personal qualities which will be discussed in the chap-
ter on the personality of the municipal executive. It is perti-
nent to observe at this point, however, that to exert any great
personal influence in a council a mayor must command the re-
spect of his politically hostile opponents as well as of his immedi-
ate supporters and friends, and he must be able to cooperate with
those who disagree with him, and to compel their cooperation in
return. Not all successful mayors are men who have exercised
a commanding personal influence, but for those who are able to
do so, men like Josiah Quincy, Carter H. Harrison, Sr., and a
few others, the bonds of legal definition offer little restraint.
A factor that is by no means negligible is the standing of the
mayor in the party to which he belongs, for the party is the
agency thru which the people determine and carry out the
policies of government. Recognized leadership in party affairs
is almost indispensable to the successful mayor. Past loyalty and
service, flavored with a touch of independence in judgment and
action make a strong partisan appeal even where leadership is
not undisputed as in the career of the late William J. Gaynor.
Even fusion and independent mayors seriously endanger their
legislative programs when they ignore the parties which put
them into office. Indeed the success of many mayors has been
possible because of their dominating position in their respective
parties and their common sense recognition of the value of party
organization and support. 51
When one discusses the use of the mayor's patronage to control
local legislation it becomes necessary to deal with the more or less
hidden, tho generally acknowledged, workings of the machin-
ery of legislation. The temptation to which the mayor yields is
strong and pressing. Mayors are, as a rule, elected not as chief
executives, but "because of advocacy of some particular legis-
lative policy" and with little or no attention to their capacity as
administrators. To secure the legislation to which the mayor is
pledged becomes imperative. Small wonder that the interests of
sound administration are sacrificed to achieve that end and that
the mayor trades patronage for the votes of recalcitrant council-
men. Nor is this power utilized only to secure legislation ; it is
si The administrations of Mayor Mitchel and Mayor Blankenburg fur-
nish instructive contrasts in this particular.
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also employed to forestall and block the acts and plans of the
council. An example is afforded by the fate of a proposed
investigation by the council of school finances in Chicago in 1916,
an investigation to which the mayor was opposed. So successful
was he that Alderman Robert M. Buck remarked: "If the
mayor can throttle or buy enough councilmen with his patronage
the investigation of school finances will never be properly made.
We found out just which Republican and Democratic aldermen
the mayor had bought with patronage or hopes of patronage.
' ' 52
The mayor's power of appeal to the public thru the press
and pamphlet literature as well as by speeches is often employed
to influence pending legislation or to bring public opinion to bear
upon members of the municipal council. Thru the daily
papers the mayor is able to speak as frequently as he may choose
to the reading public of the city, and because of his control of
many news sources he is able to make sure that his views and the
data which he presents will receive space even in opposition news-
papers. Doubtless there are exceptional cases in which the
mayor is unable to command a hearing or is subject to deliberate
misrepresentation, but the importance of his power and influence
over the news service usually is not to be denied.53 The use of
pamphlets is not widespread, yet it is employed on frequent occa-
sions for the purpose of informing the citizens about work actu-
ally accomplished, or to prepare the public for the intelligent re-
ception of policies yet to be worked out. One of the most inter-
esting uses of the pamphlet was that employed by Mayor Clifford
B. "Wilson of Bridgeport, Conn., in 1912. In August of that year
he sent a message to the common council reciting "a number of
pressing needs and improvements" and suggesting a special elec-
tion at which the voters should be permitted to determine the
fate of the proposals made. The carrying out of the plan in-
52 Cf. Chicago Sunday Tribune of July 4, 1915. American municipal
history is not wanting in many flagrant cases in which the mayor's patron-
age was made to serve his legislative program.
53 In a pamphlet issued on May 10, 1909, and entitled What Should
New York's next Mayor Do? the Bureau of Municipal Research specifies
among other things the systematizing of the city's news service for the pur-
pose of enabling the press to obtain authentic statements of facts regarding
important proposals. The cases in which the mayor is misrepresented delib-
erately appear to be more frequent than those in which he is denied a hear-
ing. The news value of his acts takes care of abuses of the latter sort.
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volved in some cases the issuing of bonds for the financing of
sewer systems, bridges, and parks proposed, and the alteration of
certain administrative features thru charter amendments.
The election was duly called and Mayor Wilson in order "to set
before the voter a few facts concerning each proposition" in
order "that he may vote intelligently" published a ten-page
pamphlet that was free from partisan appeal explaining the proj-
ects and charter changes. Its author characterized it as "an
experiment to get an intelligent expression from the people them-
selves, based on a complete knowledge of the facts.
" 5* It is a
fact, however, that mayors have not, as a rule, employed their
opportunities for publicity either with skill or effectiveness.
They are prone to follow rather than lead and create public
opinion, or such publicity as is sought is tainted with partisan or
personal objectives and lacks that candid and full presentation of
facts that alone can command respect and support.
The reference above to the mayor's interest in the fate of char-
ter amendments brings up the question of the power and influ-
ence of the municipal executive in the framing and enactment
of charters. In general it may be said that while the mayor fre-
quently takes a leading part in the initiation of charter revisions
his influence in charter conventions is not conspicuous. 55 There
are in some cases opportunities for the exercise of such influence,
as in the case of Chicago, where the commissions that have con-
sidered charter revision have been appointed by the mayor. 56
Occasionally, as in New York, the mayor has interested himself
in promoting the amendment of the municipal charter by legis-
lative action.57 Likewise mayors not infrequently advocate or
endorse proposed changes which they believe will serve the public
welfare. 58 But it can hardly be maintained that the mayoralty
5* Cf. Proposed Charter Amendments and Bond Issues, What They are
and What They are For, by Clifford B. Wilson, Mayor. The pamphlet con-
tained two maps in addition to the reading matter.
55 Cf. Mayor Fitzgerald 's part in the initiation of charter revision in
Boston prior to the creation of the Finance Commission. His first propo-
sals along this line failed to get support in the city council.
ss Both of the Chicago charter commissions since 1900 have been appoint-
ed, the second one being named in the closing year of the Harrison regime.
57 The most notorious instance is that of the ' ' Tammany-Gaynor char-
ter. " See National Municipal Review.
58 Endorsements and suggestions are frequently found in mayoral mes-
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has had undue influence on the formulation of the charters draft-
ed by commissions and conventions organized for that purpose.
The same conclusions may be reached in regard to the mayor 's
influence in the work of those boards and commissions that have
been given authority to determine public policy along certain
lines of municipal activity. The boards of education are con-
spicuous among those which enjoy large powers of a legislative
character. In some cities, notably in New York and Chicago,
the board of education is appointed by the mayor. 59 In Detroit
the mayor is ex officio a member of the board and has a veto upon
its proceedings. Two-thirds of the members elected to the board
must support a measure to carry it over the mayor's veto.60 In
other cities, however, no such authority appears to exist. Tho
members of the board of education in New York are specifically
excepted from the operation of the removal power of the
mayor,
61 the latter appears to be able to influence their decisions
thru the selection of members known to be in accord with his
views,
62 and thru his influence as a member of the board of
estimate and apportionment, which is charged with the authority
to receive the school budget and to act upon the same prior to its
submission to the aldermen. The board must also submit certain
reports to the mayor, including an annual report. With these
exceptions and others of less importance the mayor may be said
59 Cf. New York, Charter, See. 1061. It cannot be doubted that this power
of appointment enables the mayor to exercise an important influence upon
the educational policy of a great city, even tho no subsequent interference
by the mayor be recognized.
eo Detroit, Charter, Sec. 617. No pocket veto is recognized. The Detroit
board of education is elective.
ei New York, Charter, Sees. 95, 1096. The latter section permits the
mayor to remove upon proof of official misconduct etc., the removal to be
preceded by notice to the incumbent and a hearing upon the charges pre-
ferred. In Chicago the authority of the mayor to interfere thru the exer-
cise of his power of removal is recognized. Thus Mayor Harrison inter-
fered in 1914 in behalf of Mrs. Young, the superintendent of schools and
prevented her being dismissed by the board.
62 Mayor Mitchel is credited with having
' ' assumed the right to counsel
with the members of the board of education respecting policies initiated by
them." He assisted in an investigation which resulted in notable develop-
ments in school policy, particularly in vocational education and the trial of
the so-called Gary plan. See, Mayor Mitchel's Administration of the City
of New York, by Henry Bruere in the National Municipal Eeview, Vol. V,
pp. 24-37, especially pp. 32-34.
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to have little immediate power over education, owing to the pre-
vailing American practice of separating this function from other
municipal activities.
In municipal finance a new body has appeared to absorb power
from the city council and to augment the power of the mayor,
viz., the board of estimate and apportionment. In New York '
'
it
in very large measure makes the policy of the city.
" 63 In some-
what less power it has appeared in many other cities "a new
organism imposed upon the old.
' ' 64 The mayor invariably re-
tains a place upon it and may thus be expected to influence very
largely its decisions. TJhat it will become a permanent feature
of municipal organization does not, however, appear to be prob-
able, except in some large municipalities retaining the mayor
system. In Boston, indeed, the mayor appears to have absorbed
the functions which the boards of estimate and apportionment
perform in cities other than New York.
STATE LEGISLATION
The relation of the mayor to state legislation affecting cities
has found legal definition in but one state, viz., New York, and
in this case it is negative in character, consisting of a suspensive
veto upon special city laws. But in all the states in which there
6 See article by Mr. Mitchel in the Proceedings of the Academy of Polit-
ical Science, etc. on "The Office of Mayor." Vol. V, p. 4. Mr. Mitchel
explains as follows: "By that I mean that it determines such broad ques-
tions as the construction of our rapid transit system, and the terms and
conditions on which that system should be constructed and operated. It de-
termines the plan upon which our port is to be developed. It authorizes the
institution of the various portions of that plan. It determines the financial
policy of the city, as it did recently when by resolution it declared the insti-
tution of a new plan for financing permanent public improvements of a
non-revenue-producing class, and said improvements of that kind should
hereafter be financed in increasing proportions out of the tax budget of the
city of New York, instead of thru the issue of fifty year bonds. All these
duties that board performs, and I can assure you that it is about as busy
a deliberative body as sits anywhere in this country or elsewhere. . . .
In a great many instances public debate is had. ... In addition the
Board of Estimate has created under this administration a series of stand-
ing committees to determine questions of policy and the preparations of
great construction plans."
84 Cf. Charters of Baltimore, Rochester, and St. Louis, tho in none of
these has the board developed such powers as it enjoys in New York.
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are metropolitan cities the mayor must assume the more positive
role of a special leader in behalf of the interests of the city
which he represents. In this capacity he heads delegations of
city officials in their conferences with important legislative com-
mittees, and assists in the organization and presentation of the
city's case. The effectiveness of his endeavors depends upon a
great many elements other than the merits of the case which he
presents. The cooperation of the city's representatives in the
legislature is not always forthcoming owing to want of harmony
on the legislative program within the city itself. Party faction-
alism and jealousy between the rural and urban constituencies
are important factors. But on the whole it can be affirmed that
"many vicious and unwise bills" affecting cities would never be
enacted and "fewer desirable bills" would "fail" if all available
facts and data were ' ' adequately presented. '
' 65 The obligation
to undertake this presentation undoubtedly rests upon the may-
ors of many large cities today. It has been expressly insisted
upon in mayoralty campaigns in New York City and has been
prominent among the tasks which candidates for the office have
promised to perform in Chicago and other centers.
The suspensive veto with regard to special city laws is con-
ferred upon the mayor by the constitution of New York state.68
It is provided that following its passage by both houses of the
legislature a special city law shall be transmitted by the house
in which it originated to the mayor of the city or cities affected.
The mayor shall within fifteen days return the bill to the house
from which it was sent, or to the governor, with a certificate
stating whether or not the bill has been accepted by the city.67
os Cf. pamphlet issued by New York Bureau of Municipal Beseareh,
under date of May 10, 1909, entitled What Should New York's next Mayor
Dot p. 7, par. No. 18 under what are specified as "Some of the Things
New York's Next Mayor Must Do." It should be said the record of the
Mitchel administration supports the contention set forth in this paragraph.
66 See Constitution of New York, Art. 12, See. 2. This provision was
retained in the constitution drafted and submitted in 1915, but the term
"special city law" was more narrowly defined. Cf. "The New York Con-
stitutional Convention" by Charles A. Beard in the National Municipal 'Re-
view, Vol. IV, p. 644 (October, 1915).
67 The mayor alone acts for the city in cities of the first class, in others
the council or a majority of it must concur with him. The state legislature
may require the concurrence of the council in cities of the first class also.
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In 1900 the state legislature, in pursuance of the directory pro-
visions of the constitution, passed a law providing for a public
hearing on such
' '
special city laws,
' '
one to be held in each city
affected by a bill. In cities of the first class the hearings are
held before the mayor, in other cities before the mayor and the
legislative body of the city. Provision is made for public notice
of the hearing being given thru the press in all cases, and in
cities of the third class the mayor is instructed to serve copies
of the notice upon each council member either personally or by
mail. The mayor is authorized to append to the notice
' '
any ex-
planatory statement
' ' that he ' ' shall deem advisable. " It is sig-
nificant that if the bill is returned without having been accepted,
or is not returned within fifteen days, it may be repassed by the
assembly by a majority vote. In any case, whether accepted or
vetoed and then repassed, the bill is subject to the action of the
governor. In its final form the act of the legislature must show
in its title whether or not it has been accepted by the city. All
expenses incurred in connection with hearings must be borne by
the city or cities in which hearings are held.
The retention of the mayoral veto on "specified city laws" in
the proposed New York constitution of 1915 indicates that the
cities consider it of some value in their struggle against legisla-
tion of this type. There are many evidences, however, that the
veto is not so effective as the cities might wish it to be. The hear-
ings provided for have tended to be perfunctory in character and
productive of little information that would guide the mayor or
the mayor and municipal legislature in making a decision. The
New York campaign of 1909 brot out a demand for a more ef-
fective use of the power by the mayor, together with a presenta-
tion of the facts which justified a veto or an approval as the case
might be. It was contended that proper marshaling of the facts
would "largely determine later action by legislature and gov-
ernor,
' ' 68 tho in the past the mayoral veto had been overriden by
the legislature so frequently as to discourage its vigorous use.
See Constitution, Art. 12, Sec. 2 and also Act of 1900, "The General City
Law "Art. 2, Sec. 33, cited in Ash, The Greater New York Charter, etc.,
with Notes, etc., together with Appendices, etc. (Third Edition), Appendix
1, pp. 1062, 1063.
es What Should New York's next Mayor Dot For Mr. Seth Low's
opinion of the value of the mayor's veto on special city laws see Bryce,
American Commonwealth, Vol. I, p. 660, (3rd edition revised). Mr. How-
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As a method for protecting the city against special legislation
and yet permitting needed action, the veto has but one rival, the
provisions found in the constitutions of Illinois and Michigan in
which municipalities are permitted by popular vote to accept or
reject special legislation.69 At best the part the mayor can play
is exceedingly limited.
In addition to the foregoing the mayor may influence the fate
of state legislation thru appeals to the governor to exercise his
veto power. Instances of appeals of this sort are, indeed, quite
frequent and they offer an excellent opportunity for a summary
of the position of the city with respect to pending legislation,
particularly special bills affecting municipal interests. The ef-
fectiveness of such appeals is not such as to warrant any reliance
upon them as a means of protecting the interests of the munici-
pality.
70
ard Lee McBain praises the veto as well worth while and thinks it superior
to the Illinois and Ohio practice.
e In Illinois this protection is applied to Chicago only, for other cities
are protected by a constitutional restriction on the power of the legislature
to enact such laws except for Chicago. The Michigan constitution of 1908
contains a general provision for a local referendum on special legislation.
70 See a letter from Mayor Mitchel to Governor Whitman of New York,
dated May 9, 1916, appealing for a veto of fourteen million dollars in the
appropriation bills before him on the ground that taxable property in the
city of New York bears as great a burden as it can sustain without disaster
to the owners. The following excerpts from the appeal show how well the
opportunity for presenting the city's case was utilized in this instance:
"Unless you veto at least $14,000,000 from the state appropriations now
awaiting your signature, it is evident that within a year it will be necessary
for the State to impose another direct tax. This direct tax will create an
additional burden, which, added to the other taxes which New York City
must carry, may very easily produce a general collapse of real estate values
in New York City.
"The City of New York itself has done everything humanly possible to
reduce its own expenditures to an irreducible minimum. The appropria-
tions for the administrative expenses of the City Government are $2,125,000
less than the corresponding appropriations for 1914. The city now asks
that the State Government be as economical as the city itself has been.
When last year's appropriations were before you I made the same appeal
for the vigorous use of your veto power that I am now making in regard to
this year's appropriation. At that time you were unable to agree with my
conclusions, but I am emboldened to make the appeal again because, with a
wider experience, I feel sure that you have come to realize the justice of the
city's position last year."
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A summary view of the mayor and legislation reveals a dispo-
sition to continue the process of withdrawing the mayor from
membership in the council or immediate participation in its work.
His relative activity in the work of legislation appears to be in-
creasing, however, owing to the development of his power to
recommend measures, to attend council meetings, to introduce
administration measures, and to veto nearly all council acts. The
tendency to make him the responsible organ of city government
in the field of finance has enabled him to gain in power and pres-
tige at the expense of the council. In legislation as well as in
administration the mayor is approximating the importance of the
old English mayor who was described as ' ' the lord of the city. ' '
Of his various powers, that of veto appears to be exercised most
effectively for the accomplishment of his purposes; but it is
worthy of note that this power has been seriously challenged as
unnecessary and undesirable and is rarely retained in any but
mayor and council plan charters. The relation of the mayor to
state legislation can hardly be pronounced an effective one and
no expansion of his legal powers is noticeable along this line.
The net results of developments in recent years warrant the
conclusion that the mayoralty is both relatively and absolutely
more powerful in the field of legislation than ever before.
CHAPTER VI
THE MAYOR AND POLITICS
Intense partisan activity and strong party organizations have
been outstanding features of American political life. Especially
has importance been attached to the position and strength of the
national party organizations. State and local issues and inter-
ests have been subordinated in order to assure the success of the
national organizations and to provide the means for their effec-
tive maintenance and support during the intervals between cam-
paigns. In this process the municipalities have suffered tre-
mendously. Whatever of honor, reward, and opportunity their
offices have held forth for their citizens has been seized by the
great national and state organizations for the promotion of the
interests and purposes of the latter. The mayoralty, with its
power and influence, has been no exception to the rule. Times
without number it has been sacrificed upon the altar of national
party loyalty.
This tendency to exalt general at the expense of local political
interests is accentuated by the existence of a professional poli-
tician class that has consciously emphasized the importance of
success for the national and state organizations. The members
of this class look to their political activities to furnish them a
livelihood. They are in politics
' ' for what there is in it. ' ' The
opportunity offered them by the modern city and its government
has been unparalleled in former generations. It is a field that
can be most successfully exploited when the interest of the mu-
nicipal citizens is centered upon other than municipal problems.
The absence of tradition in local politics, the transient character
of much of the urban population, the indifference of large por-
tions of the population due to preoccupation in industrial and
commercial enterprises, all supplement the efforts of the pro-
fessional politician to magnify other than local programs and
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issues, or to exhaust political energies in vain and unprofitable
sham battles.
Even when the urban electorates have been aroused to the im-
portance of municipal politics and have undertaken to discrimi-
nate between local and general issues and to analyze the former
with a view to the adoption of intelligent policy and the intro-
duction of efficient administration their efforts have been largely
neutralized. The municipality has not been free to defend itself
from state interference. The state has often been only too will-
ing to assume an active hand in local affairs, even to the extent
of ripper legislation. The necessity of having local patronage
with which to reward branches of state and national political
organizations has led both to flagrant negation of the expressed
will of municipal electorates, and to the imposition upon them
of burdens which serve no local good. The city has been the
victim of unrefined political conditions and of a political phi-
losophy that defines success only in terms of victory at the polls,
the assumption of the chief offices of government, and the seizure
of the major portion of the positions in the civil service. Failure
on the part of local party organizations to retain their hold on
municipal governments not infrequently resulted in state author-
ity being invoked to thwart the will of the local electorate.
The worst conditions have arisen when powerful private inter-
ests have sought to intrench themselves in richly productive pub-
lic utilities, an end that could most easily be achieved thru an
alliance with local political organizations. The result has usually
been the establishment of a bipartisan regime, in which profes-
sional politicians of all parties and predatory privilege leagued
to promote their respective interests irrespective of the public
welfare. It is quite obvious that under such conditions the con-
trol of the municipal executive was an objective of primary im-
portance.
The mayoralty has reflected the political conditions in which
it has developed. The mayors of important urban centers have
usually been party men, at least in the sense that they have been
affiliated with a local branch of some national party organization.
They have been elected by party men, who cast their votes
' ' for
a mayor, who if he were elected President would do this thing
or that thing with reference to national expansion or the cur-
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rency question or something of that sort ; . . .
"
It remained
possible for him to develop a local party leadership that would
be sensible of its responsibilities to the community it served and
possessed of sufficient influence and power to prevent the whole-
sale and wanton subordination of municipal interests to partisan
or private self-seeking. It was much easier, however, for him to
become the pliant tool of those aggressive forces that are in poli-
tics for mercenary purposes. Probably no program of local
policy had been projected in the campaign for his election. He
had cautiously refused to commit himself to definite lines of ac-
tion on local issues. Having been chosen out of concern for some
national or state policy to the realization of which he could con-
tribute little or nothing he remained largely free to give "the
street car company or the gas company a new franchise." In
this fashion the loyal party voter who supported him ' ' has fool-
ishly bartered away his own rights, and his neighbor's rights
and his children's rights for half a century. He thought, per-
haps, he was voting for Lincoln or Jefferson, but in reality he
was voting for some contractor or for some political boss or for
some public service corporation."
There is generally a certain point, however, beyond which the
national and state political organizations may not safely disre-
gard the interests of local communities. Parties and politicians
desire above all else to retain their lease on office and power and
are therefore to some degree, more or less vaguely defined, re-
sponsible to the manifest will of the local electorate. The mayor-
alty because of its conspicuous position in the scheme of local
government is among the first of the organs of the municipality
to feel the pressure of public opinion and because of its central-
ized authority is the least likely among those organs to offer a
successful resistance. It has been frequently true that mayors
who have been chosen as machine candidates and for given par-
tisan purposes have broken with their backers when confronted
with a wave of public sentiment that was determined in charac-
ter. The action of Mayor John Weaver of Philadelphia, in
breaking with the Republican organization by dismissing from
office two of his directors and opposing the proposed gas steal,
is a conspicuous illustration of the fact that the mayor is so
positioned that he is inevitably sensitive to public thot and
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feeling.
2 Like independence and responsiveness were exhibited
by Mayor McClellan in insisting upon non-partisan appoint-
ments to membership on the New York City water supply board,
even when the state assembly at the behest of party interest had
made partisan nominations possible; by Mayor James N. Adam
of the city of Buffalo who kept in touch with his party, yet was
so largely independent of it as to make possible an honest, eco-
nomical, clean, and efficient administration. The number of illus-
trations might be multiplied many times from the records that
are accessible and doubtless there are very many examples that
have never had more than local publicity.
The determination of political parties to control municipal
politics has led to many notable struggles. In the present cen-
tury the most flagrant example of the methods to which parties
will resort to accomplish this end was the abolition of the mayor-
alty in Pennsylvania cities in 1901. The party in control of the
state had lost many local elections, the mayoral campaign among
them. The office of mayor was forthwith abolished by the noto-
rious ripper legislation of that year, and the controller made chief
executive in the municipalities. Another and more recent at-
tempt to set up a mayoralty which would be responsive to the
desires of the party in control of the state was embodied in the
Tammany-Graynor charter proposed for New York in 1911. The
charter conferred great power upon the mayor, probably with
the view of serving temporary ends. Among other things it
would have given the mayor a substantial and somewhat irre-
sponsible control over the city's budget. The proposal was de-
feated by the fortunate circumstance that the city had within it
public spirited organizations that were able to voice their pro-
tests quickly, persistently, and to stir up behind them a wave of
public protest.
3
In pursuit of their objectives party organizations do not hesi-
tate to "knife" independent or doubtful candidates of their
own. The defeat of Mayor Fagan in Jersey City in 1907 was the
result of party treachery rather than a popular repudiation of
his efforts and independence during his administration. The
more recent careers of Mayor Hunt in Cincinnati and Mayor
2 See address by Mr. White, "The Eevolution in Philadelphia" in At-
lantic City Conference for Good Government, Proceedings, p. 136.
3 Cf. account in the National Municipal Review, I, p. 67.
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Blankenburg in Philadelphia testify to the tendency of even the
so-called reform parties and fusion organizations to turn and
rend those who will not serve them. 4 A mayor in his constructive
work must watch the wiles of those who because of his indepen-
dence will stop at nothing to discredit his efforts, to bring him
into conflict with other state or local authorities under their con-
trol, or to "put him in a hole" in the execution of his own pro-
gram. In the case of Mayor Dempsey of Cincinnati, in 1906,
the ingenuity of local politicians and antagonists was exhausted
in the conflict, and the controversy with the governor of the
state further imperiled municipal reform. A striking example
of a mayor being compelled to veto a portion of his own election
promises is that of Mayor Blankenburg of Philadelphia, who
was forced into the position of vetoing eighty cent gas, a thing
he had expressly pledged himself to secure. An opposition coun-
cil had outmaneuvered him and had rendered possible the cheap-
er rate but on conditions which he could not approve.
There are few instances on record in which mayors have
successfully defied their party and been reflected. Sometimes,
however, this failure to secure a second term has been due pri-
marily to other causes than party defection. A conspicuous ex-
ample is found in the career of Mayor Timanus of Baltimore, who
established a gratifying record for independence. He refused
to countenance spoils, yet won the respect and support of his own
party, and was renominated. His opponent, however, was a man
of good character able to command the normal majority of the
opposition party and won the election. There was no evidence
of considerable defection within the ranks of Mr. Timanus' for-
mer supporters.
Among other causes none, perhaps, has been more potent than
the principle of rotation in office. As Professor A. B. Hart ob-
serves,
' '
Cities seldom permit anyone to serve more than . . .
four years ... in the mayoralty. Rotation in office pushes
a man out just as he is becoming a real force. ' ' 5 To this there
are, of course, many exceptions, but the mere inspection of the
lists of "former mayors" and other municipal officials which
* See the Providence Conference on Good City Government, Proceedings,
p. 107 (1907) for the mention of the defeat of Mayor Fagan.
s Address at the Providence Conference of Good City Government, Pro-
ceedings, p. 70 (1907).
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some cities publish in connection with their manuals or reports
confirms the statement. It should be observed, of course, that
municipal executives in this country have been drawn from the
ranks of a busy citizenship and that quite often men feel impelled
to give up their public duties after a few years in office in order
to attend to their own business interests. In some cities, too,
mayors may not succeed themselves and this of course augments
the number of changes. In other cases men tire of the struggle
which the mayoralty involves and return to private life at the
first opportunity.
In their efforts to gain control of the mayoralty with its ap-
pointive power, parties and candidates do not hesitate to use the
most deceptive slogans as campaign bait. National party loyalty
is appealed to, not only in large cities like Philadelphia and Chi-
cago, but in very many of the smaller municipalities.6 Opposi-
tion candidates are usually dubbed
' '
socialistic ' ' if they have ex-
hibited the slightest disposition to question the demands which
vested interests have made upon them, and the description is
one that has been peculiarly effective with conservative Ameri-
can electorates. On the other hand known conservatism invites
the charge of being
' '
capitalistic,
' '
and the consequent suspicion
of the labor and radical groups of the voters. Frequently such
aggressive slogans as "Get Busy," "A Business Administra-
tion," "Home Rule," and "Prosperity" are employed to rally
support and conceal from the elector the true purpose of the
spoilsman. A "Get Busy" campaign waged in Philadelphia in
1907 seems to have had particular reference to the task of cir-
cumventing the civil service law of 1906 and of providing places
for those "martyrs" who had lost out in the upheaval of 1905.
The Busse campaign in Chicago in 1907 was typical of one con-
ducted on a "Business Platform. ' ' Mr. Busse frankly recognized
the evil constituents of his party, saying, "No man can win in
politics with the help of the good alone. All elements are neces-
sary to success." In the Chicago mayoralty contest of 1915
there were many issues, but it was declared while the campaign
was on that it was to be a division on national party lines and
that the Wilson administration was on trial. The election at-
6 National politics and partisanship played a notoriously large part in the
Philadelphia election of 1915. The ' ' tariff ' ' was one of the chief issues in
the campaign.
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tracted much attention and the attitude of the mayor elect was
evidenced in the following statement concerning his victory:
"Chicago has spoken to the nation in this overwhelming vote
given the Republican candidates today. It means that Illinois
and the middle west will swing into the Republican column. The
country can get ready for a return of prosperity." The pros-
perity appears to have fallen chiefly to the lot of the party hench-
men who labored for the new mayor. The demoralization of the
municipal civil service stands out as one of the most striking
undertakings of the victors.
When measures such as the foregoing do not suffice the cam-
paign tends to degenerate into vilification. Candor and fair
play are supplanted by malice and vituperation. "Mud-sling-
ing and muckraking take the place of arguments over programs
of municipal advance. Abuse, slander, and falsehoods are at a
premium and eleventh hour misrepresentations are circulated
with cool and calculated effectiveness. ' ' 7 Sham candidacies to
split the independent vote are not uncommon, and seldom fail to
lead astray some of the unsophisticated. In short, all the devices
known to the political game are so frequently called into use in
struggles for the mayoralty that cases of gross and flagrant cor-
ruption stain the election annals of every important American
city. Frequently, the worst offenders are either organized under
the banners of a national political party or are closely affiliated
with one.
With the mayoralty looked upon as a legitimate and desirable
prize in the warfare between the two great political parties of
the nation, and the consequent tendency to reduce the indepen-
dence of the municipal executive by making him subservient to
party interests, it is small wonder that mayors frequently put
forth strenuous efforts to dominate the life and organization of
political parties. Occasionally a mayor with strong and vigorous
personality and gifted with political sagacity will succeed in con-
trolling not only local party activities and interests but in wield-
ing a powerful influence in the party life of the state. There are,
7 Striking examples of such methods are found in some of the campaigns
of Carter H. Harrison, Sr., of Chicago, Tom L. Johnson of Cleveland, and
"Golden Eule" Jones of Toledo. See Abbot, W. J., Carter Henry Harri-
son, A Memoir, pp. 124-126; Lorenz, Carl, Tom L. Johnson, Mayor of Cleve-
land, p. 24 ; Whitlock, Brand, Forty Years of It, pp. 130, 131.
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of course, many more who fail than there are those who succeed.
It is, indeed, an undertaking in which municipal executives rarely
succeed. But it is also one which is inevitably forced upon spirit-
ed and ambitious mayors, both in the interest of the community
they have been elected to serve and for the preservation of their
own independence of action. Such a course is necessary also for
the man who aspires to state or national political honors. The
struggle for partisan advantage is so keen that it becomes a ques-
tion of the mayor controlling the party or the party controlling
the mayor. This condition is likely to be aggravated in states in
proportion as home rule is not recognized.
Municipal history has produced many mayors who have suc-
ceeded in achieving control of the local party organization, but
fewer have been able to exercise effective leadership in state poli-
tics. Men like Carter H. Harrison, Sr., of Chicago, Mayor James
Dahlman of Omaha, and Tom L. Johnson of Cleveland, have not
hesitated to push the organization of their own party control,
even a reformer like Mr. Johnson not hesitating to go to question-
able limits in order to assure himself that his policies and deci-
sions would be registered in law.8 Both Mayor Dahlman and
Mayor Johnson played an active part in state politics and sought
at one time or another to dominate them. The close relation be-
tween the city of Chicago and the political activities of Illinois
has always tended to draw the mayor of the former into the arena
of state politics. Mayors Dunne, Busse, Harrison, Jr., and
Thompson have all figured with prominence in the direction of
their respective parties in the state. The temptation to build up
personal machines in order to render this party control stable
and effective has been one of the curses of municipal government.
It tends to debauch the administration by giving more or less free
rein to spoils appointments; it paralyzes municipal councils as
organs for the discussion of public policies and often reduces
them to the position of mere vehicles for recording the executive
will;
9 even in the case of well meaning men it eventually pro-
duces astigmatism of the executive vision, as they confuse per-
sonal success with the public good; it invariably subordinates
s Cf. the Eeport of the Municipal Association of Cleveland, a non-partisan
organization. Citation in the Proceedings of the Providence Conference on
Good City Government (1907), pp. 113, 114.
9 Ibid. Cf. also, Lorenz, Tom L. Johnson, pp. 89-112.
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local policies and issues to the considerations of expediency pre-
sented by the political situation at large; and in actual cam-
paigns it tends to submerge the importance of selecting good
councilmen in the tide of popular interest and absorption in the
selection of the mayor.10
On the other hand the mayor of the average American city
cannot leave the political situation either local or general out of
consideration in any of his more important undertakings. Doubt-
less this is due in part to the political character of the mayoralty
and the necessity of obtaining support thru political parties.
Opponents of the mayor system and advocates of the controlled
executive plan have been quick to seize upon the mayor's neces-
sary participation in political life as the chief menace to admin-
istrative efficiency. Undeniably this is the weakest point in the
mayor plan. Political expediency demands and receives con-
sideration at the expense of quality in service rendered. But
the weakness is not without its compensating advantage, and the
vast influence which a popularly chosen mayor, the acknowledged
leader of the political life of a community, may have upon pub-
lic policy is not to be lightly cast aside for the divided counsels
of a municipal legislature selected by crude methods of securing
representation and commanding a somewhat colorless expert ser-
vice in administration. Indeed, the emancipation of the city
from the domination of state and national political parties and
issues has probably been hastened by the leadership of strong
mayors.
11 Few believe that the mayor plan even where most
perfectly developed and most satisfactorily operated represents
the last word in municipal organization. But it has represented
a distinct advance, it has contributed richly to the improvement
of American city government, and it has cultivated that inde-
10 The records of the Municipal Voter 'a League of Chicago indicate how
much more successful is the effort to secure good councilmen in years when
there is not also a campaign on for the election of mayor. The editorials
and cartoons of the Chicago press during the 1915 campaign were contin-
ually seeking to remind the elector that the councilmanic election must not
be lost sight of in the attention paid to the struggle for the mayoralty.
11 Cf. the address of William Dudley Foulke, retiring president of the
National Municipal League, delivered at Dayton, Ohio, November 17, 1915,
and published in the National Municipal Eeview, Vol. V, p. 12, under the
title "Coming of Age. Municipal Progress in Twenty-one Years," espe-
cially p. 15.
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pendence in the electorate which will enable the achievement of
higher standards in administration and hasten the reduction of
partisan and political considerations to the minimum.
Evidence of the independence of the electorate with regard to
the mayoralty has been steadily accumulating. Some very strik-
ing examples are at hand. Mr. James Dempsey was elected
mayor of Cincinnati in 1905 in a campaign noteworthy for the
independent stand of Mr. W. H. Taft against the partisan ma-
chine dominated by Boss Cox. Independent appointments fol-
lowed and the education of the electorate began. The fact that
reform in administration had a comparatively poor chance owing
to the hostility of the council did not prevent the utilization of
the meager opportunity that was presented. The leadership of
Mr. Taft came while he was a member of the national adminis-
tration during Mr. Koosevelt's second administration. Doubt-
less it encouraged to the point of action many voters who were
thinking along independent lines. The reform administration of
Mayor Hunt was possible only because of these earlier influences
which tended to ' ' free ' ' the elector in Cincinnati. Brand Whit-
lock 's career in Toledo followed close upon that of "Golden
Eule" Jones, and produced an intelligent response that resulted
in a sympathetic council. Tom L. Johnson's repeated success in
Cleveland was due not only to his political skill within his own
party but to the cultivated independence of voters in the opposite
party who approved his conduct and policies in local affairs.
At one time it was remarked that it had become almost a cus-
tom in Providence to choose a mayor from the opposite party
than that to which the council belonged, a condition which did
not contribute greatly to harmony in the city government, but
which justified itself under the enlightened leadership of Mayor
McCarthy. Mr. McCarthy sought the counsel of groups of able
and prominent citizens in making up his nominations for ap-
pointment and his suggestions to the city council, thus throwing
a burden of proof upon that body which they could not lightly
escape when they refused to confirm his nominees or adopt his
proposals. It was easier to get a Blankenburg administration
in Philadelphia because of the "revolution" of the first decade
of the century. The Mitchel regime in New York is the product
of an independence in spirit and action that has been fostered
appreciably by so-called Tammany mayors as well as by fusion
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and independent incumbents of the office. The independence of
Mayor Gaynor was frequently the occasion of comment, tho he
was himself a member of the Tammany society and was elected
on a party ticket. Of course this independence was not always
in evidence, but "the recent Tammany mayors of New York, Mc-
Clellan and Gaynor, were very much better men than the earlier
ones such as Van Wyck or Grant. ' '
Nor are these examples furnished by larger communities alone ;
they are becoming increasingly common in the smaller cities.
The case of the city of Lapeer, Michigan, is rather unusual, but
indicates the trend in many small communities. The majority
of the electors in Lapeer are Protestants, yet in 1912 they elected
a Roman Catholic priest, Father Dunnigan, as mayor, owing to
his attitude toward the liquor problem and despite the fact that
he thereby became a member ex officio of the school board. In
almost every case the mayors are found in the lead, even under
circumstances in which they owe their election to the very lack
of independence which was formerly so common in municipal
politics.
Altho undoubted gains have been made in the character and
independence of municipal politics, stability is far from assured.
The independence of the elector is fitful, originating sometimes
in temporary disgust, a desire to chasten, or in reliance upon the
promises of the reform leaders. At times the old fealty re-
asserts itself, or the reform movement has struck closer home
than was anticipated, or has failed to do all that it promised to
do at any rate periods of reaction are frequent and make up
many chapters even in recent municipal history. Often it ap-
pears that independence and struggle have been futile and that
no results are evidenced by the shift to the candidate of the op-
position. In other cases it is much easier to push forward the
tide of reform than it is to maintain it. Political habits are not
easily changed. Yet in the reactions which follow strong mayors
and reform administrations, and despite many pyrrhic victories
of independent movements, the city rarely slips back into condi-
tions as bad as they were before, nor the elector into the smug
complacency or preoccupation which characterized him before
once being aroused. At times there may be little choice among
the candidates set before the voter and the election returns may
hide the record of a brave tho unavailing struggle, or a dignified
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and considered refusal to choose.12 Over a period of years, how-
ever, the evidences of progress are unmistakable. To this result
independent mayors have not failed to contribute.
The opportunities which are opened up in the field of political
activity by the increasing position of the mayor in American
cities are vast and numerous. The clash of economic and social
interests, the battles of industrial warfare, and the rising con-
sciousness of community interest in the outcome of these strug-
gles all tend to elevate the mayoralty in authority and influence.
Frequently, it is true, municipal executives fail to realize their
opportunity to deal with situations that are ominous and threat-
ening, or more often merely annoying and unsatisfactory. But
the number of mayors who will interfere to settle a threatened
tie-up of local transportation due to the strike of the employees
or the bulldozing attitude of magnates in a traction controversy,
or who will attack the problems of unemployment, poor housing,
public extravagance, and petty graft, is already large and grow-
ing. State associations of mayors are studying these and other
municipal problems ; a national gathering of mayors has consid-
ered the questions presented by public utilities ; while many chief
executives have seized upon chances to champion measures that
will promote sound social organization and insure efficiency.
Whether politics be considered as the process of getting into and
retaining public office, or be viewed in the larger sense of devel-
oping, establishing, and maintaining a just and responsible or-
ganization of society, such action is more and more recognized
as good politics. Mayor Mitchel's efforts to cope with unem-
ployment in New York City in 1915; Mayor Thompson's settle-
ment of the traction strike in Chicago in the same year ; and De-
troit 's prompt organization of motor bus facilities for transpor-
tation in reply to the traction companies who threatened to cease
operation unless their demands for franchise privileges were
acceded to; the action of Mayor Henry T. Hunt of Cincinnati
in forcing the traction interests of that city to arbitrate the dif-
ference with their employees or to face an action for a receiver-
ship on the ground that the company's public duty was not being
12 Such was the case in the Chicago election of 1915. The Independents
failed to place a candidate in the primary race when Thompson defeated
Judge Olson. Thousands felt there was little to choose between Thompson
and his opponent, Mr. Sweitzer.
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performed ; and many other similar instances illustrate the pos-
sibilities of mayoral leadership. The continued growth of the
mayoralty will be due no less to the influence and authority of
the incumbent in the "good politics" just mentioned than to the
ordinary and more obvious political leadership which the office
has called forth.
The responsibility which attaches to the mayors of our cities
for overcoming the disturbances in municipal government due
to the play of national politics or to the pettiness of local differ-
ences of opinion has hardly been recognized by them. This re-
sponsibility belongs primarily to the mayor as a leader of the
majority party, a leader whose business it is to carry out the
party program with the least disturbance to the interests and
welfare of the municipality. But it also inheres in the office it-
self. The mayor is something more than a party leader. He is
the official head of the municipality; he is the mayor over all
its inhabitants. It is his duty to study the things that make for
cooperation and for the suppression of irrelevant or inconse-
quential differences. In speaking of the failure of Mayor Baker,
one of Cleveland's most enlightened leaders, to contribute mate-
rially to the solution of this pressing problem, Professor C. C.
Arbuthnot says: "It behooves the majority in municipalities
without surrendering the power that the electors have placed in
their hands, to put the minority members into active service,
load them with some share of responsibility for the public work,
entangle them indeed in the execution of the administration's
policies and by sheer force of working together put the minority
in a positive relation to the city government. The policy of iso-
lating the group in comparative ineffectiveness draws the parti-
san line sharper, turns energy that should be constructive into
obstructive tactics, sours the milk of common interest and sacri-
fices matters of local concern to an over emphasized national
distinction. The cities will never begin to free themselves from
this incubus unless they commence in substance as well as in
form. 13 An enlightened majority must start the unloading proc-
ess."
is The changes in form referred to are those which relate to the altera-
tion of the election machinery, especially those which seek to eliminate con-
tests by national parties on other than local issues. Mr. Baker's failure to
further the development of this reform is "all the more keenly felt because
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In concluding this review of the relation of the mayor to the
party and political life of the time it is well to call attention to
the fact that the large number of municipal executives who have
served as local political leaders have contributed a relatively
small proportion of the men who have achieved recognition in
the political life of the state and nation. There are some striking
exceptions, especially in states like New York and Illinois which
include great urban populations.14 But too often the exigencies
of practical politics tend to render the stronger man unaccept-
able for the municipal service. When this influence is supple-
mented by the retirement of valuable public servants either
voluntarily or thru the tendency to pass offices around, it is not
difficult to perceive why the cities do not furnish from among
thfeir executives a larger percentage of those prominent in the
larger units of government. It would seem to be altogether
desirable that men who have experienced as valuable training as
the chief magistracy of modern cities affords should not be lost
to a people whose higher forms of government have need of the
most skilled and trained ability. Fortunately there is encourage-
ment in the number of mayors who have won recognition from
state and nation within the past decade.
Mayor Baker has taught many a republican in this eity to forget national
party affiliations when voting for himself as eity solicitor or as mayor."
National Municipal Review, Vol. V, pp. 235, 236.
i* Grover Cleveland served as mayor of Buffalo, governor of New York
state, and President of the United States. Governor Dunne of Illinois had
already served as mayor of Chicago; Secretary of War Baker served two
terms as mayor of Cleveland; David R. Francis, ambassador to Russia,
served as mayor of St. Louis; Brand Whitlock, minister to Belgium, had
been mayor of Toledo; and there have doubtless been a number of others.
CHAPTER VII
THE PERSONALITY OF THE MAYOR
Ten years ago a prominent student of municipal government
made the statement that "tho there have been plenty of notable
governors there is hardly a man in the country who has made a
national, or even a state reputation as a highly successful mayor
of a city."
1 In the intervening years there have been a number
of men who have been known within their respective states for
their success in the mayor's office and some who have been known
thruout the nation for the same reason. The majority, however,
may never hope to achieve fame of more than local scope, not
because their work might not merit broader recognition, but be-
cause of other conditions over which they have no control. The
facilities for extending a mayor's reputation were not so well
organized ten years ago as they are now. The formation of state
and national mayors' associations, of municipal leagues, the pub-
lication of many journals devoted to the municipal field either
local, state, or national, or to some particular phase of municipal
government, the rising interest in municipal affairs and systems
of organization, and the striking advance in the betterment of
administration have served to give successful mayors an oppor-
tunity to achieve more than local recognition. Moreover, there
has been created during the past quarter of a century a constit-
uency which is primarily interested in learning of successes which
are worthy, and which keeps abreast of municipal affairs in the
more important cities and states, if not in the nation as a whole.
It must be remembered also that many able mayors have not
been men with political ambitions that would lead them to seek
the advertisement and public acclaim essential to the establish-
ment of a so-called reputation. Municipal executives have not
infrequently been men called from private life for a few years
1 Address before the Providence Conference on Good City Government;
see Proceedings, p. 69 (1907).
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of public service; then quietly reabsorbed into the body politic
as one of the mass. The means by which many of our well-known
public men have come to the front and the rewards which suc-
cess achieved in this way offers have not attracted the attention
of individuals whose ambition lies in other channels. Equally
true, too, is the fact that the importance of the mayoralty as a
position in the public employ and as a channel thru which to
serve the public has been quite generally underrated when com-
pared with state and federal positions. The short term which
formerly obtained generally gave only a few men a tenure suffi-
cient to attain more than local prominence. Others accounted
it a source of quick relief from a very arduous and quite thank-
less responsibility. On the other hand popular election fre-
quently cut short promising careers in the mayoral office. Want
of popular sympathy with municipal programs and broad gauge
planning usually gave statesmen small opportunity for leader-
ship, especially where the council continued to retain and exer-
cise considerable power in administration. Many mayors de-
spaired because of the mire of intrigue, petty politics, ward and
district squabbles that must be faced and mastered before con-
structive movements could begin. These conditions have not been
abolished today, but very marked improvements have taken place
and the mayoralty is tending to attract a distinctly abler class
of individuals into the public service. This tendency will in-
crease in proportion as the conditions in municipal government
improve and as the mayor plan feels the impact of other types of
executive organization.
No history and description of the mayor's office is adequate
that overlooks the personality of the incumbent. There have
been mayors who like some accomplished actors "take a small
part and make of it a great one. ' ' The opportunity to play the
part with distinction comes to almost every mayor; it may be
offered in the chance to clean up corrupt and vicious practices
in city government, it may come in a conflict with outside forces
that seek to dominate the city's life and welfare, it may come in
struggles to define and direct municipal programs of action, or
it may appear in the ever present problem of interpreting the
ordinary powers and duties of the office. The mayoralty has
felt the personality of great men in every one of these lines, and
in others. "Whatever other factors may contribute to the impor-
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tance of the office in the municipal field it owes much to those
individuals who have left the impress of their own personality
upon its development. To portray that obligation fully would
require too extended a treatment, but a survey of the more im-
portant personalities of the past two decades will indicate its
extent. In earlier years one may mention such remarkable may-
ors as Josiah Quincy of Boston, in many respects the most force-
ful character in the history of the office, Mr. Abram S. Hewitt
in New York, and Mr. Carter Harrison, Sr., of Chicago, who not
only made a name for himself but cast such a spell over the
electors in his city that a less forceful son has been able to exer-
cise a predominate influence in Chicago during the greater part
of the present century, he himself being mayor for twelve years. 2
The record of the mayoralty in the twentieth century inspires
new hope and establishes hopes already aroused with regard to
the future of city government in the United States. No index
to this record is more significant than the personalities of the
men who have held the office during these years. It is true there
have been men of the type of Eugene Schmitz of San Francisco
and "Doc" Ames of Minneapolis, men whose administrations
were malodorous with corruption and inefficiency, 3 and who have
faced trials for misconduct or who have become fugitives from
justice. One can also turn to the careers of the great majority
to find their work fairly honest, tho often characterized by medi-
ocrity, want of notable force and vision, and subject to the con-
ventional methods and demands of practical politics. The record
of Carter Harrison, Jr., of Chicago is typical, except in length
2 For an account of the life of .the elder Harrison see a work by Willis
John Abbot, Carter Henry Harrison, A Memoir, New York, 1895. Accounts
of the municipal activities of Mr. Quincy will be found in his Municipal
History, etc., Boston, 1852, and in the Memorial History of Boston, Vol. III.
The nature of his public service is indicated in his closing address to the
two houses of the council sitting in convention at the end of which he
uttered this challenge: "I inquire, as I have a right to inquire . . .
Have you found in me anything selfish, anything personal, anything mer-
cenary? In the simple language of the ancient seer, I say: 'Behold here
I am; witness against me. Whom have I defrauded? Whom have I op-
pressed? At whose hands have I received any bribe?'
"
s The Don Eoberts case in 1915 indicates that the worst type of munic-
ipal chief executive is not yet extinct.
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of service. John F. Fitzgerald of Boston and George B. McClel-
lan of New York also belong to this group. Occasionally too,
there appears a mayor who is wanting in the qualities which
would bring enduring recognition, but who possesses a pictur-
esqueness in personality and a semi-independence in action that
win for him more than local recognition. Before his election it
was prophesied of William J. Gaynor that with him as mayor,
"New York would not know one dull and uninteresting day."
"His picturesque and inscrutable character supplied the basis
for much genuine curiosity." "But at least his policies were
all his own. Citizens opposed to him were glad to feel that their
chief executive was incapable of submitting to crude dictation,
that he had reasons or motives for every official act in short,
that he was mayor in fact as well as in name." "His strong
and unusual personality will doubtless be remembered by New
Yorkers for a longer time and more vividly than will any partic-
ular acts and policies of his administration." More frequently
the office attracts the type of man quite commonly described as
a war horse of reform.
Recent years appear to be evolving a new type of mayor, a
type skilled and practiced in the art of municipal administration
and devoted to the application of sound principles and methods
and the development of sound traditions. It is being justified
by its substantial achievements.4
One of the most unique personalities that has occupied the
mayoral post in this country was Samuel M. Jones, more famil*
iarly known as "Golden Rule Jones," of Toledo. Mr. Jones was
considered eccentric. In public and in private life he became
a national and an international figure. He tried to practice the
golden rule, not in a limited sense but so completely that "every
act of his life, no matter how trifling and insignificant it may
have seemed, suddenly took on a vast and vital significance."
When the golden rule "seemed not to 'work', he would truly say
it was only because he didn't know how to work it." 5 In the
* Mitchel as mayor of New York serves to illustrate this later type ; also
Newton D. Baker, recently mayor of Cleveland, a city declared by non-
resident students of city government to be the best governed city in the
United States, a reputation for which there was considerable basis, at least
up until the close of his administration.
s For a sympathetic, yet searching portrayal of the career of Mayor
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field of municipal government, Mr. Jones, as mayor of Toledo,
is credited with two great contributions. In stating these, Mr.
Brand Whitlock, a later mayor of the same city and minister to
Belgium during the first years of the Great War, says :
6
"I regard it as Jones' supreme contribution to the thought of
his time that, by the mere force of his own original character and
personality, he compelled a discussion of fundamental principles
of government. Toledo today is a community which has a wider
acquaintance with all the abstract principles of social relations
than any other city in the land. . .
"Jones' other great contribution to the science of municipal
government was that of non-partisanship in local affairs. That
is the way he used to express it; what he meant was that the
issues of national politics must not be permitted to intrude them-
selves into municipal campaigns, and that what divisions there
are should be confined to local issues. ' '
Mayor Jones' achievements as mayor differed from those of
the ordinary office holder.
' ' There is not a public building which
he erected, no reminder of him which the eye can see or the hands
touch." Lincoln Steffens remarked of him, "Why, that man's
program will take a thousand years.
' '
Nevertheless, his attitude
toward public service franchises, toward the right of society to
inflict punishment, toward machine controlled politics, and the
rights of property made a distinct impression upon his city.
With regard to the problem of the enforcement of law in cities,
Jones must be hailed as a major prophet. For the policeman's
club, or the rigors of the law as a means of "making people
good" he had no use. 7 He believed that only hatred, not love,
could appear in the processes of force, and therefore he shunned
them. His leniency was the despair of conventional, orthodox, or
reforming folk, who opposed him bitterly. Being an independ-
ent in politics, he was relentlessly opposed by the organized polit-
Jones see Brand Whitlock 's Forty Years of It, pp. 112-150. A collection of
his letters have also been published by the Bobbs-Merrill Co. of Indian-
apolis.
e Forty Years of It, pp. 137, 138.
7 His position on this subject is probably most lucidly expressed by his
fellow worker, and disciple, Mr. Whitlock, in his "Open Letter" addressed
to certain
"Representatives of the Federation of Churches, Toledo," pub-
lished in booklet form, Indianapolis, 1913. The letter was written in 1910.
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ical forces of the community, especially the Republican party or-
ganization. Aided by fellow partisans who controlled the Ohio
state legislature a special act was secured which deprived the
mayor of Toledo of control over the police force and gave it to
the governor of the state operating thru an appointive com-
mission. Jones' determined resistance to this statute resulted in
the reversal by the courts of doctrines and precedents long estab-
lished and the overthrow of "the whole fabric of municipal legis-
lation in the state," opened up the entire question of the status
of municipalities in relation to the state, and gave the oppor-
tunity for the agitation which resulted in the adoption of a lib-
eral measure of home rule by the constitutional amendments of
1912. Says Mr. Whitlock, "the decision had ultimate far-reach-
ing effects in improving the conditions in Ohio cities, and was the
beginning of a conflict that did not end until they were free and
autonomous. ' ' 8
Few men have left a more permanent mark upon municipal
life and thot in this country than Tom L. Johnson of Cleve-
land. He was among the first to give a practical demonstration
of what was meant by clean administration at a time when the
movement to purify municipal politics and government was
acquiring popularity and momentum. 9 Under him Cleveland
became one of the best and most honestly governed cities in
America.10 "To the last Mayor Johnson and his administration
marched abreast with the times assimilating and putting into
practice the most advanced theories on the governing of a modern
city.
' ' " Cleveland became a source of inspiration for the advo-
cates and friends of clean and honest administration everywhere.
Representatives of other cities came to see and to study. John-
son 's methods were often new and original, for Cleveland was a
sort of laboratory or experiment station as well as a live, going
concern.
Even more important than the foregoing was Mr. Johnson's
struggle for municipal freedom; freedom from the domination
s Forty Years of It, p. 137.
9 Cf. Carl Lorenz, Tom L. Johnson, Mayor of Cleveland, p. 85.
10 Lincoln Steffens called Johnson ' ' the best mayor of the best governed
city in the United States." Cf. McClure's Magazine, July, 1905. Also,
Lorenz, Tom L. Johnson, p. 48, expressed the same opinion.
n Lorenz, Tom L. Johnson, pp. 49, 50.
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of privileged interests and from the restrictions imposed by state
law. To do this it was necessary to awaken and educate the
Cleveland electorate on the vital problems of the municipality.
He succeeded so well "that they overthrew him, when they be-
lieved that his usefulness had come to an end. Today the people
of Cleveland are perhaps better versed in public affairs than the
citizens of any other city of the United States.
' ' 12 One observer
concludes,
' ' he did perhaps more than any other man in America
to make possible the coming of the free city in this land.
' ' 13
Another believes that "his struggle for three-cent railway fares
in Cleveland, which was but a roundabout method of securing
municipal ownership in a state where the legislature in those
days would not permit cities to own their public utilities, was
his great work.
' ' 14
Whether one accepts the judgment of his friends and sup-
porters or the more moderate views of detached observers one is
impressed with the strong personality of Mr. Johnson and the
extent to which it pervaded every branch of the administration
of which he was the head. Mr. Whitlock pictures it as follows :
"I used to like to go over to Cleveland and meet that charming
group Johnson had gathered about him. There was in them a
spirit I never saw in such fullness elsewhere ; they were all work-
ing for the city, they thought only of the success of the whole.
They had the city sense, a love of their town like that love which
undergraduates have for their university, the esprit de corps of
the crack regiment." Tho a man with a vision of Cleveland
as
"
a city set on a hill,
' ' he was essentially a man of action. Mr.
Johnson was aggressive, resourceful, and dissatisfied with aught
less than domination in any undertaking in which he was in-
volved. The latter characteristic he once clearly expressed in
reply to a proposal from Mark Hanna for a partnership and the
consolidation of their interests. Mr. Johnson refused on the
ground that he and Hanna were too much alike ; that ' ' as associ-
ates it would be a question of time, and a short time only until
one of us would ' crowd the other clear off the bench. ' " 15 His
12 Lorenz, Tom L. Johnson, p. 65.
is Whitlock, Forty Tears of It, p. 174.
i* Ibid.
is Tom L. Johnson, My Story, New York, 1913, p. 25. This autobiog-
raphy is not the least among Mr. Johnson's contributions to municipal gov-
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love for power and political ambition was mingled with admitted
sincerity of purpose and desire to serve the public interest.
Selfishness and personal hatred undoubtedly asserted themselves
at times during his career but they were the errors of a well
meaning, determined leader. There were other apparent contra-
dictions in this great mayor who "liked a straight course and
went a crooked way" at times. In the end the very training
and traits of character that made him a valuable and indis-
pensable leader in the terrific struggle his city was making for
the privilege of working out its own salvation proved to be his
undoing, once victory had been won.18
There can be no question of the added significance which Mr.
Johnson gave the mayoralty as a result of his incumbency.
' ' The
secret of a good executive," he writes in his autobiography, "is
this one who always acts quickly and is sometimes right. ' ' 17
He was possessed with what he calls a "civic consciousness" in
addition to superior ability and a reputation as a successful busi-
ness man. He had no use for boodlers nor for many of the ways
of practical politics, though his skill in political strife was usually
of a high order. But above all else he set a new standard for
constant and persevering labor in behalf of the public interest,
for fearless and tenacious struggle in its behalf, and developed
and exhaustively exploited the powers of the office. The mayor-
alty had a different meaning in Cleveland when he left it than it
had when he entered upon its duties, and the value and impor-
tance of this change has not been lost upon other municipal
executives.
Two of the remarkable figures that have held the mayoralty
since the opening of the present century are Henry T. Hunt of
Cincinnati and Rudolph Blankenburg of Philadelphia. Both
men were essentially "reform" mayors. The political conditions
in the respective cities were somewhat different, but there was
little to choose between them as regards the depth of their degra-
ernment in this country. It should have a wide reading among municipal
officials, many of whom have doubtless profited from its perusal since it was
first published in 1911.
i Mr. Lorenz's chapter entitled "A Pyrrhic Victory" illuminates this
statement. Cf. also Mr. Whitlock, Forty Tears of It, p. 174.
n My Story, pp. 121, 122. Mr. Johnson admits many mistakes in his
early appointments, for example, cf. pp. 121, 167.
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dation. Hunt had his council with him, Blankenburg did not.
Both men refused to compromise with their supporters' demands
for the spoils of victory and thus alienated many.18 The failure
to take account of "politics" betrayed idealistic tendencies which
the municipal electorate was not educated to appreciate and left
their reform programs without that cohesive and substantial
support which is still usually necessary for victory at the polls.
Both were opposed by machine organizations that had been long
organized and that were implacable. By their impartial execu-
tion of law both men alienated some of those who had been
friendly to them. Hunt was charged with having exploited the
powers of the office unduly ; Blankenburg with failure to exhaust
them in the fulfilment of some of his pledges.19 Their person-
alities were different in many respects. Hunt was young, and
had served in the state legislature and as prosecuting attorney of
the county. He was "single-minded, brave, outspoken, able." 20
The leading press of the country joined in praise of his charac-
ter, ability, faithfulness, judgment, loyalty to public interest,
and his progressive attitude toward social betterment.21 Mr.
Blankenburg, on the other hand, had long been associated with
the movement for reform in Philadelphia and at the time of its
culmination was looked to as "the one man qualified for the
task" which the reformers had undertaken.22 He was a typical
"war horse" in agitation, picturesque and severe in his denun-
ciations. He was courageous, enthusiastic, even vehement in his
!8 In both cities the campaigns had been waged on the promise that no
wholesale displacement of office holders should take place. The keeping of
that promise proved costly in each case. Cf. National Municipal Review,
Vol. Ill, pp. 519, 520, for a discussion of the procedure followed by Mr.
Hunt, and Vol. V, pp. 213 and 223, for the discussions of the course taken
by Mr. Blankenburg.
19 Ibid., pp. 522, 523 in Vol. Ill, and 218-220 in Vol. V.
20 Cf. "Mayor Hunt's Administration in Cincinnati," by A. Julius Frei-
berg in the National Municipal Review, Vol. Ill, p. 518.
21 See Harpers' Weekly, October 11, 1913; Boston Transcript, September
24, 1913; New York Evening Post, September 20, 1913; Chicago Tribune,
October 13, 1913. Extracts from these and other editorial opinions that
appeared during the campaign for reelection were published as a part of a
pamphlet entitled "An Account of the Administration of Henry T. Hunt
and His Associates. ' '
22 Editorial in the Philadelphia North American for January 3, 1916,
reproduced in the National Municipal Eeview, Vol. V, pp. 217-222.
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temperament, qualities which found motive power in his
' ' innate
abhorrence of venality, chicanery and oppressive abuses." He
was^experienced, however, in public administration. One observ-
er judges his work as follows : "Very few men with such a tem-
perament possess also in large degree the virtues which enter into
the making of a successful administrator in an extensive public
office elected by the people and involved in active politics. Pa-
tience, reticence, a shrewd knowledge of human nature, practical
concentration of purpose, a keen perception of public opinion in
all its fluctuations and eccentricities, the faculty for ready co-
operation with all sorts of men who represent the varied life of
the community, and the cool judgment or insight by which the
useful man discerns the things which can be done and avoids
those which can 't be done are among the qualities which are to be
found in the mayoralty or any kindred office when it is well and
satisfactorily administered. In these respects Mr. Blankenburg
has not been strong. But in honesty, in sincerity, in a sense of
fidelity to conception of the mayoralty as a trust, in a pure love
of the city and in eagerness to serve it to the very best of his
ability, there is no man among us to whom he stands second. ' ' 2S
Both Mr. Hunt and Mr. Blankenburg appear to have had the
faculty of being able to select able subordinates; and to retain
their devotion and respect. Of the two Mr. Hunt appears to
have been the more practical in his turn of mind, Mr. Blanken-
burg the more visionary.24 Hunt was defeated for reelection;
Blankenburg was ineligible to succeed himself and his protege
was defeated. Nevertheless each man contributed to the concep-
tion of what a mayor should be, and this contribution was a
general one. Their administrations attracted wide attention in
other cities and their achievements made impossible a complete
23 Cf. article by William Perrine in the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin,
December 30, 1915, and published in the National Municipal Eeview, Vol.
V, pp. 223, 225.
24 " It is in the understanding of the underlying principles, and sympathy
with the problems of the people, that the mayor (Blankenburg) and his
assistants have done their best." One recalls also the "courses" which the
mayor and members of his staff took in the University of Wisconsin. The
value of Mr. Blankenburg 's vision of municipal problems should not be
underestimated. The calling of the conference of American mayors to con-
sider "Public Policies as to Municipal Utilities" may prove to be one of
the principal achievements of his administration.
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return to former conditions in their respective cities. Mr. Blank-
enburg, by calling the first "Conference of American Mayors"
to meet in Philadelphia, November 12-14, 1914, made a distinct
contribution to the development of a spirit of professional service
in the ranks of municipal executives (a development which it
must be recognized is yet in the embryonic stage) and gave new
meaning to the halting progress which has often attended the
efforts to organize effective associations of municipal executives,
or to the work which those already in existence were accomplish-
ing in the various states. Nor did it fail to call the attention of
the cities to the fact that fundamentally their public utility prob-
lems are very much alike. Mr. Hunt continues to be an active
contributor to the understanding and solution of municipal prob-
lems in general and in such effort his practical experience and
observations are invaluable factors.
Two mayoralties in recent years constitute developments that
are little short of epochal, viz., the Baker administrations in
Cleveland and the Mitchel regime in New York. Both Newton
D. Baker and John Purroy Mitchel were experienced and trained
public servants before they were elected mayors. Mr. Baker had
been city solicitor while Tom L. Johnson was in power and had
made a splendid record for efficient service in that capacity.
Upon him fell the mantle of his chief when Cleveland denied to
Mr. Johnson continued support.25
Mr. Baker was a ' ' scholar in the mayor 's office,
' '
a man unlike-
ly to renew the
"
storm and stress" of the Johnson period, yet
imbued with devotion to the public interests and equally deter-
mined that they should find expression and protection. He faced
the ' ' wearing task of constructive and conciliatory upbuilding of
the city's interests. The mayor's aptitude for positive achieve-
ment fitted him well for the need of the time. He showed a
power of adjustment and an ability for negotiation that reduced
strained relationships, and sought the equitable way out of con-
flicts between public and private interests. . . To draw a
parallel between his career and that of the general run of mayors
in this country would be provocative of adulation distasteful to
a man of his fine fiber. . . That he will rank in history as
25 There was an interval of two years between their periods of service,
this being the period of Mayor Baehr's term.
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one of the few great mayors of American cities is certain.
' ' 26
The personal qualities which contributed to his success as mayor
were "a splendid intelligence influenced by a wholesome sym-
pathy," a personality that was "radio-active, graciousness, a
cultivated taste, and a wide intellectual outlook, united with a
catholicity in judgment. ' ' 27 Coupled with his political idealism
there was an insight into the practical which gave him the ap-
pearance, at times, of being an opportunist, especially in his rela-
tion to party politics.
28 The contribution of Mayor Baker to the
mayoralty lies not merely in the failures or successes of his
administration, striving as it did to consummate a worthy munic-
ipal program, but is rather to be found in his expression and
cherishing of
' '
a civic spirit of extraordinary vitality.
' ' 29 He
imparted to it elevation, assisted it to consciousness of its powers
and possibilities, and gave to it leadership and opportunity.
Such achievements are rare among statesmen in American democ-
racy and that they should have been recorded in municipal
administration is most significant. Cleveland's example and
influence will long encourage recognition and stimulate the devel-
opment of like leadership in other cities. As for Mr. Baker, it
is noteworthy that he found large range for his ability in the
office of secretary of war. Indeed it is indicative of the altered
character of American municipal administration that the national
government is drawing many of its servants from the ranks of
those who have served their respective cities well.
While still a young man when chosen mayor of New York City
in 1913, Mr. Mitchel brought to the office previous training in
the city's service. Under Mayor McClellan he had been commis-
sioner of accounts, and for the four years prior to his election
as mayor he had been president of the board of aldermen, a posi-
2 Cf. article by Prof. C. C. Arbuthnot on ' ' Mayor Baker 's Administra-
tion in Cleveland," National Municipal Review, Vol. V, pp. 226 ff. The
above quotation is found on pp. 240, 241. This survey of the Baker admin-
istration is appreciative, yet free from partisan exaggeration; critical yet
without taint of antagonism. It is a refreshing portrayal of the subject
dealt with. Mayor Baker's failures and unfinished tasks are indicated as
well as his successes.
27 Hid., p. 240.
28 Ibid., p. 235.
29 Ibid., pp. 239, 240. Mr. Baker not only helped to draft the Cleveland
charter but enjoyed during his two terms as mayor the opportunity of in-
terpreting it.
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tion which also made him a member of the board of estimate and
apportionment and enabled him to exercise a powerful influence
in the determination of municipal policy under Mayor Gaynor.
For a short time he had served the national government as col-
lector of the port of New York. Altogether he brought an un-
usual fund of experience to the office of mayor, a fact that was
the more significant inasmuch as he had shown himself loyal to
principles of sound administration, viz., economy, efficiency, and
fidelity to the public interest. In speaking of the general contri-
bution which Mr. Mitchel's administration has made to munic-
ipal government Mr. Henry Bruere says:
' '
It has given the city a government of a non-partisan charac-
ter. It has emphasized the professional character of municipal
administration by seeking qualified experts for administrative
positions. It has brought to the forefront the social welfare
aspects of government activity, and given emphatic and continu-
ing emphasis to economy and efficiency.
"The administration has not had presented to it, nor has it
created an opportunity for general popular appeal. It has kept
itself in the position of recognizing from week to week and month
to month the obligation it assumed on entering office to conduct
the affairs of the city government with efficiency and to devote
the resources of the city exclusively to public welfare.
' ' 30
The personal qualities which enabled Mr. Mitchel to make a
distinct success as mayor of the country's metropolis were in
keeping with the solid and substantial character of his public
service. He was a man of clear perceptions, broad vision, and
courage. His insight was demonstrated in the establishment of
an executive budget by the exercise of powers which the mayor
already possessed. He was skilled in the art of securing effective
cooperation, both on the part of subordinates and from those not
in the public service. Says Mr. Bruere, "the mayor [Mr.
Mitchel] has not stood alone in the traditional isolation of New
York's chief executive. He has had the sympathetic and effective
cooperation of his fellow members of the board of estimate and
apportionment. . .
so Ibid., Vol. V, p. 24. The article by Mr. Bruere from which the quota-
tion is taken is an illuminating discussion of the subject, "Mayor Mitchel 's
Administration of the City of New York. ' ' It covers the first two years of
his term.
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"I do not recall in any previous administration an equal use
of cooperating citizen committees. Committees not only repre-
senting all classes of citizens and types of interests have been
summoned to assist in the consideration of problems of emergent
or continuing character, but, what is of greater consequence,
practical results have been obtained from this cooperation. Not
only have there been committees appointed by the mayor on such
questions as unemployment, markets, ports, terminals and taxes,
but various department heads have affiliated with their activities
interested groups of citizens to assist them either in developing
public interest or providing special experts to help in solving
technical questions.
' ' 31 Mr. Mitchel impressed the public
with his sincerity as well as his ability, and the want of
' '
politi-
cal pharisaism" did not fail to evoke an enthusiastic response
from the public.
It is important, also, that Mr. Mitchel retained the point
of view of a true representative of municipal democracy. He
said, "Everybody wants to see the mayor and see him person-
ally ... no matter how trivial the business . . . they
feel they must see the mayor. He is called upon to keep the door
of his office open to the public, and after all it is proper that he
should, because the public ought to have direct contact with the
mayor ; people ought to have access to him, and he must reserve
enough time to see the people who come to the office and want to
see him." This view contrasts strongly with that of Tom L.
Johnson, who advised Mr. Brand Whitlock as follows : ' ' Don 't
spend too much time in your office. A quarter of an hour each
day is generally too long, unless there are a whole lot of letters.
Of course," he went on reflectively, "you can get clerks who can
sign your name better than you can.
' '
Patience, tact, and execu-
tive ability of a high order, especially his powers of selection and
decision, and undoubted promptness and forcefulness in action,
have all aided in making conspicuous Mr. Mitchel 's
' '
exceptional
success in doing the right thing in the right way both at the out-
set of his administration and as each successive emergency has
arisen. ' ' 32
si Ibid., pp. 24, 25. Mr. Bruere contrasts his political sincerity with the
customary
' '
political pharisaism
' ' in the city 's administration and describes
the city's enthusiastic response.
32 Mr. Johnson is also reported as defining executive ability as follows:
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Moreover, one finds in Mr. Mitchel's record evidences of the
qualities of initiative and thoroness, both being abundantly
demonstrated in his labors in behalf of the city during the ses-
sions of the New York state legislature. Indeed his thoroness
in the formulation and presentation of the city's interests made
it difficult for "vicious and unwise measures" to be passed, and
easier for necessary and desirable measures to secure support.
This was especially noticeable in the legislative session of 1916,
tho his efforts fell short of being crowned with complete suc-
cess, particularly his efforts to curb appropriations that would
necessitate an increase of taxation in New York City.
It is altogether too early to define in detail Mr. Mitchel's con-
tribution to the mayoralty except as related to New York City.
Of one thing, however, those interested in the future of municipal
administration may well feel assured, viz., that a new standard
has been set for the office in the principal city of the land, and
that this standard cannot fail to be felt elsewhere. Mr. Bruere
prophesied as follows: "New York's present administration
promises to be the climax of a period of progressive, hard-won
transition and the beginning of a period of revolutionary change
in the government of the city.
' ' 33 There can be no question but
what the character and position of the office has been strength-
ened, a result which can hardly fail to be felt in mftny other
cities. It is rather significant, also, that the mayor system has
evolved two administrations headed by men who can satisfy the
demand for skilled and trained executives just at the moment
when the city manager plan appears to lay special emphasis upon
the necessity for public servants of that type.
The roll of those who have left their impress upon the mayor-
alty has by no means been exhausted. One likes to think of the
constructive leadership of Mr. Vance McCormick of Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, a leadership conspicuous for pluck, determination,
and earnest spirit, and notable results. 34 The initiative and devo-
" It 's the simplest thing in the world ; decide every question quickly and be
right half the time and get somebody who can do the work. That's all there
ia to executive ability." Brand Whitlock in Forty Years of It, p. 207.
See also the National Municipal Eeview for the estimate of the success of
Mr. Mitchel's administration, Vol. V, p. 24.
33 National Municipal Eeview, Vol. V, p. 24.
s* Cf. article on "The Harrisburg Plan: Celebration of a Dozen Years
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tion of the Hon. James M. Head as mayor of Nashville, Ten-
nessee, placed that municipality under lasting obligation to him
for the modern character of its franchise grants and other for-
ward looking steps. 35 Portland, Maine, recognizes in the mayoral
service of James P. Baxter the loyalty and public spirit of "a
citizen, who, more than any other man in his generation, has
devoted himself in many ways to her [Portland's] welfare, " hav-
ing held the office for six terms. 36 Toledo shares with Belgium
the fortune of having known the ability and sympathy of Mr.
Brand Whitlock, one who has done much to place the "police
problem" and the problem of law enforcement in their proper
settings and so to hasten their ultimate solution, a consummation
of immediate importance to every municipality. It was his priv-
ilege also to have no unimportant part in the campaign which won
for constitutional home rule the approval of the Ohio electorate,
a fitting climax to eight years of earnest effort in the mayor's
chair.37 Space permits but the mention of the late Seth Low
of New York, of Messrs. David I. Jones of Minneapolis, William
B. Thompson of Detroit, George F. Cotterill of Seattle, James
Rolph of San Francisco, and James N. Adam of Buffalo, to say
nothing of executives in smaller cities and with less opportunity
to gain wide repute, many of whom have done service in the
development and maintenance of the rising standards and tradi-
tions of the mayoralty.38 It should be observed also that men
of Municipal Betterment," by J. Horace McFarland in the National Muni-
cipal Review, Vol. V, pp. 71 ff. It should be noted that Mr. MeFarland
himself had the honor to be singled out as the "one man above others who
stands out preeminently as a patriot in all these years of improvement
campaigns . . ."
ss Atlantic City Conference for Good City Government Proceedings,
1905, p. 296 et seq.
36 See Proceedings of the Atlantic City Conference on Good City Govern-
ment, pp. 170-180. This conference was held in 1906. See also the Pro-
ceedings of the Providence Conference, 1907, p. 27.
37 Few men have given us a clearer picture of some of the problems of
the mayoralty than has Mr. Whitloek in his book, Forty Tears of It. For
the account of his own struggles and labor in that position see especially pp.
205 ff. See also his open letter "On the Enforcement of Law in Cities,"
published in booklet form, 1913.
as For further information concerning Mayor Jones, see statement by
Stiles P. Jones, Proceedings of the New YorTc City Conference on Good City
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who have not become mayors have made their contribution to the
development of higher standards in becoming candidates at the
times when the public interest demanded an effective protest, and
often to no small sacrifice to themselves. There are probably
very few cities that could not furnish similar examples of public
spirited citizens who have aided the cause of good government
in this fashion, even when without well based hope of immediate
success.
In this brief review of the men who have been successful
mayors during recent years it is noticeable that only men who
possess executive ability to an extraordinary degree can credit-
ably fill the office. Mr. Tom L. Johnson defined executive ability
as follows : ' ' It 's the simplest thing in the world ; decide every
question quickly and be right half the time. And get somebody
who can do the work. That's all there is to executive ability."
But Mr. Johnson's definition is incomplete. It overlooks the
imponderables. Mr. Whitlock, with finer insight, puts it thus:
"Executive ability is a mysterious quality inhering in personal-
ity, and partaking of its mysteries.
' ' 39 This statement does not
imply that personality, though possessed and cultivated, is a
mark of executive ability. It rather summarizes the observations
and facts which have been noted in this chapter. The municipal
executives who have contributed to the significance and growth
of the mayoralty have been men of strong and vigorous person-
ality. Their work becomes most intelligible only when the men
themselves are known; tho, on the other hand, they may fre-
quently be known in their works. It is not intended here to
attempt any definition or analysis of the mysteries of personal-
ity.
40 The truth of Mr. Whitlock 's statement is obvious. The
debt of the American mayoralty to men of personality consti-
tutes an obligation that had assumed large proportions by the
close of Josiah Quincy's six years service as chief magistrate in
Government, 1905, pp. 120-132. For the record of Mayor Thompson see
notations in Providence Conference Proceedings, 1907, p. 119, and in the
National Municipal Review, Vol. I, p. 726. Mr. Thompson won special
recognition for his probe of graft in the city council, an investigation which
was privately financed and which involved eighteen aldermen, a number of
whom confessed.
39 Forty Tears of It, p. 205.
40 Cf. The Eiddle of Personality, by H. Addington Bruce.
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Boston, that continued to increase during the years of the nine-
teenth century and that has been tremendously augmented dur-
ing the opening years of the present era of municipal renais-
sance. For at best its powers and possibilities sink to the level
of the commonplace when disassociated from the personal qual-
ities of its incumbents. Municipalities can ill afford to neglect
the personality of those who would administer their affairs and
represent them before the state and nation.
CHAPTER VIII
THE MAYOR-COMMISSIONER 1
The movement for concentration of power and responsibility
in municipal government received a tremendous impetus from
the success of the commission plan in Galveston and later in
Houston. Prior to the introduction of this plan the movement
had found expression chiefly in the growth of the mayoralty.
FBOHI the time of the tidal wave of 1901 it has been expressed
in a variety of forms, notably the commissionership and the man-
agership in addition to the mayoralty. Beginning with Galves-
ton a mayor-president and a group of four commissioners the
latter a term that is primarily administrative in meaning were
entrusted with all the legislative and executive functions of the
municipality. Since that time approximately four hundred
cities have adopted the essential principles of the commission
plan.
2 Most of them, however, add features which aim at very
complete responsibility on the part of the commissioners to the
electorate and which make it possible for the latter to act directly
in the expression of its will. In all cases, however, the concen-
tration of executive power remains intact.
While it is the purpose of this chapter to consider the chief
executive office under the commission system it is essential to call
attention at the beginning to the fact that one of the "predom-
inating" features of the plan is a much greater concentration of
power than the mayoralty had ever known. It is in this larger
measure of power that the chief executive under the commission
plan shares and in the exercise of which he has a prominent and
1 This term is a combination of the official titles ' ' mayor ' ' and ' ' com-
missioner,
" the chief executive serving in both capacities under the com-
mission plan.
2 In reality all but two of the cities participating in this movement toward
commission government have joined it since 1907, a fact that emphasizes the
rapidity with which it has spread.
JL81
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influential part. While in many cases he retains some of the
powers which he formerly enjoyed under the mayor and council
form, his relative position as chief executive is very much weaker
than is that of the mayor, for there are other executives with im-
portant powers. Nevertheless it is altogether too early to affirm
that the relative weakness of the mayor-commissioner in the com-
mission plan will continue. The Royal Commission on Municipal
Government of the Province of British Columbia reported in
1912 that "the tendency ... is strongly toward one-man
government." 3 Others have observed that there is the oppor-
tunity for the mayor-commissioner to acquire a
' '
dominating in-
fluence." Certainly the chief executive under the commission
form is in a more favorable position than was the mayor of a
century ago.
By way of general description it may be said that the mayor-
commissioner, mayor-president, or whatever title he may be
given, is the principal member of the small group of from three
to seven commissioners to whom, under the commission plan, is
entrusted the determination of public policy and the adminis-
tration of public affairs in a city. He is usually the head of a
department over which he exercises immediate supervision. As
a rule, also, he enjoys a general supervisory authority over the
other departments, headed by his fellow commissioners. He is
the ceremonial head of the corporation in matters of a social or
legal nature. In municipal legislation he is an active partici-
pant, being the presiding officer of the commission, having a vote
upon all matters, and enjoying certain other powers of varying
degrees of importance. Apart from the commission plan of gov-
ernment viewed as a whole the office of mayor-commissioner has
received little or no study, yet both because it is differentiated
from the rest of the commission and because of its inherent pos-
sibilities it is worthy of attention and study.
I. CONSTITUTION OF THE MAYOR-COMMISSIONERSHIP
The title of mayor is generally employed to distinguish the
chief member of the commission from the other members who are
known as commissioners or councilors. The early Galveston
charter retained the title and combined it with that of the presi-
sEeport, published at Victoria, B. C., 1913, p. 16.
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dent of the board of commissioners, and the recent Buffalo char-
ter provides that one of the five members of the council shall be
styled the mayor. There have been a number of cases, however,
in which the title has been dropped. In some Ohio cities, in Mar-
shall, Texas, and in the North Dakota statute of 1907 the title of
chairman or president is substituted for that of mayor. The title
is occasionally applied to one holding an office who is compara-
tively distinct from the commission proper, as in St. Paul, Min-
nesota.
Qualifications
The qualifications which obtain for the office of mayor under
the commission plan are usually the same as those laid down for
members of the commission.4 A number of charters require can-
didates to be citizens either of the state or of the United States or
of both. In some of the cities of Alabama the charter specifies
citizenship in the city. The requirement of residence is quite
general but the length of it varies greatly. In Chattanooga,
Tennessee, it is one year; in New Jersey and in some cities of
Oklahoma, two years ; in Portland, Oregon, three years ; in Oak-
land, California, four years, and in Houston, Texas, five years.
In a majority of cases the mayor must have been a qualified
elector. While Denver was under commission government the
mayor had to qualify as a tax payer. In Chattanooga he must
be a freeholder at the time of his election and in Kentucky and
Nebraska it is merely provided that he shall be of "good char-
acter." The age qualification ranges from twenty-one years, a
figure that is usually determined by the provision that the candi-
date shall be an elector, to twenty-five years in Oklahoma City
and some of the cities of Alabama, and to thirty years in Chatta-
nooga. In the latter city the age requirement for the mayoralty
is five years higher than that fixed for the office of commissioner.
In addition to the legal qualifications which are imposed upon
candidates for the office of mayor-commissioner there are certain
conditions which operate to disqualify individuals from holding
the office and which in effect tend to become qualifications that
* In a number of important cases no qualifications are mentioned in the
city charter. Cf. charters of Buffalo, New Orleans, and Pasadena, Calif.
Inasmuch as considerations of availability are really of much greater im-
portance than are the legal qualifications, this would seem to be a step in
the right direction.
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those who seek the office must satisfy. Frequently the incumbent
must be able to devote his whole time to the work of the office.
He is often forbidden to hold any other public position.5 In
many cases he may not be interested in contracts or franchises,
nor be an employee of any holder of a contract or franchise. A
few charters provide that he may not be indebted to the state,
city, or county for taxes, nor have been convicted of malfeasance
in office, bribery, or other corrupt practice. In Dallas, Texas,
he is excluded from being a member of any political party or
serving on any party committee.
How Chosen
The process of choosing the mayor under the commission plan
presents many variations. Three methods of nomination are in
vogue, the convention method, the direct primary, and nomina-
tion by petition.6 Of these the direct primary enjoys the most
favor, the petition method being a poor second and the conven-
tion method being rarely employed. Under the direct primary
method petitions in the form of statements of candidacies are
sometimes employed, and, in the absence of any system of prefer-
ential voting, the primary election becomes a qualifying election
to determine which candidates shall be nominated to the office.
This procedure is both costly and cumbersome. Owing to the
embarras des richesses in the number of candidates who "are
willing to govern ... at from $3,000 to $6,000 a year"
some means for weeding out candidacies appears to be impera-
tive. 7 The primary election serves this purpose in a crude way,
e.g., "the two candidates receiving the highest number of votes
for mayor shall be the candidates and the only candidates whose
s Exceptions are usually made to permit him to be a notary public and to
hold a place in the militia.
For the convention method see the charter of Huntington, Va. The
Illinois general law relating to the commission form incorporates the direct
primary method. See also the general acts of Nebraska and Pennsylvania
and the charters of Buffalo, N. Y., Chattanooga, Tenn., Wilmington, Del.,
and others. The charter of Portland, Ore., and the late charter of Denver,
Colo., provide for nomination by petition. The charter of Dallas, Tex.,
permits nominations by "written requests," petitions, primaries, the pro-
visions governing these methods being found in Art. 3, Sees. 2-5.
7 In the first election of Spokane ninety-two candidates appeared for the
office of commissioner, there being five places to be filled.
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names shall be placed upon the ballot for mayor" at the regular
election. In Dallas any candidate for the office of mayor who
receives a majority of votes at the first election is declared elect-
ed, but failing a majority on the part of any one of the candi-
dates a second election is held. Nomination by petition together
with a system of preferential voting as worked out in a few cities
appears to be preferable.
The election of the mayor is brot about in one of three
different ways. In some cities he is a candidate for the office of
mayor and is elected to this office by popular vote.8 In others
any candidate for the office of commissioner who receives the
highest number of votes cast for commissioners thereby becomes
the head of the commission and receives the title of mayor.9 In
still other instances the voters elect commissioners only and the
latter elect one of their number to act as mayor.10 It will be
readily perceived that the position of the mayor is much stronger
when he is chosen by the first method, while under the third his
responsibility to the commission and dependence upon it appears
fairly complete. Of course, the full significance of election by
the commission as contrasted with election by the voters can be
developed only as it obtains over a longer period of time than
has elapsed since its introduction. It is significant that two cities
which approved of election by the commission have returned to
popular election, Denver by the abolition of commission govern-
ment and Wilmington, North Carolina, by charter amendment.
The proportion of votes necessary to elect under popular elec-
tion ranges from a plurality, or a
"
preponderance," in Galves-
ton, New Orleans, and in some other cities, to a clear majority,
the rule in most places. The majority result is possible usually
because of the action of the direct primary election in eliminating
s Cf. the charter of Dallas, Tex., Art. 3, See. 2 :
" Candidates for mayor
and for places on said board of commissioners shall be voted for separate-
ly." Also the charter of Oakland, Art. 5, See. 14, and Art. 4; the charter
of Portland, Sees. 18a, 18b, 22, and 35. The charters of Buffalo, New Or-
leans, and many other cities and the general laws of Illinois, Iowa, Alabama,
Pennsylvania, and some other states provide for popular election.
9 See the general act of W. Va., Art. 5, Sec. 20. Also the charter of
Wilmington, N. C., amended in 1913 to provide for popular election.
10 This practice was introduced in New Jersey in 1911. Laws, Chap.
GCCLXVI, Sec. 3. Cf. also charters of Spokane, Art. 3, Sec. 9, and Pen-
sacola, See. 9.
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all but two candidates for the office. In a number of cities, Grand
Junction, Colorado, being an example, the majority result is se-
cured by the adoption of a form of preferential voting. Of the
three methods of making the count, the plurality system has the
least to recommend it, while the preferential system contains
sufficient promise to gain for it increasing recognition and adop-
tion among cities operating under this form.11
Removal from Office
The determination of municipal electorates to find effective
means by which they may get rid of undesirable public servants
is abundantly manifest by the provisions to be found in commis-
sion government charters. Of these provisions the most common
is the recall. It is present in the general acts of many of the
states and in numerous special charters.12 It is applicable to the
mayor as well as to the other commissioners. The next most im-
portant method of removal is by a vote of the commission, a pro-
cess which usually obtains where the commission elects the mayor
and sometimes in other cases also.13 Mayors may also be removed
by judicial proceedings as well as by the recall or other process.
In Huntington, West Virginia, there is created a Citizen's Board,
popularly chosen, and competent to remove municipal officials
for certain causes specified in the state constitution. In New
York the governor may remove the mayor as in the case of cities
operating under the mayor and council plan. Impeachment as
well as the recall are available in Houston and Corpus Christi,
Texas. In Louisiana the constitution provides for removal by
11 The preferential system has been adopted since 1909 in more than a
score of the cities under commission government. For list of them, see
Equity, Vol. XVII, p. 51 (January, 1916). For explanation of the prefer-
ential system see article on "Preferential Voting," by Robert Tyson in
Beard's Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 21501.
12 Bradford, Commission Government in American Cities, p. 276. To the
list given by Mr. Bradford should be added the states of Georgia, Florida,
Missouri, Nebraska, Wisconsin, and perhaps some others. The recall is
usually found in special charters.
is In Battle Creek, Mich., by a vote of four-fifths of the commission ; in
Bluefield, W. Va., by a vote of two-thirds of the commission. In Kentucky
the vote must be unanimous on the part of the other members. Cf. Act of
1910. In Denver the mayor was not only chosen by the commission but
was "removable at will" by it under the charter discarded in 1916.
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the district court upon suit instituted at the written request of
twenty-five resident tax payers.
Term of Office
The term of office of the mayor-commissioner is usually the
same as that of his fellow commissioners and varies from one to
six years. In some cases, however, the mayor serves for a shorter
term. Thus in Pensacola, Florida, the mayor is elected by the
commission and serves for but one year, a situation which is
doubtless related to the fact that one of the three commissioners
is elected each year, making the body a continuing one. The
shorter term for the mayor is also found in certain cities in Okla-
homa and California. In the Kentucky general act, on the other
hand, the term of the mayor is four years, that of the commis-
sioners but two. Practice is far from uniform as to the time at
which the mayor shall be chosen, even in those cities and states
in which the length of the mayor's term is the same as that of
the commissioners. In many cases the mayor and the other com-
missioners are all elected at the same time
;
in others the mayor
and part of the commission are chosen at one election, the remain-
ing commissioners at another. 1* As a rule, however, this varia-
tion does not appear to affect the length of the term for which the
mayor is elected.
The Filling of Vacancies
In the filling of vacancies in the mayoralty the commission
plan is far from achieving uniformity of method in the cities
which have adopted it. Four principal methods are employed;
of these two are much more important than are the others. The
first in importance is that of the temporary appointment or elec-
tion by the commission " of an eligible person ' ' to fill the vacancy
until the next general municipal election, at which time "the
vacancy shall be filled by election for the unexpired term.
' ' This
method obtains in Buffalo, Portland (Oregon), Oakland and
Pasadena (California), Chattanooga (Tennessee), Spokane, Okla-
homa City, Pensacola (Florida), the third class cities of Utah,
i* For further discussion of the length of the term and the practice of
alternating elections, see Bradford, pp. 157-160. The author points out (p.
160) that the average term of the mayor is somewhat shorter than the aver-
age term of the commissioners, a fact which may indicate some recognition
of his greater authority and the need for proportionately greater control.
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and many other places. Of like importance are the provisions
found in the general laws of Illinois, New Jersey, Nebraska, and
in the charters of St. Paul, Birmingham, Wilmington (North
Carolina), and other cities granting to the commission the power
to fill such a vacancy "during the balance of the unexpired
term." In both of these methods the task which the council
performs is important, but in the second method the failure to
resort to popular election is worth noting, especially as this fea-
ture has been made the object of attack by those who have opposed
the adoption of the commission plan in cities proposing to come
under it. Of the other two methods in vogue that of calling a spe-
cial election to fill the vacancy appears to be the most important.
It is found in the charters of Lowell and Lynn (Massachusetts),
Houston (Texas), the general act for second class cities in Ken-
tucky, and some other cases.15 The last important method of
filling vacancies is that provided for in cities between twenty-five
and fifty thousand inhabitants in Alabama, in which the gov-
ernor of the state makes the appointment for the remainder of the
unexpired term.16
Vacancies are defined in terms very similar to those employed
under the mayor system. Death, resignation, removal, absence
from the city for a specified period, usually six months, incom-
petency, judicially declared, failure to qualify, continued disa-
bility, or conviction for felony constitute the causes which are
declared to effect a vacancy.17 In the case of Portland, Oregon,
and a few other cities the voluntary acquisition of an interest
in public service enterprises or public contracts operates to va-
cate the office ' ' at once. ' ' 18
is
Lowell, Charter, See. 56. If the vacancy occurs within four months
prior to the annual city election the council is authorized to fill the vacancy.
The same is true in Lynn. See Charter, Sec. 60 ; but no such exceptions are
made in the other eases cited. C/. Kentucky, Act of 1910 as amended in
1912, See. 22; and Houston, Charter, Art. 9, Sec. 17a, an amendment of
1913.
i See Act of 1911 as adopted by Montgomery, See. 14. The fact that
the act was intended to apply primarily to the capital of the state may be
significant in this case. In Pensacola the governor appoints temporarily
under certain circumstances.
17 Cf. the charter of Spokane, Art. 2, Sec. 8 ; also the general act for
cities of the second class in Kentucky, Sec. 22.
is Charter, Sec. 18f. "If he shall become so interested otherwise than
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As under the mayor system, the commission plan knows an
"acting mayor" or "mayor pro tern," who is usually selected
by the commission or council from among its own number, tho
in cities in which there is a president of the council in addition
to the mayor, the president becomes the acting mayor.19 The
acting mayor enjoys the powers of the mayor and performs his
duties during the temporary absence or disability of the mayor,
subject to the restriction that in matters admitting of delay he
shall await the return of the mayor.20 In Houston, Texas, the
mayor pro tern acts during the interim between the occurrence
of a vacancy and the holding of the special election and enjoys
' '
all the rights and powers of the Mayor, and performs all of his
duties. ' ' In some cases, as in Buffalo, the office of acting mayor
is not provided for, the council merely being authorized to
choose another presiding officer temporarily but nothing more.
Salaries
The mayor-commissioner is usually paid a larger salary than
his fellow commissioners. There is no agreement in the practice
of the various states and cities in this regard, however, and the
difference in the amounts paid to the mayor and to a commis-
sioner ranges from little or nothing at all to several times the
salary of the commissioner.21 Both of these extremes are excep-
voluntarily he shall within ninety days divest himself of such interest, and
failing to do so his office shall become vacant upon the expiration of the
said period of ninety days." This provision supplements that part of the
section cited above.
19 As in the city of Portland, Ore. See Charter, Sec. 19. Cf. also Lynn,
Mass., Charter, Sec. 60. The method of selecting the mayor pro tern shows
some variations. In Houston, the mayor nominates him from among the
aldermen at the first regular meeting of the council. He receives no addi-
tional salary. See Charter, Art. 4, See. 2. In other cases the president of
the council is elected by the council, or, as in the case of Illinois the com-
missioner of accounts and finance is by state law made vice president of the
council and becomes acting mayor. See Act of 1910, Sec. 32.
20 Cf. Houston, Charter, Art. 6, Sec. 3 ; also Lynn, Sec. 61. The restric-
tions in Houston have to do more particularly with the exercise of the ap-
pointive power. In Kentucky cities the acting mayor appears to be without
limitations except those operating in case of the mayor also. Some char-
ters omit the
"rights and powers" but impose the "duties" upon the tem-
porary incumbent.
21 Waco, Tex., pays its commissioners one thousand dollars and its mayor
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tions to the usual custom which gives the mayor anywhere from
one-seventh to four-fifths more than the commissioners receive. 22
There are a few cities, however, which make no distinction be-
tween the mayor and the other members of the commission in
this particular. With but few exceptions the mayor-commis-
sioner is better paid than was the mayor under the old form of
government. The salaries to be paid are, as a rule, specified by
the charter or by the law of the state, but in Wilmington, North
Carolina, the council is permitted to exercise its discretion within
a prescribed maximum of three thousand and minimum of eight-
een hundred, the mayor having no vote on this question.
Miscellaneous Features
There are comparatively few miscellaneous features found in
connection with the constitution of the mayor-commissionership,
and none of them may be called characteristic of the office as
differentiated from the other places on the commission. The
prescription of the oath of office, the process of induction into
the position, etc., are similar to like features described under the
mayor system. The incumbent must give bonds, the amount of
which is often quite large. Provision is sometimes made for sec-
retarial and other assistance. In none of these respects, how-
ever, has the mayoralty under the commission system developed
any marked departures from that which obtains under the mayor
plan.
A comparative survey of the chief magistracy as it is consti-
tuted in the mayor and commission plans respectively shows
many interesting and a few important lines of differentiation in
the commission plan. In the first place there is some tendency
to substitute a new title for that of mayor, a development that
does not appear to be making great headway. The efforts put
forth to free the mayor from professional political affiliations
twenty-four hundred dollars. Marshall, Tex., is even more abnormal, pay-
ing its mayor eighteen hundred dollars and the commissioners three hun-
dred.
22 Buffalo pays the mayor eight thousand, the commissioners seven thou-
sand; Portland pays the mayor six thousand, the commissioners five thou-
sand; St. Paul pays the mayor five thousand, the commissioners four thou-
sand five hundred; New Orleans pays the mayor ten thousand, the commis-
sion councilmen six thousand.
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have been of little value. The retention of popular election as
the method of choosing him appears to be permanent. Prefer-
ential voting has increased the political effectiveness of the elector
with respect to this office. The desirability of longer terms seems
to have gained some recognition under the commission system. The
filling of vacancies thru election by the commission is an innova-
tion that has worked no ill, but it is debatable in principle and
of doubtful value. The requirement of full time service and reg-
ular office hours together with a disposition to increase salaries
constitutes a step in the direction of efficient and professional
service. 23 The essential differences between the mayor-commis-
sionership and the mayoralty are not indicated, however, by their
respective constitutions, but rather in their relations to municipal
administration and legislation.
II. THE MAYOR-COMMISSIONER AND ADMINISTRATION
The relation of the mayor-commissioner to municipal admin-
istration is determined, in general, by two well defined concep-
tions of his position and authority. According to the first view
the office occupies a place very similar to that found in connection
with the federal plan. It is the chief executive office of the cor-
poration. Its incumbent should have authority of a greater or
less degree over all the administrative services of the city. The
second view recognizes the mayor-commissioner as merely the
first among equals, 'the commission itself being responsible for
the administration. No special powers attach to the mayoralty,
and its incumbent enjoys only the added dignity which his func-
tion as presiding officer may bestow, together with that which
may be involved in the performance of his social and ceremonial
duties as titular head of the city government. In both of these
conceptions and the practices in which they are embodied the
position of the mayor as one of the commissioners, and as such
the head of a department, is much the same.
The Strong Mayor Type
The charters of many cities and the statutes of some states
have embodied the conception of the mayor-commissioner as the
head of the administration. 24 This embodiment is, however, by
23 For an example of a provision relating to office hours, etc., see Okla-
homa City, Charter, Art. 2, See. 13.
2* Cf. the charters of Buffalo, Portland, Ore., New Orleans, St. Paul,
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no means uniform either in expression or in purpose. The pro-
visions which bestow special authority upon the mayor may
carry with them little more than powers of general supervision.
Thus in the city of Buffalo the mayor is required ''to acquaint
himself with the conduct of each of the other city departments"
and is authorized to recommend changes or innovations that will
promote their efficiency and economical operation.25 In the com-
mission government act of Kentucky the mayor is authorized to
exercise "a general advisory supervision over the affairs of all
the departments." The Nebraska act imposes a similar duty
upon the mayor in the following terms: "the Mayor shall, in
a general way, constantly investigate all public affairs concern-
ing the city's interest and investigate and ascertain, in a general
way, the efficiency and manner in which all departments of the
city government are being conducted." He is also empowered
to make recommendations with respect to matters of administra-
tion.
There are many cities, however, which go much further than
the group just described and which give to the mayor-commis-
sioner power and opportunity for the active direction of admin-
istration. The power of appointment subject to the confirmation
of the council, is vested in the mayor of Houston, Texas. In
Portland, Oregon, in St. Paul and a number of other cities the
mayor assigns the commissioners to their respective departments
and in some cases he may reassign them ' ' at his discretion. ' ' 26
The mayor of Dallas, Texas, "nominates" all appointive officers
of the city except the auditor, the confirmation of the council
being required and^the mayor being denied a vote in this mat-
ter.27 The removal power is found in Houston and St. Paul, 28
Houston, Dallas, Oakland, and Wilmington, and the statutes of Nebraska,
Kentucky, Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts.
25 Charter, See. 42.
28 Portland, Charter, See. 20a. The order making the assignment has the
force of an ordinance and is preserved and filed as such. Cf. also See. 20a.
For St. Paul, see Charter, See. 57, 58. It will be observed that the mayor
of St. Paul has but one such opportunity, viz., the first Monday in Decem-
ber following his entrance upon the duties of his office, while the mayor of
Portland may make reassignments ' ' whenever it appears that the public ser-
vice will be benefited thereby."
27 Charter, Art. 3, See. 6.
28 Houston, Charter, Art. 5, Sec. 2. The council also possesses the power
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and the power of suspension pending an investigation in Port-
land and in Wilmington, North Carolina. The power to conduct
investigations into official conduct carries with it the right and
authority to compel attendance and testimony, administer oaths,
and examine witnesses.
A number of other cities which do not vest the powers of ap-
pointment in the mayor assure his active participation in the
conduct of the administration by other means. Thus in New
Orleans the mayor is ex officio a member of each board, com-
mission, or body created or authorized either by the charter or
by any subsequent ordinance. In addition he is charged with the
general oversight of the administration, and with the enforce-
ment of the state laws and municipal charter and ordinances.
In Dallas it is made his special duty to see that the provisions of
franchises and contracts are complied with, and in Oakland he
is particularly charged with the supervision of public utilities,
contracts, and the enforcement of law. In Wilmington, North
Carolina, the mayor is ex officio chairman of all departments of
the city.
The "Strong" Mayor vs. the Ordinary Mayor
The foregoing indicates what is meant by the strong mayor-
alty under the commission plan. Except in a few cases, among
which Houston is the most prominent, the "strong mayor" exer-
cises very much less authority than does a mayor under the fed-
eral plan. On the other hand, the tendency to retain the mayor-
alty with many of its powers unimpaired is most evident in the
to remove. It will be observed that the mayor 's power extends to
"
all offi-
cers or employees" in the city service. The provision "for cause" is so
broad as to leave the action in the discretion of the mayor. He may, how-
ever, be required to file a statement of the reasons in the public archives
of the municipality. For St. Paul provisions see Charter, Sees. 59 and 60 of
Art. 5. It will be observed that he may start proceedings for the removal
of any councilman either as councilman or as the head of an administrative
department. The mayor's action in the case of non-elective officials and
employees must be preceded by notification of the officer or body having
the power to appoint and requesting removal. If the request is not complied
with the mayor may then "in his discretion" make the removal, but must,
on demand, file a bill of particulars with the city clerk. The mayor of St.
Paul is also restrained from removing the appointees of the controller, an
official who, in practice, has proven to be of much more consequence than
any other elective officer.
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larger cities that have adopted the commission plan. While it
is undoubtedly true that in the great majority of commission
governed cities the mayoralty has been
"
merged in the board,"
the mayor apparently being little more than presiding officer, yet
it is pertinent to note that in those centers of population where
the plan is likely to be put to the greatest strain, the office main-
tains something of its individuality. The
' '
tendency to one man
government" noted by the Royal Commission of British Colum-
bia in its investigation of commission government in the United
States can under ordinary circumstances have but one direction,
viz., toward the development in the commission plan of a power-
ful mayoralty. Such a development may not obtain legal recog-
nition until some time after it has actually assumed importance
in the affairs of government. Such an evolution would gratify
many critics and opponents of the commission plan who have
contended that the absence of a central dominating mind em-
powered to coordinate and control administration constitutes a
serious defect in the plan.
29
As Commissioner
The mayor-commissioner is generally the head of a depart-
ment, tho this function was not imposed upon him in the origi-
nal commission plan as developed in Galveston, and has not been
a feature of the office in some other cities. 30 The department of
which he is the head is usually specified in the charter, but there
are frequent exceptions to this rule.
31 The most favored depart-
mental assignment for the mayor is that of public affairs. On the
other hand, in some commission cities the departments of public
safety, of finance and public affairs of administration, of accounts
and finances, of public affairs and public education, and of
water and waterworks, are respectively designated as the posts
29 For brief reviews of the mayoralty under the commission plan, see
Woodruff, C. R, City Government by Commission, pp. 121, 123; Bruere,
Henry, The New City Government, pp. 63-68, and Bradford, Commission
Government in American Cities, pp. 204-207. Mr. Bruere 's work contains
an enumeration of the mayor's powers in selected cities.
so For example Houston and St. Paul and Haverhill, Mass.
si In Portland, Ore., the mayor appears to be free to select the depart-
ment of which he becomes the head. The same is true in Huntington,
W. Va. In many cities the council or commission may designate the de-
partment to which each member shall devote his attention.
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to be filled by the mayors.32 With very few exceptions the may-
or, as commissioner, enjoys all the rights and privileges accorded
to the other members of the commission. He shares in the general
executive and administrative authority vested in the commission
as a whole, and frequently exercises great influence in its con-
duct of the affairs of the city. As commissioner he is responsible
for the conduct of his department, and often enjoys considerable
power of appointment and removal within the department.
In addition to the foregoing description of the position of the
mayor-commissioner in administration, it should be noted that he
often enjoys considerable reserve and emergency powers con-
ferred under the general laws of the state, a factor that contrib-
utes something to his standing and dignity.38 He may also be
charged with certain ministerial duties similar to those imposed
upon the mayor under the federal plan. 3* In a few cases he
retains judicial powers of some consequence.85
III. THE MAYOR-COMMISSIONER AND LEGISLATION
In accordance with the principle of commission government
which seeks to concentrate the administrative, legislative, and
other authority of the municipality in the hands of the commis-
sion and then distribute a share of each of these branches of
power among the various commissioners, the mayor-commissioner
exercises important powers in legislation. These may be divided
into the powers which he enjoys by virtue of his position as
mayor and those which are his by reason of his membership on
the commission.
As mayor, president, or chairman of the board or commission,
32 Cf. the charters of Salem, Mass., Lawrence, Mass., the Massachusetts
statute of 1915, Plan "C," the charters of Gardner, Me., Cartersville, Ga.,
the Louisiana statute of 1910, the charters of Colorado Springs and a num-
ber of other cities for examples of different commissionerships that may be
filled by the mayor. The commission government acts of Illinois, Arkansas,
and Pennsylvania and the charters of many cities will give the provisions
specifying the department of public affairs.
33 See, for example, Oklahoma City, Charter, Art. 2, Sec. 4.
s* The first part of section 4 in the charter of New Orleans enumerates
some of these duties, such as the custody of the seal of the city, the signing
of all contracts, bonds, and other instruments, etc.
ss Cf. the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1911, State of Texas, for the
provisions relating to the issuing of warrants, the keeping of dockets, etc.,
by the mayors of cities in that state.
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the chief executive may call special meetings, 36 presides over all
sessions at which he is present, 37 and is entitled to submit pro-
posals, recommendations, 38 and in some cases to prepare and lay
before the council the annual budget.39 In a number of cities he
retains the veto, either in its suspensive or its qualified form,
40
and in one case he has the selective veto with respect to items in
appropriation measures.41 His signature is often required to be
affixed to ordinances and other records of the council. It is ap-
parent, however, that his powers of coercion in matters of policy
determination are largely curtailed ; the influence of the powers
of appointment, removal, and veto being quite generally denied
to him.42 On the other hand, his position as commissioner in
36 See, for example, the charter of Lowell, Mass., Sec. 23. This power is
also entrusted in this case to the president of the council and to any two
members of it. The usual provisions for notice of time and place obtain.
Many charters omit any mention of this power.
37 There are a few exceptions as in San Diego, Calif., but even in cities
like Lowell and Portland, Ore., which has a president of the council in addi-
tion to the mayor, the latter presides
' ' if present.
' '
Ordinarily the charters
specify that the mayor shall be the presiding officer. Cf. Oklahoma City,
Charter, Art. 4, S Sec. See message of mayor of Lincoln, Nebr., July 17,
1916.
38 See St. Paul, Charter, Chap. V, Sec. 1 ; Dallas, Charter, Art. 3, See.
15; and the general act of New Jersey, Sec. 5, and of Illinois, Sec. 32.
39 The budget is prepared and submitted by the mayor in Houston, Dal-
las, and some other cities in Texas; in Pennsylvania he is expected to keep
the board informed as to the financial needs of the city.
40 Cf. charters of High Point, N. C., St. Paul, and Chattanooga, and
Houston, Greenville, Dallas, Beaumont, Denison, Corpus Christi, Marshall, all
in Texas, Tulsa, Ardmore, and Salpulpa in Okahoma, Colorado Springs, (se-
lective), San Diego, Calif., and Lewiston, Idaho. In Houston and Dallas,
Tex., and Tulsa, Okla., the mayor has a vote on the question of sustaining
his veto, a power that is clearly due to his being a commissioner as well as
a mayor.
41 Colorado Springs, Charter, Art. 4, Sec. 24. The vote of four members
of the council of five is necessary to override this vote. Inasmuch as the
mayor is the fifth member, it means that the rest of the council must be a
unit against his act.
42 The special committee of the National Municipal League on City Gov-
ernment by Commission says in its report, See. 9 : " It is doubtful whether
the mayor should have a veto over his confreres or in fact any added powers
lest he overshadow the other commissioners and attract the limelight at
their expense, leaving them in obscurity where the people cannot intelli-
gently and justly criticise them." National Municipal Eeview, Vol. I, p. 42.
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some measure compensates for the powers which he has lost as
mayor.
In the capacity of commissioner the mayor may participate
and vote on practically all matters coming before the council.
Inasmuch as the commissioners are rarely more than five in num-
ber, and in smaller cities often only three, it is apparent that his
voting power is greatly augmented above that which the mayor
under the federal plan, with his casting vote, enjoys. Coupled
with whatever other legislative authority he may possess and with
his general and administrative powers the mayor-commissioner
often exercises an influence in municipal affairs that would com-
pare favorably with that of many mayors under the federal plan.
On the other hand, the relatively great powers enjoyed by the
other commissioners, especially in matters of public policy, ren-
ders it less likely that the mayor will dominate except by the
force of his personality and the processes of moral suasion. The
pressure of political forces, so common under the mayor system,
is usually greatly minimized under the commission plan, a fac-
tor which does not, however, necessarily weaken the position of
the mayor-commissioner.
A few observations based upon the foregoing survey of the
office of chief executive under the commission plan can be made
in conclusion. Altho mayoralty has undergone great modifica-
tions in its adaptation to the commission plan, it has usually sur-
vived as an office of some importance, and in significant instances
it has retained much of its former power and prestige. Gener-
ally, however, there has been little disposition to magnify it and
it has seemed to merge in the executive authority vested in the
commission as a whole.
In the second place it should be noted that in actual practice
the mayor-commissioner is often much more powerful than the
provisions of charters and statutes indicate. This is the result
of an undoubted tendency to create a powerful chief executive
under this scheme of organization as well as in other fields of
American government. It is a tendency that may be expected
to become better defined as the plan is adapted to large cities
where the exigencies of government will demand the guiding
hand of some one man to unify policy and coordinate administra-
tion, and also as the legal provisions which now constitute the
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office become modified by amendment so as to conform with cus-
tom. One can predict the development of this tendency with
some assurance. The impact of the manager plan upon the com-
mission form has been felt most keenly at the point of executive
organization and in the field of administration. It is also signifi-
cant that Denver, which tried to snuff out the mayoralty under
two years of pure commission government, has returned to the
mayor system, and that Wilmington, North Carolina, has sub-
stituted a strong mayor-commissionership for a weak one.
Finally, the sweep of the commission plan and its remarkable
and consistent record of success have been a continuing challenge
to the old mayoralty. The result has been the revival of the
latter into new life and vigor, a condition which cannot fail to
react upon the commission form. Such reaction will manifest
itself, in part, in the strengthening of the mayor-commissioner.
CHAPTER IX
THE CITY MANAGER
Nothing is more significant of the trend in municipal govern-
ment than the country-wide interest which is manifested in the
development of the city manager plan. The readiness with which
it has been adopted in scores of cities, its recognition in the gen-
eral municipal statutes of a number of the states, and its advo-
cacy by the National Municipal League in the model charter
recommended by that organization in 1915 combine to promise
for it increasing consideration and acceptance by municipal char-,
ter commissions and electorates. The feature of the plan with
which this work is concerned is the introduction of an expert
chief executive called the city manager who is responsible to a
powerful representative legislative body, the council or commis-
sion. The mayoralty barely continues a perfunctory existence.
Its incumbent is reduced to the position of a figurehead in admin-
istration, tho as councilman or commissioner he may be active
and influential in the determination of public policy. The city
manager becomes the chief executive.1
The Mayoralty
The condition of the mayoralty under the manager plan con-
stitutes a fitting introduction to a consideration of the place and
functions of its successor. As in the commission plan the mayor
i There are exceptions as in the case of Phoenix, Ariz., in the charter of
which the mayor is made the "chief executive of the city" with authority
that gives considerable substance to the title. See Charter, Chap. V. In
the charter proposed for Douglas, Ariz., the disposition to retain a powerful
mayoralty was quite apparent. The mayor was not only to enjoy the usual
authority given him under the manager plan but was charged with
' ' the gen-
eral oversight of all departments, boards and commissions of the city" and
was the sole party thru whom the regulations, directions, and orders of
the municipal commission were to be transmitted to the city superintendent
(manager) and to such other city employees as might be necessary. It
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is a member of the legislative body. He is first a councilor or
commissioner, then a mayor with whatever limited prerogatives
the latter office may carry with it. The qualifications for the
place are the same as those that obtain for councilor. 2 The
methods by which the incumbent may be chosen are three in
number : first, by direct popular vote ; second, by receiving the
highest number of votes cast for any member of the commission ;
and third, by election at the hands of the commission.3 In
Springfield, Ohio, the failure of the commission to choose a pres-
ident (mayor) brings into operation a fourth method, viz., the
lot.* The mayor may be removed by the recall, by judicial or
statutory process, and in New York and Ohio by the governor
of the state. 5 In some charters the mayor is given a term shorter
than that which he enjoys as a member of the commission, a
practice which is necessitated by the election of part of the com-
mission every second year, thus making it a continuing body. 8
should be noted that the title of mayor sometimes gives way to that of
president or chairman as in the commission form. Cf. charters of Spring-
field, Ohio, and La Grande, Ore.
2 Cf. the provisions of the charters of Dayton (See. 6), Springfield (See.
3), and St. Augustine, Fla. (See. 11).
s Direct popular vote on the mayoralty obtains in Hickory, N. C. ; Phoe-
nix, Ariz.; Jackson, Cadillac, and Manistee, Mich., and in Amarillo and
Sherman, Tex. It also obtains in a number of other cities and is provided
for in the general laws of New York state. The candidate for commis-
sioner who receives the highest number of popular votes becomes mayor in
Dayton, and in cities adopting the manager form as provided for in the
general charter act of Massachusetts. This method was also a feature of
the original Lockport proposals. Election of the mayor by the commis-
sion is the most common method and tends to place the mayoralty in the
same relative position with respect to legislation that it usually occupies
under the commission plan. Cf. the charters of Springfield and Sandusky,
Ohio; Sherman, Tex.; Collinsville, Okla. ; Montrose, Colo., and San Jose and
Bakersfield, Calif., and the general acts of Iowa and Virginia.
* Springfield, Charter, Sec. 6. The lot is to be conducted by the city
solicitor.
s The recall is not provided for in Massachusetts and New York and in a
number of cities with special charters but it is the most widely used of the
methods noted.
s See the charters of Springfield and Sandusky, Ohio, and Jackson, Mich.
In these cases the mayor is chosen for two years, while his term for com-
missioner is four years. A new mayor is possible following each election of
commissioners.
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Otherwise his term as commissioner and mayor is usually the
same. The salary of the mayor generally is no more than that
of any other commissioner, but in some cities he receives a some-
what larger remuneration. In the original Lockport plan it was
proposed that he should be paid double the amount paid to other
members of the council; in Dayton, Ohio, the mayor is paid
eighteen hundred dollars and the commissioners twelve hundred
dollars per year.
7 In no case is the remuneration large enough
to make the office specially attractive from the standpoint of
salary alone. Vacancies in the mayoralty are in almost all cases
filled by the council. In some cases it elects the mayor pro tem-
pore at the same time that it chooses the mayor, in others at the
time when the vacancy occurs.
The powers of the mayor under the manager form of govern-
ment are exceedingly limited. He is the presiding officer of the
commission or council, 8 and enjoys a voice and a vote in its delib-
erations. 9 With but one exception he has been denied the veto
power.
10 The duty of furnishing the council with information
thru messages and reports, and the privilege of submitting execu-
tive proposals and recommendations appear to have fallen into
abeyance or to have been transferred to the city manager. 11 In a
number of proposed charters his power to appoint the committees
7 The amount to be paid is usually specified as a fixed sum ($2, $5, or
$10) per meeting or per month. In some eases the monthly rate is twenty-
five or fifty dollars. In Cadillac and Manistee, Mich., no salary is provided.
In Jackson the mayor receives seven hundred and fifty dollars, in Ashta-
bula, Ohio, one hundred and fifty.
s The terms ' ' council ' ' and ' ' commission ' ' are employed synonymously
in treating of the legislative organ under the manager form. Both terms
are found in the charters that are classified in this group. The model char-
ter of the National Municipal League uses the term
' '
council. ' ' This term
is to be preferred, tho a majority of the cities that have adopted the
manager system probably use the other title.
9 In the charters proposed for Lockport, N. Y., and for Youngstown, Ohio,
the mayor was given two votes if necessary to break a tie in the commission,
a situation that might arise during the absence of a member or when one
of the commissionerships was vacant. Cf. Youngstown, Proposed Charter,
Sec. 44.
!<> In Elizabeth City, N. C., the charter enables the mayor to veto or-
dinances, contracts, and franchises.
" An exception is found in the city of Phoenix, Ariz.
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of the council has been affirmed and the practice is established in
Manistee, Michigan.12
The administrative authority and duties of the mayor (or
president) under the manager form are usually of minor impor-
tance. He is the official head of the municipality for ceremonial
purposes and is the officer to be recognized by the courts for the
service of civil process and by the governor for military pur-
poses.
13 A charter provision that occurs frequently requires
him to perform such duties as may be prescribed by law and or-
dinance, while other charters give him such powers and duties
as are prescribed in the charters
' '
and no others. " 14 In Spring-
field, Ohio, and a few other cities the charter expressly declares
that the use of the title of mayor shall not confer upon the holder
"the administrative or judicial functions of a mayor under the
general laws of the state.
' ' 15
On the other hand the mayor is sometimes invested with emer-
gency power of no small moment. Thus in Dayton, Springfield,
and Manistee, and under the general law of New York, the mayor
in times of public danger or emergency may assume control of
the police and govern the city by proclamation, and in some
cases is made the judge of when such conditions exist.16 In the
model charter of the National Municipal League it is proposed
that emergency power of this character be given to the mayor
subject to the restriction that it be exercised "with the consent
of the council. " 17 In addition to this occasional emergency
authority the mayor sometimes has other duties of importance.
12 See the charters proposed for Youngstown, Ohio, and for Douglas,
Ariz. Also that of Manistee, Art. 4, Sec. 14.
is Cf. the charters of Hickory, N. C. ; Dayton, Ohio ; Wheeling, W. Va. ;
Manistee, Mich.; Amarillo, Tex., and Phoenix, Ariz. Provisions to these
ends appeared in the original Lockport proposals.
i* For example, Dayton and Springfield use the first method of determin-
ing the mayor's range of power and action, while Hickory and Manistee
limit the mayor to the sphere outlined in the charter itself. There is doubt-
less a fear that the former mayoralty may reappear under the new form of
government.
is See Springfield, Ohio, Charter, See. 6. In the case of Cadillac, Mich.,
no definition of the place and functions of the mayor is incorporated in the
charter.
i For example, see charter of Springfield, Sec. 6. The New York provi-
sions are incorporated in what is known as "plan 0."
IT "A Model Charter," etc., Sec. 6.
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In Sherman, Texas, he is charged with the task of making an
audit of the city accounts annually ; 18 in Jackson, Michigan, he
is clothed with the power of a sheriff;19 in Phoenix, Arizona, he
is authorized to enforce the law
;
20 and in Hickory, North Caro-
lina, he may administer oaths.21 On the whole, however, the
magisterial powers which were retained in the Lockport pro-
posals have not found favor with the framers of city manager
charters.22 The judicial powers of the mayor are either expressly
abolished as in Springfield or are ignored by the charter makers.23
In Douglas, Arizona, it was proposed to retain in the mayoralty
the power to remit fines, costs, forfeitures, and penalties im-
posed for violation of municipal ordinances, but this charter was
not adopted.
24 In some cases the mayor retains certain minis-
terial functions such as the signing of ordinances, resolutions,
and legal documents and in New York state he is charged with
the custody of the seal of the city over which he presides.25
It is apparent from the foregoing description that the mayor-
alty has little opportunity for renewed development under the
city manager plan. Indeed, there is no prospect that such devel-
opment will occur. The office is reduced to a position lower than
that which obtained under the council regime of the early nine-
teenth century and certainly much less prominent than that at-
tained in the Baltimore charter of 1796. However influential
the mayor may become in legislation due to personal strength
and force of character, the compactness of the council, the lat-
ter 's collective responsibility for the conduct of municipal affairs,
and the appearance of the expert executive as the dominating
factor in political execution, all seem to preclude any marked
or permanent expansion of mayoral authority and influence.
It is to the office of city manager that one must turn in order to
describe the chief executive position in cities under this form of
government.
is See Beard, C. A., Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 36031.
19 Ibid., p. 35015.
20 Charter, Chap. V, Sec. 1.
21 Charter, Art. 5, Sec. 2.
22 See Lockport proposals, Art. 6, Sec. 46.
23 Charter, Sec. 6.
24 Proposed Charter, Art. 6, Sec. 2, Par. (a).
25 Cf. Beard, Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 32001.
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The City Managership
The genesis of the city managership in this country is a matter
of comparatively recent history. The idea of a municipal exec-
utive chosen by a representative council on the basis of his fit-
ness and ability to administer the affairs of the corporation long
appealed to Americans who had observed and studied the work-
ings of municipal government abroad, especially in Germany.
The idea has, indeed, found expression on numerous occasions
and frequently in such opportune places as before charter com-
missions.26 It is not altogether unexpected, therefore, during a
period of rapid development in municipal government as evi-
denced by the perfecting of the mayor system and by the spread
and development of the commission plan to find the conception
of an expert executive finding favor in some one of the many
centers of activity. Tho it failed in the effort, Loekport, New
York, was the first community to seek to realize the conception
now embodied in the city managership. Staunton, Virginia, suc-
ceeded in grafting the idea on to the old stem of mayor and
council government. Sumter, South Carolina, grasped the oppor-
tunity offered it by the legislature of the state to adopt the city
manager idea root and branch, a step which was heralded to the
world on October 20, 1913, by the appearance of an advertisement
for a city manager. Since that date the plan has been adopted,
either in a complete or modified form, in scores of cities represent-
ing all sections of the country. 27
A survey and analysis of the provisions creating the city man-
agership discloses many interesting points with regard to the use
of the title, the constitution of the office, and the powers vested in
it. The contrast with the mayoralty and the mayor-commission-
ership is usually quite striking. The chief executive under the
manager form is in most cases styled the city manager, but this
26 For example, Messrs. C. E. Merriam, Walter L. Fisher, and Alderman
Frank I. Bennett advocated the election of the municipal executive by the
council before the Chicago charter convention of 1905. Cf. article by
George C. Sikes in the Proceedings of the Providence Conference for Good
City Government (1907), pp. 191, 192.
27 There are many discussions of the city manager plan in both magazine
and newspaper files. The best work on the subject up to date is found in
the National Municipal League Series, The City Manager, by H. A.
Toulmin, Jr. The volume reveals special familiarity with the operation of
the plan in Dayton, Ohio.
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title is varied. It is the "general manager" in Cadillac, Michi-
gan, and La Grande, Oregon; the "business manager" in Col-
linsville, Oklahoma ; and in Texas it has been proposed to apply
the title of "mayor" to the incumbent of the office. 28 It now
seems well assured that the title of city manager will be generally
accepted, especially as it has been incorporated in the model char-
ter recently recommended by the National Municipal League and
is already employed in such a predominate number of the cities
having this form of government.
The constitution of the managership is relatively simple as
compared with that of the mayoralty. The qualifications for the
office are determined by the legislative organ of the municipal
government. The charters very often specify that residence in
the city is not necessary, and in practice there seems to be little
disposition to discriminate in favor of residents.29 Provision is
usually made for the selection of the manager without regard to
his political beliefs, a policy which is also frequently evident in
the parts of the charter that deal with the nomination and elec-
tion of the council.30 In a number of instances cities have under-
28 Cadillac, Charter, Chap. XI, Sec. 1. See also the charters of La
Grande and Collinsville. The Texas proposal was made by H. G. James,
first in his ' ' Model Charter for Texas Cities ' ' and later was incorporated in
his Applied City Government, p. 72.
29 For example for this change in attitude see the following charters :
Amarillo, Tex., Sec. 20; St. Augustine, Fla., Sec. 30; also see the charters
of Dayton, Springfield, and Sandusky, Ohio, and the general acts of Massa-
chusetts and Iowa. Of course there are exceptions. In Jackson, Mich., the
charter reads, "The city manager . . . may or may not be a resident
or elector of the city at the time of his appointment, but other things being
equal, preference shall be given to a citizen of Jackson." Sec. 55. In its
advertisement for a city manager in 1912, Sumter, S. C., stated that "a
knowledge of local conditions and traditions will, of course, be taken into
consideration," but the choice fell upon a non-resident. In the charter
proposed for Youngstown, Ohio, there was a notable departure from the
usual custom. Five years residence as an elector was required of the
' ' Gen-
eral Director." (Sec. 65.) This charter was not adopted. In Ashtabula,
Ohio, the council acted "contrary to the spirit of the charter" and under-
took to select one of its own number to act as city manager, and failing in
this it chose a local resident without technical or other special qualifications
for the place. These exceptions are, however, in marked contrast to the
usual elimination of the residence feature.
so Cf. charters of St. Augustine, Fla., Sec. 30, and of Sandusky, Ohio,
Sec. 31.
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taken in a broad way to fix the standards by which the manager
shall be chosen. Thus the St. Augustine charter reads ' ' He shall
be chosen solely on the basis of his executive and administrative
qualifications ;
' ' the Massachusetts statute authorizes his selection
' ' for merit only ;
' '
and the Iowa general act permits the council
to consider "the qualifications or fitness only" of the candidates
who apply. In Jackson, Michigan, the qualifications are defined
as those of "a man of good business and executive ability, and,
if practicable, a civil or mechanical engineer.
' ' The first Sumter
advertisement announced that the applicant should be competent
to oversee public works, that an engineer of standing and ability
would be preferred, and that applicants should state their pre-
vious experience in municipal work.31 In practice the applicants
who have had technical training, especially in the field of en-
gineering, seem to have commanded the attention of councils
and a majority of the city managers may properly be called
experts.
32 In addition to the technical qualifications indicated,
the charters of Hickory, North Carolina, and of Cadillac and
Manistee, Michigan, and some other cities require the manager
to furnish bonds and to take the oath of office. Still other cities
provide for the disqualification of managers who are interested
in the profits of contracts, supplies, or service for the city. Cad-
illac prohibits its manager from holding any other public office,
a feature which was also incorporated in the Youngstown pro-
posals.
The manager is always chosen by the council or commission.
The latter is usually free to adopt whatever measures it sees fit
to enable it to perform its duty, and the methods which are fam-
iliar in private business when an important post is to be filled
are frequently employed. Applications are secured from candi-
dates by means of advertising, by personal solicitation, and by
invitation to successful managers in other cities. In Taylor, Tex-
as, it is provided that the manager shall be chosen
' ' from among
si See the advertisement as reproduced in Sumter City Manager Plan of
Municipal Government, published by the Sumter Chamber of Commerce,
February and April, 1913.
32 An examination of over a score of city managers indicates that more
than half of them have had some engineering training. It should be ob-
served, also, that a number of universities have undertaken to give training
to men who aspire to places in municipal service.
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all the candidates who apply to public advertisements. " 33 In the
case of Sumter the local chamber of commerce cooperated with
the council in its first attempt to find a manager.
The removal of a manager from office may be brot about in
the following ways: (1) by the action of the council; (2) by
the recall; (3) by the expiration of a fixed term. Of these
methods the first is everywhere possible and is the feature of the
plan which makes the council fully responsible for the kind of
management secured. In the majority of cases the council's
power of removal is unrestricted, the charters providing for its
exercise "at will" or "at pleasure." 34 In Phoenix, Arizona,
there is no restriction on the exercise of the power of removal,
but the manager is protected against attempts to oust him by
indirect means by a provision that removal may be effected only
by a majority of the commissioners "voting affirmatively there-
for." There is, moreover, a disposition on the part of some char-
ter makers to limit this power. Thus, in Tyler and in Taylor,
Texas, the removal power may be exercised without restriction
only during the first three months of a manager's service; at
any time after that date the manager may demand the filing of
written charges and the holding of a public hearing before the
commission prior to the order of removal going into effect. St.
Augustine gives the council six months in which to act without
restriction, and the model charter of the National Municipal
League fixes the same period, both providing for written charges
and a public hearing after the expiration of that length of time.
The council, in the meantime, may suspend the manager until
after the hearing is held and its decision reached. The purpose
of the hearing is merely to throw the restraint of publicity about
the action of the council, and apparently the latter 's ability to
take whatever course of action it may determine upon is not im-
paired.
The recall may be used against the city manager only in Day-
ton, and the conditions under which it operates are the same for
the executive as for the members of the commission. The peti-
33 Taylor, Charter, Art. 7, Sec. 2.
s*C/. the charters of Springfield, Ohio, Sec. 15; Sandusky, Sec. 31;
Dayton, Sec. 47 ; Amarillo, Tex., Sec. 20 ; Hickory, N. C., Art. 6, Sec. 3, and
many others. In La Grande, Ore., the charter permits the council to remove
the manager "with or without cause." (Chap. VIII, Sec. 4.)
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tion for the recall election must be signed by at least twenty-five
per centum of the total number of voters registered in the munic-
ipality. Precautions to assure the genuineness of the signatures
and the form of the petition are provided for in the charter, and
the details regarding the filing of the petition with the clerk of
the commission, the notification of the manager, and the calling
and conduct of the election are specified. In the event of a man-
ager being recalled no successor is elected, but the place is to be
filled by the commission. A majority of the votes cast at the recall
election determine the result. If the vote be for removal, the
manager "regardless of any technical defects in the recall peti-
tion," shall be deemed removed from office. There is a provision,
however, which makes it impossible to file a recall petition within
six months of a manager's appointment or six months of a pre-
vious recall election.35
The application of the recall to the manager has been one of
the most severely criticised features of the Dayton charter. It
forces upon the manager the duty of considering his standing
before the people in the performance of work which the commis-
sion has ordered. It enables the electorate to override the com-
mission instead of making it representative of the public will.
Its presence in the Dayton plan is defensible only on the ground
that its incorporation was a concession necessary to assure the
adoption of the plan as a whole. It is significant that it has not
been made a part of any of the city manager charters adopted
since that of Dayton.
The removal of the city manager by the expedient of giving
him a fixed term and thus reopening frequently the question of
his retention obtains only in Tyler, Texas.
36 With respect to
any other public office one would hardly count this a method for
removing an officer, and with the majority of American munic-
ipal executives the fixed term is the rule. In the case of the
manager plan, the fixing of a term of office is rare, and the only
reason for its presence is to enable removal of a manager without
resorting to the "right to fire" him. Indeed, the city manager
is in almost all cases chosen for an indefinite term. As long as
he gives satisfaction and chooses to remain his place should be
SB Dayton, Charter, Sees. 13-20 inclusive.
36 In Taylor the manager is chosen for a fixed period of two years. Cf.
Beard, Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 36031.
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secure. There is every reason to believe that many city man-
agers will be able to render as long and acceptable service as
have superintendents of schools in many cities.
In almost all the manager governed cities the salary of the
chief executive is left to the determination of the council. This
practice has not, however, met with universal approval, and the
charter of St. Augustine fixes a minimum of three thousand dol-
lars. The model charter of the National Municipal League rec-
ommends a like provision. A fixed minimum protects the city
against a penny wise commission and guards the manager against
petty attacks by a council that might hesitate to remove him. In
Elizabeth City, North Carolina, Montrose, Colorado, and La
Grande, Oregon, the charters prescribe that the salary of the
manager shall not exceed a given maximum. Tyler, Texas, fixes
both a maximum and a minimum figure, the one at thirty-six
hundred dollars and the other at eighteen hundred. Phoenix,
Arizona, permits the council to change, increase, or modify by
ordinance the salary of the city manager
' '
as it may deem proper
and necessary."
Vacancies in the managership are usually filled by action of
the commission. This is always true of permanent vacancies, but
in case of absence, disability, or suspension, and vacancies of a
temporary character there are different methods of providing
for the conduct of administration. In the majority of cities the
council is authorized to "designate some properly qualified per-
son to execute temporarily the functions of the office of city man-
ager.
" In Taylor, Texas, the commission selects one of its own
members to act as manager. Jackson, Michigan, gives to the
manager the power to name one of his subordinates as assistant
manager. The latter becomes the acting manager in case of tem-
porary vacancy "unless the commission provides otherwise."
Few other features are discernible in the constitution of the
manager's office. The tendency has been to slough off many of
the provisions that had gathered about the mayoralty in the
course of its development and to simplify the structure of the
executive as well as the other organs of municipal government.
The results in the mere simplification of machinery in the man-
ager plan constitute no small part of its claim to public attention
and favor.
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The Manager and Administration
The relation of the city manager to the administration of the
affairs of the municipality is the subject of careful and detailed
definition in manager charters. In a general way the manager
is the executive head of the government, is responsible for the
efficient conduct of the departments and divisions, and exercises
control over them.37 This relation is occasionally modified by
provisions which make possible the interference and direct action
of the council,
88 but in some cases the manager is expressly pro-
tected against such activity on the part of the council, the latter
being obliged to deal with matters of administration thru
him.39 The organization of the administration is usually deter-
mined in the charter or left in the hands of the commission, but
the manager is still in a position to influence and modify the
plans. In Dayton the commission appoints advisory adminis-
trative boards "on request of the city manager." In Spring-
field, St. Augustine, and Cadillac the manager is the head of all
departments except those otherwise provided for by the charter,
while in Wheeling, West Virginia, he appoints "such officers
. . . as are necessary or proper" to make the authority of
the city, the council, or the manager effective and grants to his
appointees the power necessary to perform the duties assigned
to them. His appointive power is usually broad and extends to
all municipal employees except those few such as clerk, treasurer,
and municipal judge, reserved by the charter to the commission.40
This practice with respect to appointments is modified in some
cities. Amarillo, Tyler, and Taylor, Texas, and Jackson, Mich-
igan, make the manager's appointments subject to the approval
of the council. Frequently the appointees must be named from
an eligible list prepared by a civil service commission as in Day-
ton, San Jose, California, and for certain departments in Wheel-
ing. On the other hand the majority of manager governed cities
37 See charters of Dayton (Sees. 47 and 48), Springfield (Sec. 16c), Tay-
lor (Art. 9, See. 1), Hickory (Art. 6, Sec. 1), Manistee (Art. 6, See. 10),
and the statutes of Massachusetts, New York, Iowa, and Virginia.
ss Cadillac, Charter, Chap. XI, Sec. 1 and 4e.
3 St. Augustine, Charter, Sec. 10.
*o Cf. charters of Dayton, Sandusky, Montrose, Phoenix, and others. In
La Grande, Ore., the appointing power of the manager is ''absolute."
Charter, Chap. VIII, Sec. 4.
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do not maintain a civil service commission, tho it would seem
to be eminently desirable in places of any considerable size as a
means for assisting the manager to learn of the qualifications and
fitness of applicants for positions. In contrast with those cities
that require confirmation of appointments by the council stands
the provision in the St. Augustine charter that neither the com-
mission nor any of its members shall "dictate the appointment
of any person to office or employment by the city manager or in
any way prevent the city manager from exercising his own judg-
ment in selecting the personnel of his administration." A few
charters, notably those of Amarillo and Montrose, seek to guard
against nepotism, the former by prohibiting the city manager
from appointing any person "related within the second degree
by affinity or the third degree by consanguinity to either of the
commissioners, or to the city manager." 41
Altho the power of appointment is usually vested in the
manager, there are exceptions, as in the city of Hickory, North
Carolina, where the council appoints or elects the municipal em-
ployees for a term of one year. The manager, however, is
authorized to supply the council with lists of names from among
which the council may choose. In case one list does not satisfy
the council may call for as many other lists as it desires.42
Along with the power to appoint, the manager is frequently
empowered to suspend, remove, or dismiss, and otherwise to dis-
cipline members of the municipal service. The exercise of these
powers is carefully supervised either by the council or by the
civil service commission. Thus in Dayton, the manager may
remove officers appointed by him, except that in the classified
service removals are subject to an appeal to the civil service
commission, a body appointed by the council. The power of sus-
pension is vested in the city manager of Dayton exclusively when
exercised with respect to the chief of police and the fire chief.
In Cadillac, Michigan, he may suspend any appointive officer
"for any just and reasonable cause" including a number of
specified offenses such as neglect of duty, drunkenness, and the
*i Amarillo, Charter, Sec. 30. The Montrose provision is less specific,
providing simply that the manager "shall not appoint any relative of hia
own to any office of trust." Sec. 36.
42 Charter, Art. 6, Sec. 12. See also the charter of Manistee, Mich., and
the explanatory note in Beard's Digest, p. 35017.
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like.43 La Grande, Oregon, gives its manager "absolute control
and supervision over all ... employees of the City except
the Commissioners and Municipal Judge," including the power
to appoint all other officers prescribed by the charter and to em-
ploy "such additional help as may be necessary" and "to dis-
charge, with or without cause, any person appointed or em-
ployed by him."
The manager's powers of appointment and removal are un-
questionably vital features of the plan. In a recent discussion
of the professional standards which should characterize member-
ship in the City Managers' Association, the requirement was pro-
posed that members must come from cities operating under ap-
proved charters and one of the things for which an approved
charter must provide was the manager's appointive power with
respect to all city departments.
4* That it may be necessary "for
some years" to have the protection which the civil service system
offers in the matter of appointments is admitted, by Manager
"Waite of Dayton. On the other hand the power to dismiss sub-
ordinates absolutely is held by many managers to be essential
to efficiency. "If you are going to look to an executive for
results, he must and should have the power of dismissal." On
the other hand anyone familiar with municipal conditions in the
United States will recognize that in the exercise of the powers
of appointment and removal the manager system will face one of
its gravest tests. The disposition of councils to interfere with
the appointments made by managers has already been evidenced
in Sandusky, Ohio, and some other cities.45 On the whole, man-
43 With respect to officers and members of boards and commissions that
are not included within regular departments the removal power of the man-
ager of Cadillac is absolute. The power of suspension noted above is ex-
clusive with respect to all other officers, except the few selected by the com-
mission. Charter, Chap. XI, Sees. 5 and 8.
44 See proposals in a paper by Mr. Richard S. Childs on
' ' Professional
Standards and Professional Ethics in the New Profession of City Man-
ager," National Municipal Review, Vol. V, p. 197 (April, 1916). This
feature was not approved.
45 See the discussion of the situation in Sandusky in National Municipal
Review, Vol. V, p. 383. The commission in this case justified its action in
removing some of the manager 's appointees on the ground that he had fallen
with those who were "out of sympathy with the ideals of the people" and
had made his appointments "without consulting the commissioners." Con-
sequently it becomes
' ' the imperative duty of the commission to supervise his
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agers appear to look with favor upon such assistance as the civil
service can render in securing qualified candidates for appoint-
ment
; opinion is divided with regard to activity on the part of
the council. Some believe under such circumstances a manager
should retire
;
others believe that if a community is not ready for
"a non-political set of appointments" a manager must stay his
hand, get along the best he can, and bide his time. He is the
servant of the municipality as represented in its council and
should make non-political appointments only when he can make
such a course seem worth while to those who employ him. Gen-
erally speaking, however, one must agree with the view that com-
munities which cannot vest their managers with broad powers of
appointment and removal
' '
are not ready for the ideal ;
' ' doubt-
less also such communities should proceed cautiously before
adopting a form of government as simplified and advanced as is
the manager plan ; 46 on the other hand the establishment of im-
proved conditions in administration and the elimination of spoils
politics are goals to be won only by degrees, and in the winning
of them the municipal manager will assist more effectively by
the patient and tactful education of the public than by ultimata
threatening resignation if his powers of appointment and re-
moval are not recognized. The successes which the manager
plan has already achieved have not always been realized under
conditions which admitted of the unrestricted exercise of the
powers in question, but this fact by no means impairs their claim
to importance.
The manager's powers of appointment and removal are some-
times accompanied by the right to fix the compensation of em-
ployees, subject to the approval of the council.47 Limitations
provide that the rates of pay shall be uniform for like service in
each grade of the service.
48 He is also empowered to require and
to fix the amount of bonds of appointees.49
appointments," p. 384. From an article on "Some Eecent Uses of the
Recall," by F. S. Fitzpatrick. Phoenix, Ariz., and Niagara Falls, N. Y.,
are other examples.
46 See report of a discussion by Manager Waite of Dayton on the man-
ager plan, New York Times, March 9, 1916.
47 Cf. the charters of Wheeling (Sec. 14), Montrose (Sees. 36, Par. 1),
and Dayton (Sec, 131).
48 Dayton, for example, Charter, Sec. 161.
49 Cf. Wheeling, Charter, Sec. 14, and Dayton, Charter, Sec. 162.
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Naturally, the city manager has extensive authority to investi-
gate the conduct of subordinate officers of administration. There
are but rare exceptions to the bestowal of this power and few
limitations upon it. 50 The authority is usually complete, includ-
ing the right to investigate without notice, to conduct examina-
tions under oath, to compel the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence, books, accounts, etc., to punish for con-
tempt, and to delegate his power in these particulars to persons
selected by him to conduct such investigations for him. 51 In
Dayton the city accountant is required to make for the manager
an examination of the accounts of any office vacated by death,
resignation, removal, or the expiration of the incumbent's term.
In Bakersfield, California, it is one of the duties of the manager
to investigate all complaints in regard to public utility services
and to take the steps necessary to correct abuses. The power of
investigation constitutes one of the most essential features of a
managership that is worthy of the title and that aspires to useful
and effective service. It is necessary if the responsibility of the
executive is to be thoroly established.
The control of the manager further extends to the power of
requiring information and reports, either orally or in writing,
from his subordinates and from other municipal officers. Such
reports are expected at stated intervals, and may be demanded on
such other occasions as the manager may direct. Where the
manager is not responsible for the conduct of all the depart-
ments, such as the department of law, the charters sometimes
specify that he may require the submission of opinions or other
data.52
One of the most important duties imposed upon the city man-
ager is the exercise of his power of approval. Matters from the
departments come before him continually, the extent of this
power in actual practice depending, of course, upon the disposi-
so In Hickory, N. 0., the manager is not authorized to investigate the
books of the eity treasurer.
si See the charters of Dayton (See. 50), Springfield (Sec. 88), St. Augus-
tine (Sec. 211), Manistee (Art. 6, Sec. 16), Cadillac (Chap. XI, Sees. 8 and
10).
52 Cf. the charters of St. Augustine (Sees. 35 and 38) and Dayton (Sec.
58).
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tion of the particular individual who is manager. There are
some things, however, with respect to which the charters require
the approval of the chief executive. For example, some cities
provide that he must countersign all vouchers for the payment
of claims against the city, or that he shall countersign and ap-
prove all orders for the purchase or sale of supplies.
53 In Spring-
field, Ohio, contracts in excess of a given sum, usually one hun-
dred, five hundred, or one thousand dollars, are valid only upon
the approval of the manager. Any modification of the terms of a
contract may be effected only with his consent. In Taylor, Texas,
the charter provides that the board of commissioners shall not
act on any matter of administration without first asking the opin-
ion in writing of the city manager, thus making the matter of his
approval or disapproval a consideration of primary importance,
even tho it is not binding upon the legislative organ.
Frequently the manager is, by charter enactment, a member of
important municipal boards or commissions or holds certain of-
fices ex officio. He is one of the three members of the board of
review of assessments and one of the seven trustees of the sink-
ing fund in Dayton. The manager of Springfield is also platting
commissioner and budget commissioner of the city. St. Augus-
tine 's charter evidences the influence of the Dayton plan in that
the manager is made a member of the equalizing board, and as in
Springfield he is also superintendent of plats. In both of the
latter cities he is made the purchasing agent of the city, a prac-
tice that obtains also in Elizabeth City, North Carolina, and in
Montrose, Colorado.
In some of the departments the manager has special powers
and responsibilities. The charter laws very often lay upon the
manager the duty of seeing that the laws and ordinances are
enforced. 5* Thus special emphasis is sometimes laid upon his
sa See the charters of St. Augustine (Sec. 91), Dayton (Sees. 80 and
85), and Amarillo (Chap. XXVI).
s* Cf. Dayton, Charter, Sec. 48 (a) ; Springfield, Charter, Sec. 16(a) ;
Sandusky, Charter, Sec. 16 (a); St. Augustine, Charter, Sec. 33 (a). In
Bakersfield, Calif., the manager must see that the laws and ordinances are
"faithfully enforced by the heads of the departments." Charter, Sec. 36,
Par. 1. In Phoenix, Ariz., the manager shares the duty of enforcing the
ordinances with the mayor. Charter, Chap. VI, Sec. 2.
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control of the department of public safety which includes the
divisions of police and fire protection. In Dayton the manager
determines the composition of these divisions and has the exclu-
sive right to suspend their chiefs pending a hearing by the com-
mission. Cadillac gives its manager exclusive control of the sta-
tioning and transfer of all members of the police and fire forces,
subject only to such rules and regulations as the council may lay
down. Jackson places its manager in "active control" of the
departments of police and fire. The effectiveness of the man-
ager's authority to enforce the laws and ordinances is increased
in Cadillac and Manistee by his power to revoke or suspend
licenses.
The relation of the manager to the department of finance is,
of course, intimate, and his duties in this connection bring him
into close contact with every part of the administration. The
investigation of accounts, the approval of claims, purchases,
sales, and contracts, the revision and equalization of assessments,
and other duties have already been mentioned. In reality, how-
ever, his relation to municipal finance is even more important
than the foregoing would indicate. He must make frequent
reports to the commission and be prepared to inform it regarding
the finances and the future needs of the municipality. These
reports are made weekly in some places, monthly in others, or at
the request of the commission; and annual reports are expected
in all cases. Of greater significance is the work of preparing and
defending the annual budget. 55 This task involves familiarity
with all the details of the city 's finances and an intelligent appre-
ciation of the departmental needs and services. The Dayton
charter provides that the estimates "shall be compiled from
detailed information obtained from the several departments on
uniform blanks to be furnished by the city manager. ' ' In prac-
tically all cases the budget is presented to the council, but in
Bakersfield it is submitted to the auditor.
The miscellaneous duties which the manager is called upon to
perform are almost as imposing in number and variety as those
which pertain to the mayoralty. Charters frequently provide
ss Cf. Dayton, Charter, See. 156 ; Springfield, Charter, Sec. 86 ; also the
charters of Sandusky, Ohio, Manistee and Jackson, Mich., Taylor, Tex., and
the general acts of New York and Virginia.
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that in addition to the duties and functions listed within their
limits the manager shall perform such others as may be required
by ordinance or resolution of the municipal council.58 Many are
specified in the charters that are more or less miscellaneous in
character and of no little importance and interest. In Dayton
and St. Augustine the manager serves notices on property owners
involved in commission resolutions regarding the repair of side-
walks, curbings, and gutters, the vacating of streets, and con-
demnation proceedings. In the latter city he distributes the
rebates due property owners from the unexpended surplus in
special assessment funds. He is required to prepare and display
publicly the plans of proposed improvements, together with data
and information relating to them. Springfield, Bakersfield, and
Montrose expect him to see that the obligations of public utility
corporations operating under franchise grants are faithfully ob-
served. Montrose places in his hands the issuance of building
permits, the care of city tools and property, and the work of
advertising for bids on supplies; Phoenix empowers him to see
to the performance of all contracts; Cadillac entrusts him with
the management of all charitable, correctional, and reformatory
institutions and agencies, the supervision of weights and meas-
ures, the keeping of a "complete and accurate system of vital
statistics and the enforcement of health, sanitary, and quaran-
tine regulations of every kind.
' ' The Iowa general act and the
charters of Cadillac and Jackson lay special emphasis upon his
management and supervision of all public improvements and en-
terprises. Clerical and ministerial duties such as the signing of
all public documents, licenses, contracts, etc., specified by the
commission are enumerated in the charters of Manistee and Cad-
illac. La Grande expects the manager to see that the business
affairs of the corporation are transacted in "a modern scientific
and businesslike manner and the services performed and the
records kept" to be "as nearly as may be like those of an effi-
cient and successful private corporation." In Collinsville, Okla-
homa, he is vested with the judicial power and authority of the
city, and in Cadillac and some other cities he may sign warrants
and cause arrests. To fill the cup of his authority he is occa-
se For example of this blanket provision see Springfield, Charter, Sec
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sionally authorized to
' '
exercise and perform all other executive
and administrative functions and duties" not provided for by
the charter or by the commission. 57
The justification for the concentration of executive and admin-
istrative authority which the manager enjoys is threefold: the
manager is immediately and continuously responsible to the rep-
resentative council; the legislative and administrative functions
of the municipality are separated from each other, and the con-
fusion resulting from a system of checks and balances is elim-
inated
;
58 and the introduction of trained and expert department
heads and of capable employees in subordinate positions is en-
couraged and facilitated. There can be no question but that in
communities where intelligent cooperation, sympathy, and sup-
port are accorded this type of administrative organization the
results achieved tend to compare very favorably with the best
that has hitherto been achieved under either the mayor or the
commission plans. On the other hand the possibility that the
manager form "might prove to be susceptible to perversion in
the interest of a boss in cities with an undeveloped and inactive
public opinion
' ' has led the friends of the manager plan to urge
caution in its adoption and the National Municipal League to
insist that none of the other principal features of the plan be
omitted if the administrative provisions are adopted.59
The Manager and Legislation
The relation of the city manager to legislation is much more
simple than is that of the mayor or the mayor-commissioner. In
the manager plan the council is at once the organ for the deter-
mination of public policy and the judge and critic of the manager
and of his conduct of the administration. It is a restored and
powerful representative body. But despite this renaissance of
the council the manager retains an influence in legislation that
is far from inconspicuous. Tho he enjoys no vote as does the
mayor-commissioner, and no veto as in the case of the mayor, he
finds still open to him the more important and useful avenues of
executive participation in the initiation and enactment of legis-
57 Jackson, Charter, Sec. 33 (f) ; Cadillac, Charter, Chap. XI, Sec. 4.
58 Cf. comment by Manager H. M. Waite of Dayton, quoted in the New
York Times, March 9, 1916.
e A Model City Charter, etc., p. 29, note 12.
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lation. His power to initiate legislation is threefold: he may
call meetings of the council or commission ; he may submit rec-
ommendations
;
and he prepares and submits the annual budget.
His power to call meetings of the council is usually expressed in
the charter and is shared by the mayor or president or by a fixed
number of commissioners. The method of making the call effec-
tive is not always incorporated in the charter provisions, but in
Dayton, St. Augustine, and some other cities, the members of the
council must be served with written notice, either personally or
by messenger at their respective residences at least twelve hours
in advance. In Amarillo, on the other hand, the manager may
call the meetings "at any time deemed advisable." The model
charter of the National Municipal League does not confer this
power on the city manager but leaves the matter of calling special
meetings with the council to be "prescribed by ordinance."
The manager's power to make recommendations is recognized
in the great majority of charters, and in most of them its exercise
is couched in directory language. The form which the recom-
mendations shall take is rarely specified, but in Amarillo they
are to be "in writing." The value of this provision is somewhat
enhanced by the requirement, generally made, that all meetings
shall be public and the privilege of access to the minutes and
records of the council vouchsafed to any citizen.60 The right of
the manager to introduce proposals is not generally provided for
in express terms, but it is frequently the practice to supplement
recommendations with measures already drawn and ready for
consideration and action. This course is provided for in the
charter of Cadillac, the manager being authorized to "draw up
resolutions and ordinances for adoption by the commission ' ' and
to "introduce" them before the commission. Perhaps, however,
the most important function of the manager in connection with
the initiation of legislation is that of submitting the annual
budget. This does not involve the preparation of the annual
appropriation bill, but it does include the recommendations of
the manager as to the amounts to be appropriated, together
"with the reasons therefor." The estimates as prepared and
the manager 's recommendations are open to the inspection of the
public and following the preparation of the appropriation ordi-
eo For example, Dayton, Charter, Sec. 39.
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nance by the commission and prior to its adoption, the ordinance
is published, together with a parallel comparison of the proposals
made by the manager. In some cities as much as ten days must
elapse after publication before the ordinance may be adopted,
and it is obvious that in the majority of cases the council will
hesitate to alter the manager's estimates materially, unless there
be sound reasons for such action.
The power of the manager to participate in the enactment of
legislation is limited to his having a voice in discussions on mat-
ters before the council for consideration. The vote is expressly
denied to him by many charters, thus differentiating him from
most other municipal executives in this country. The right to
be heard is of the utmost importance and is generally bestowed.61
Exception to the manager's presence when the council is con-
sidering his removal is made in the model charter proposed by
the National Municipal League, but this document goes further
than those already in operation in that it provides that the man-
ager may meet with all sessions of council committees as well as
with the council, and may discuss with such committees matters
under consideration by them. In Taylor, Texas, the board of
commissioners may not act on measures which affect administra-
tion without first securing the written opinion of the manager.
From whatever angle one may view this power of making his
opinions known, whether in oral discussion or in written state-
ments, one must recognize its potency. The manager's intimate
knowledge of conditions, his grasp of the effect of measures and
policies upon all branches of the public service, and the experi-
ence which he will in time have acquired in the organization and
presentation of his material cannot fail to gain for his opinions a
degree of recognition and a measure of approval which will rival
the success of even the strongest mayors. The manager's attend-
ance upon all meetings of the commission is almost always made
one of his duties. His presence operates to make him an active
and influential factor in legislation, especially where his record
in the service of the municipality has won for him the respect
and loyalty of the community. His judgment will rarely be con-
sidered lightly.
6i Cf. charters of Dayton, Springfield, Cadillac, Jackson, St. Augustine,
Montrose, Amarillo, for examples of the bestowal of the right of discussion.
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Conclusions
There is no doubt but that the- manager plan is firmly estab-
lished in this country as one of the three main types of city gov-
ernment. Of course it is altogether too early to judge of its
ultimate place in the municipal life of American cities. Under
unfavorable conditions it has registered a record of success and
an increase in efficiency that has commanded for it the attention
and respect of all who are interested in the improvement of city
government and politics. Not all of the problems that are called
into being by the appearance of the expert executive have been
solved. His relation to the commission has been easier to outline
in charter law than to establish in practice and will ultimately be
defined only under the pressure of experience. To keep the man-
ager in the background and out of politics and the commission in
the foreground where the public eye may follow its every act will
be a most difficult and persistent undertaking. The development
and maintenance of the active and intelligent public interest in
governmental affairs that is essential to the success of the man-
ager plan as well as to any other will be achieved only by degrees.
Yet despite these and other difficulties the city manager plan is
undoubtedly of great promise. It has been received with en-
thusiasm by students of political theory as embracing sound
principles of government organization. Its entry into the field
of city government has been opportune. It has the endorsement
of the National Municipal League in its model charter. Already
its impact has been felt by the older forms of organization. The
administrative system which it incorporates seems to be capable
of indefinite development and expansion and therefore qualified
to be successfully applied in the large cities, thus coming into
effective competition with the mayor system at the point where
the commission plan has made the least impression.
The advocates of the respective executive types described in
this work are not wanting either in arguments or in enthusiasm.
Especially is this true of the commission and the manager plans.
It is hardly to be expected, however, that the enthusiasm for a
product of long and evolutionary development, such as the mayor
plan, could rival that displayed in behalf of plans of more recent
devising, lacking as they are in records of conspicuous failure.
On the one hand it is said that "there should be no mayor of the
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old-fashioned sort,
"
a
"
chief official having both deliberative and
executive powers, and elected at the polls" "he should not
exist.
' ' 62 On the other it is said that under commission govern-
ment there ' ' would often be found one man who would dominate
. . ." and that the "tendency, therefore, is strongly toward
one-man government,
' '
government by a
' '
city autocrat.
' ' 63
From another work one learns that the tendency of commission
government to invest the elective official
' '
with active managerial
functions is an unwise inclination toward the Jacksonian doc-
trine of the popular election of administrative officials.
' ' 6* The
principal objections to the manager form are that it does not
admit that there are "good men in every locality capable of
administering the government of the city,"65 and that it pre-
sumes standards of public life and citizen activity that do not
obtain in the average city. As to the validity of these views
regarding the municipal chief executive the reader is left to
judge. The writer views with favor and hopefulness the future
spread of the manager type, the expert executive responsible to
a representative council. Certain it is, however, that no revolu-
tion is impending that will sweep away the mayoralty or the
mayor-commissionership. In the evolution of municipal democ-
racy toward higher ideals and nobler achievements in govern-
ment, the type of executive organization which proves fit will
survive and endure
;
and in a world which bears witness to the
adaptability and permanence of differing forms of governmental
organization it would be idle to prophesy the ultimate passing
of any one of the three types studied in the preceding pages.
Bather, one may reasonably expect that each of them will, under
varying conditions, and with divers modifications, develop into
agencies adequate for the tasks, responsibilities, and purposes
with which they are charged.
62 ' ' The City Manager Plan with Proportional Representation, otherwise
called The Representative Council Plan," by C. G. Hoag. Found in Beard,
Digest of Short Ballot Charters, p. 21305.
s Eeport of the Royal Commission on Municipal Government, British
Columbia, 1912, published at Victoria, 1913, p. 6.
6* Eyan, Oswald, Municipal Freedom, a Study of the Commission Govern-
ment (New York, 1915), p. 99.
65 Toulmin, H. A., The City Manager, A New Profession (New York.
1915), pp. 262, 263.
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President of council. See council
Presiding officer, mayor, 64, 128;
mayor-commissioner, 196 ; city
manager, 201
Primary, direct, 44, 45, 48ff , 72, 184 ;
party, 44, 48ff; closed, 48; open,
49
Property qualification of mayor, 41;
of mayor-commissioner, 183
Providence, B. I., 90, 124, 153, 158
Publicity and efficiency commission,
96
Public safety, 102ff
Qualifications, for mayor, 37ff; for
mayor-commissioner, 183; for city
manager, 205
Qualified voters, 49. See veto
Qualifying election, 184
Quiney, Josiah, 25ff, 73, 76, 95, 125,
140, 165, 179
Quiney, Mass., 117, 121, 131, 132
Recall, of mayor, 52, 57ff ; of mayor-
commissioner, 186; of city mana-
ger, 200, 207ff; of officers, 87,
90. See election, petition
Recommendations to council. See
reports, message
Registration, of voters, 49, 208
Reinsch, 94
Removal, of mayor, 52ff, 67, 72; of
mayor-commissioner, 186; of city
manager, 200, 207. See council,
courts, governor, impeachment, re-
call, and below
Removal, power of mayor, 30, 31,
87ff, 112; of council, 53ff, 90, 93,
189ff, 207; of mayor-commission-
er, 192, 196 ; of city manager, 211 ;
of governor, 52, 56ff
Reports, mayor, 98ff, 121; of may-
or-commissioner, 196; of city
manager, 201, 216, 219
Residence, of mayor, 37ff, 44; of
mayor-commissioner, 183; of city
manager, 205
Responsibility, of voters, 46 ; of may-
or, 32ff, 73ff
Ripper legislation, 150, 152
Roberts, Don, 55, 165
Rochester, 38, 39, 42, 55, 64, 65, 95,
100, 132, 144
Rolph, James, Jr., 55, 111, 178
Roosevelt, 158
Root, Elihu, 73
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Eowe, L. S., Ill
Eoyal Commission on Municipal
Government of Province of Brit-
ish Columbia, 182, 194, 222
Eyan, Oswald, 222
Safety, public, 102ff
Salary, of mayor, 67ff; of mayor-
commissioner, 189ff; of city man-
ager, 201, 209
Salem, Mass., 50, 195
Salpulpa, Okla., 196
San Diego, Calif., 196
Sandusky, Ohio, 200, 205, 207, 210,
212, 215, 216
San Francisco, 38, 41, 43, 49, 55,
59, 65, 68, 71, 75, 76, 80, 88, 92,
93, 99, 102, 103, 104, 120, 128,
133, 135, 165. See Eolph
San Jose, Calif., 200, 210
Schmitz, Eugene, 165
Scranton, Pa., 54, 80
Seattle, 41, 48, 53, 54, 59, 64, 65,
67, 72, 80, 102, 103, 106, 116, 120,
121, 124, 129, 132, 133, 135. See
Cotterill
Sehon, John, 122
Selective veto. See veto
Separation of powers, 28, 117
Sheriff, 22, 102, 203
Sherman, Texas, 200, 203
Signature, to petitions, 46, 208; pow-
er of, 109, 131ff, 196
Sikes, George C., 204
Smith, Wm., 22
Somerville, Mass., 121, 131
South Carolina, 22
South Dakota, 39
Spokane, 184, 185, 187, 188
Springfield, Ohio, 200, 202, 203, 205,
207, 210, 214, 215, 216, 217, 220
St. Augustine, Fla., 200, 205, 206,
207, 209, 210, 211, 214, 215, 217,
219, 220
St. Louis, Mo., 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 53,
59, 61, 64, 65, 69, 70, 71, 80, 81,
89, 93, 96, 98, 99, 100, 102, 104,
105, 106, 107, 109, 117, 120, 125,
127, 130, 131, 132, 133, 135, 144, -
162
St. Paul, Minn., 48, 50, 51, 183, 188,
190, 191, 192, 193, 194,. 196
Stanwood, Edward, 45
Staunton, Va., 204
Steffens, Lincoln, 167, 168
Succession, of mayor, 42; of city
manager, 208. See vacancy
Suffrage, 40, 44
Sumptuary legislation, 107, 108
Sumter, S. C., 204, 205, 206, 207
Superior, Wis., 87, 92, 98
Suspension, power of, 92ff, 193, 207,
211
Suspensive veto. See veto
Sweitzer, 160
Tacoma, 75, 95
Taft, W. H., 158
Taylor, Texas, 206, 207, 208, 209,
210, 215, 216, 220
Tennessee, 45, 52, 133
Term, of mayor, 31, 61ff, 72; of
mayor-commissioner, 187, 191; of
city manager, 200, 208
Terre Haute, Indiana, 55, 91, 165
Texas, 38, 39, 134, 195, 196, 205
Thompson, Wm. B., 178, 179
Thompson, Wm. Hale, 82, 160
Thum, Wm., 122
Tie. See vote
Tiedeman, George W., 122
Timanus, mayor, 153
Toledo, Ohio, 32, 50, 51, 80, 87, 88,
89, 96, 97, 99, 101, 102, 104, 105,
118, 125, 127, 130, 135. See Sam-
uel Jones, Whitlock
Toulmin, H. A., 204, 222
Tulsa, Okla., 196
Tyler, Texas, 207, 208, 209, 210
Tyson, Eobert, 186
Utah, 45, 187
Utica, N. Y., 68, 130
Utterback, J. G., 122
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Vacancy, of mayor, 63ff; of mayor-
commissioner, 187ff, 191; of eity
manager, 201, 209
Van Wyck, 62, 159
Veto
Absolute, 29, 136ff
Of city manager, 201, 218
Of governor, 147
Of mayor, 24, 29, 32, 131ff, 144ff
Of mayor-commissioner, 196ff
Pocket, 134ff, 143
Qualified, 29, 134, 135ff, 196
Selective, 29, 32, 134, 135, 196
Suspensive, 134, 144ff, 196
Threat of, 137
Virginia, 22, 55, 56, 200, 210, 216
Vote
Of mayor, 130, 131; of mayor-
commissioner, 185, 197; of city
manager, 201, 218, 220; of com-
missions, 186
For removal of mayor, 53; of
mayor-commissioner, 186 ; of
city manager, 208; of officers,
89ff, 93
Tie, 51, 128, 130, 197, 201
See election, removal
Waco, Texas, 189
Waite, H. M., 212, 213, 218
Waltham, Mass., 90
Water department, 103ff
Weaver, John, 151
West Virginia, 52
Wheeling, W. Va., 202, 210, 213
White, 152
Whitlock, Brand, 32, 102, 104, 111,
155, 158, 162, 167ff, 176, 178, 179
Whitman, governor, 147
Willis, governor, 57
Wilmington, Del., 184
Wilmington, N. C., 185, 188, 190,
192, 193, 198
Wilson, Clifford B., 141, 142
Wilson, mayor (Chicago), 154
Wisconsin, 49, 53, 62, 64, 65, 121,
129, 130, 135, 186
Witnesses, 95ff, 193
Woodruff, C. E., 194
Worcester, Mass., 90
Young, Mrs., 143
Youngstown, Ohio, 201, 202, 205, 206
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